Horoschak v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.

Background

David Horoschak, Michael Harris, and Mills Staylor sued on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated people, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiffs were former Sirius XM employees, had each worked there for more than a decade, and were each over 40 when their employment ended in 2024.

Sirius XM said the plaintiffs’ employment ended as part of a February 2024 reduction in force that eliminated about 160 roles, or approximately 3% of the workforce. The plaintiffs argued that the reduction in force was a cover for age discrimination. They alleged that company leadership had promoted hiring younger employees, that the company’s chief technology officer said in May 2022 that it intended to recruit younger employees, and that the plaintiffs later experienced negative reviews, marginalization, and replacement by younger employees.

The plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of an Age Discrimination in Employment Act collective action. Their proposed group was described inconsistently: one definition covered all Sirius XM employees over 40 whose employment separated since February 12, 2024, while another covered employees over 40 whose employment ended since 2022. The plaintiffs submitted only the email announcing the February 2024 reduction in force and did not submit declarations, affidavits, or other supporting evidence.

Legal standard

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act incorporates the Fair Labor Standards Act’s collective-action procedures. Under the first step of the two-step process used in the Second Circuit, a court may conditionally certify a collective action and facilitate notice if the plaintiffs make a “modest factual showing” that they and potential participants were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.

The court emphasized that the burden at this stage is low but not nonexistent. Unsupported assertions and conclusory allegations are not enough. The plaintiffs must provide evidence showing that potential participants were similarly situated with respect to the alleged unlawful policy or practice.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the plaintiffs did not make the required factual showing. They asserted that Sirius XM had a companywide plan to discriminate against older employees, but they supported those assertions with no declarations, affidavits, or other evidence of evidentiary value.

The court also found that the chief technology officer’s alleged statement about recruiting younger employees did not establish a connection to the plaintiffs’ terminations 20 months later, much less to the employment decisions involving other employees. The statement therefore did not support an inference of a companywide policy or plan for purposes of conditional certification.

The inconsistent definitions of the proposed collective created an additional problem because the court could not determine clearly which employees the plaintiffs claimed were similarly situated. The proposed collective was also broad, increasing the plaintiffs’ burden to show that a discriminatory policy or plan affected the relevant employment-separation decisions.

Finally, the court considered differences identified by Sirius XM among potential collective members. Only some employees reported to the chief technology officer; only some ended their employment through termination; some signed releases waiving age-discrimination claims; some signed arbitration agreements containing collective-action waivers; and some claims might be time-barred. The court said these differences further undermined the plaintiffs’ showing of common proof.

Ruling

The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet the modest factual showing required for conditional certification. It DENIED the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of a collective action and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion, ECF No. 19. The court did not decide the merits of the plaintiffs’ individual age-discrimination claims.