Boggis v. City of Moorhead

Background

On November 3, 2019, Moorhead Police Officers Jonathan Hanson and Tanner Hennen responded to a 911 call reporting two apparently intoxicated men who had been fighting — but were no longer physically fighting — in an apartment building hallway. When officers arrived, they found four residents at the end of the hallway. One matched the description of a man involved in the fight: Todd Boggis, who was seated on the floor.

Hanson asked the uninvolved witnesses to move away so he could speak with Boggis. Boggis was agitated, claimed he lived in the hallway of the building, and demanded Hanson's name, badge number, and training details. As Hanson questioned him, Boggis said he had been jumped by the other men. A woman nearby sarcastically disputed this. According to Hanson, Boggis then ran toward the woman and bystanders, disregarding Hanson's verbal commands to stop. Boggis says he was running toward the door of his own apartment, which was in the same direction.

Hanson ran after Boggis and wrapped his arms around Boggis's midsection, bringing him to the ground. Hanson acknowledged that his bodyweight landed on Boggis in the process. Immediately after the takedown, Boggis complained of knee pain. A medical examination revealed a fracture in his right femur. Boggis testified that he has been unable to walk unassisted since, has required multiple surgeries, and suffers daily pain.

Boggis filed his complaint on October 14, 2022, asserting five counts. By the time of Defendants' summary judgment motion, Boggis conceded that discovery supported summary judgment against him on Count II (a § 1983 claim against officers other than Hanson) and Count V (a negligence claim against responding officers). The remaining counts were: Count I (§ 1983 excessive-force claim against Hanson), and Counts III and IV (assault and battery under Minnesota law against Hanson).

Legal Framework: Summary Judgment

Summary judgment (a ruling issued without a trial) is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact — meaning no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on the evidence presented. The court views all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party (here, Boggis). The party opposing summary judgment cannot merely rely on allegations; it must point to specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

Count I: Section 1983 Excessive-Force Claim — Qualified Immunity

Legal Standard

42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue state or local government officials for violating their constitutional rights. Here, Boggis alleged that Hanson violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable (excessive) force.

Qualified immunity is a defense that shields government officers from § 1983 liability unless their conduct violated a "clearly established" constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Officers are not liable for misjudgments in legally uncertain situations; they are only liable for crossing clear legal lines.

To overcome a qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must show both: (1) that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct — meaning prior case law placed the constitutional question "beyond debate." The court may address either prong first and need not address both.

Analysis

The court agreed with Boggis that the Fourth Amendment secures the right to be free from unreasonable force as a general matter. However, the court held that this general proposition does not constitute clearly established law sufficient to defeat qualified immunity in the specific circumstances here — namely, that Boggis was running toward bystanders in an apparently threatening manner and had disobeyed an officer's commands to stop.

The court found that multiple Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions (binding authority in this district) supported Hanson's conduct:

- Hosea v. City of St. Paul, 867 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2017): Affirmed the use of a tackle similar to Hanson's where the plaintiff posed a threat to a nearby individual and disobeyed commands. - Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2017): Held that a takedown was objectively reasonable where the plaintiff ignored commands and continued walking past the officer. - Additional cases supporting force against suspects running from officers or threatening others: Ledbetter v. Helmers (2025), McDaniel v. Neal (2022), Kelsay v. Ernst (2019).

Boggis relied on Stockton v. Auren, a 2008 federal district court case in which a court denied summary judgment on an excessive-force claim involving an arm-bar takedown. The court rejected this reliance because Stockton involved a plaintiff who was "docile throughout the entire encounter," stood still, never attempted to flee, and posed no threat to others — facts the court found meaningfully distinguishable from Boggis's situation.

The court also cited a line of Eighth Circuit cases finding excessive force where the plaintiff was "nonviolent," "nonthreatening," "not fleeing," and "not resisting" — all factually distinguishable from Boggis, who the court found was running toward bystanders and disobeying commands.

Holding on Count I

Because the case law Boggis cited was distinguishable, and because several analogous cases permitted Hanson's conduct, Boggis failed to show that the constitutional question was "beyond debate." Therefore, Hanson is protected by qualified immunity, and the court granted summary judgment on Count I. The court did not reach the question of whether Hanson's use of force actually violated Boggis's Fourth Amendment rights (the first prong), because it resolved the matter on the second prong (clearly established law) alone.

Counts III and IV: State-Law Assault and Battery — Official Immunity

Legal Standard

Under Minnesota law, the doctrine of official immunity shields police officers from civil suits for conduct occurring in the course of their official duties when those duties require the exercise of judgment or discretion — unless the officer acted "willfully or maliciously." For this purpose, malice is defined as the "willful violation of a known right" — an objective standard focused on whether the officer violated a right they knew existed, not on subjective ill will.

Analysis

Both parties agreed that the takedown was a discretionary act. The dispute was whether Hanson acted with malice. The court noted that the official immunity analysis under Minnesota law closely mirrors the qualified immunity analysis under federal law in cases like this one, citing Yang v. City of Brooklyn Park and other authority.

For the same reasons that Hanson did not violate a "clearly established" federal constitutional right, the court found Boggis could not show Hanson violated a "known right" under Minnesota's official immunity standard. Therefore, Hanson is protected by official immunity from the assault and battery claims.

Because Hanson is entitled to official immunity, the City of Moorhead — which could only be liable on a theory of vicarious liability (legal responsibility for an employee's actions) — is also immune. When an officer's discretionary conduct is protected by official immunity, the employing government entity cannot be held vicariously liable.

Holding on Counts III and IV

The court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Counts III and IV.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in full. The matter was dismissed without prejudice.