Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:25-cv-01003
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 5
In Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone, Judge Bryan dismissed with prejudice a prisoner's petition seeking early release credits, finding a 1998 immigration removal order disqualified him.
Federal prisoners who are subject to final immigration removal orders and are seeking to apply First Step Act time credits toward early release. This ruling confirms that the statutory bar on FTCs applies regardless of whether the prisoner's country of origin has a deportation treaty with the United States.
What happened
Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone involves Buon Rattanavong, a federal prisoner at FCI Sandstone in Minnesota serving a 240-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, who filed a petition for a court order (under 28 U.S.C. § 2241) claiming the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) wrongly refused to apply First Step Act time credits (FTCs) to his sentence. The First Step Act allows eligible prisoners to earn credits that can reduce their time in custody, but federal law bars applying those credits to any prisoner subject to a final immigration removal order. The BOP declined to give Rattanavong FTCs because he is subject to such an order; Rattanavong argued the order should not count because Laos — his country of origin — has no deportation treaty with the United States.
A federal magistrate judge reviewed the petition and recommended denying it, concluding that the statute barring FTCs for prisoners under a final removal order contains no exception for countries without deportation treaties. Rattanavong objected, first arguing there was insufficient evidence that a valid removal order existed, and second arguing that a 2001 legal filing had vacated any prior removal order. In response, the government produced a copy of a December 1998 immigration court removal order and a sworn statement from an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer explaining that the 2001 filing vacated only civil document-fraud penalty orders — not the removal order itself.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan overruled Rattanavong's objections, adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The court found the December 1998 removal order valid and still in effect, and agreed that under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), Rattanavong is ineligible for First Step Act time credits as long as he remains subject to that order.
The detailed version
- Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone · No. 0:25-cv-01003
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
- July 23, 2025
Background
Petitioner Buon Rattanavong is a self-represented federal prisoner at FCI Sandstone in Sandstone, Minnesota. He is serving a 240-month (20-year) sentence following a conviction in the Western District of Missouri for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine (United States v. Vong, No. 06-CR-0408). His projected release date is May 2026.
Rattanavong filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order challenging the legality of one's imprisonment or custody conditions) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) unlawfully refused to apply First Step Act time credits (FTCs) to his sentence. FTCs are earned credits under the First Step Act of 2018 that eligible prisoners can accumulate and apply toward early release or transfer to supervised release.
The Statutory Bar
Federal law at 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) provides that a prisoner is ineligible to apply FTCs if the prisoner "is the subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws of the Immigration and Nationality Act." The BOP cited this provision as the reason it declined to apply FTCs to Rattanavong's sentence, noting that he is subject to a final order of removal.
Rattanavong's central legal theory was that the removal-order disqualification should not apply to him because Laos — his country of origin — does not have a deportation treaty with the United States, meaning he cannot actually be removed there. He argued, therefore, that the removal order should be treated as a nullity for purposes of the FTC eligibility rule. Notably, the court observed that Rattanavong raised no legal authority in support of this theory and did not object to the magistrate judge's conclusion that the statute contains no such exception.
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on April 3, 2025, recommending denial of the petition. The magistrate judge concluded that (1) the BOP records submitted with the petition showed Rattanavong was subject to a removal order, and (2) § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) makes no exception for individuals whose countries of origin lack a deportation treaty with the United States.
Rattanavong's Objections
Rattanavong filed two objections to the R&R:
Objection 1 — Insufficient Evidence of a Removal Order
Rattanavong argued the record before the magistrate judge lacked sufficient documentation to establish that he was actually subject to a final removal order, and that the magistrate judge should have ordered the government to produce such documentation before issuing the R&R.
In response, the government submitted a declaration from a BOP case manager attaching a December 1998 document signed by an immigration judge ordering Rattanavong's removal from the United States, as well as an affidavit from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Peter Fellenz, who attested that the December 1998 document is a true and correct copy of a final order of removal issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a at the conclusion of removal proceedings.
The court noted that Rattanavong argued the December 1998 document should be disregarded because it was not presented to the magistrate judge before the R&R issued, but the court found no legal authority barring consideration of supplemental evidence during de novo review of an R&R, and pointed to the District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.2(b)(3) permitting courts to receive further evidence when resolving objections. The court found no procedural error by the magistrate judge in not independently requiring the government to produce the documentation.
Objection 2 — Removal Order Vacated
Rattanavong argued that a 2001 notice of vacatur filed in his immigration proceedings had vacated the December 1998 removal order. The court rejected this argument based on Officer Fellenz's averment that the 2001 notice vacated only "274C Orders" — orders relating to civil penalties imposed when an immigration judge finds a person engaged in document fraud — not the removal order itself. On its face, the notice of vacatur stated it vacated only orders arising from "the Service's implementation of the civil document fraud provisions of section 374C of the Immigration and Nationality Act," not removal orders.
Holding
Judge Bryan conducted de novo review (independent review from scratch, not deferential to the magistrate judge) of the portions of the R&R to which Rattanavong objected, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court also applied the rule of liberal construction to Rattanavong's filings as a self-represented litigant.
The court overruled both objections, adopted the R&R in full, and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The court concluded that Rattanavong remains subject to a valid, unvacated December 1998 final order of removal, and that 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) therefore renders him ineligible for First Step Act time credits.
Disposition
The petition was dismissed with prejudice. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.