Pyron v. Johnston
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:24-cv-04051
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 22
In Pyron v. Johnston, Judge Bryan dismissed all claims by four civilly committed individuals challenging restrictions on their JPay electronic devices at a Minnesota sex offender treatment facility.
Individuals who are civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program and who use or seek to use JPay electronic devices and services while confined. The ruling also affects private companies contracting with state institutions, clarifying that such contracts alone do not make a private company liable as a government actor under federal civil rights law.
What happened
In Pyron v. Johnston (No. 24-CV-04051), four self-represented individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) sued program officials and JPay LLC, a private company that provides electronic devices and entertainment services to confined persons. The plaintiffs alleged that MSOP policies limiting their access to JPay features — such as two-way email, newer device models, and uncensored music — violated their First Amendment, due process, and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. They also sought an emergency court order to prevent JPay kiosks from being removed from their facility.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were legally insufficient. The state officials argued they were shielded from money damages by the Eleventh Amendment (which generally bars federal lawsuits seeking money from state officials acting in their official roles), that no individual official was sufficiently tied to the alleged wrongdoing, and that the MSOP's policies did not violate any constitutional right. JPay argued it was a private company, not a government actor, and therefore could not be held liable under the civil rights law the plaintiffs invoked.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted both motions to dismiss in full and denied the emergency restraining order as moot. The court found that money damages against state officials in their official roles were barred, that the complaint failed to connect any individual official to specific unconstitutional acts, and that the MSOP's device and content restrictions did not rise to the level of constitutional violations. The court also concluded that JPay was not a state actor and that the complaint consistently blamed state officials — not JPay — for the challenged policies.
The detailed version
- Pyron v. Johnston · No. 0:24-cv-04051
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
- July 25, 2025
Background
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) provides sex-offender treatment to individuals who have been civilly committed under Minnesota law. Four civilly committed individuals — Allen L. Pyron, Raymond L. Semler, Joe Bellanger, and Thomas Bolter — brought this self-represented (pro se) lawsuit challenging MSOP policies governing their access to JPay devices and services. JPay is a private company that contracts with institutions to provide confined persons with electronic devices capable of email, music downloads, educational content, and other pay-to-use features.
Plaintiffs alleged that in June 2014, the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), through the state defendants, entered into a contract with JPay. Despite the contract's potential for full-featured device access, MSOP policies allegedly restricted clients to: (1) one-way email only (they could receive but not send to the general public); (2) older JPay device models because newer ones use lithium batteries that violate MSOP policy; (3) no retention of JPay devices purchased while previously incarcerated in Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities; and (4) censored music, including three songs from a Taylor Swift album that were unavailable via JPay even though the full album could be purchased at retail stores. Plaintiffs also alleged that DOC inmates received full JPay capabilities, while MSOP clients did not.
Plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — the federal civil rights law that allows suits against state officials for constitutional violations — asserting violations of the First Amendment (free speech and association), the Fifth Amendment (due process), and the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process). They sought both money damages and injunctive relief requiring access to full JPay capabilities. They also moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent removal of JPay kiosks from their facility.
The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Eleventh Amendment Bar on Money Damages
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars federal lawsuits for money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities. The court found that the State of Minnesota had not waived this immunity and had not consented to suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed all claims against the state defendants in their official capacities to the extent plaintiffs sought money damages. The court noted, however, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar money damages against state officials sued in their individual (personal) capacities.
Lack of Personal Involvement by Individual Defendants
Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on a supervisor's general oversight role (no vicarious liability). A supervising official can be liable only if they directly participated in a constitutional violation or their failure to train or supervise caused the violation.
The court reviewed the specific allegations against each state defendant:
- Johnston (CEO of MSOP): Plaintiffs alleged only that she signed a policy in June 2018 about client notification of electronic communications rules. Plaintiffs did not allege this policy was itself unconstitutional or tie her to any other specific wrongful act. - Johnson, Kneisel, and Moser (facility-level officials): Plaintiffs alleged they attended meetings in 2014 and 2018 at which clients raised concerns about JPay restrictions. Plaintiffs did not allege these officials took any unconstitutional action at or after those meetings, or that they had the authority or obligation to remedy the issues. - Stevens (Acquisition Management Specialist/Buyer, Department of Administration): Plaintiffs alleged he signed the 2014 JPay contract and that he knew the limitations were unconstitutional but continued them anyway. The court found these allegations amounted only to contract execution, not creation of the allegedly unconstitutional MSOP policies.
Because none of the allegations specifically implicated any individual state defendant in unconstitutional conduct, the court dismissed all individual-capacity claims.
Constitutional Claims on the Merits (Official-Capacity Injunctive Relief)
First Amendment
Courts have recognized that individuals civilly committed as dangerous persons retain constitutional rights, but those rights are considerably more limited than those of free citizens. Restrictions at civil commitment facilities are permissible if they bear a rational relationship to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests, the person has alternative means to exercise the right, and accommodating the right would strain resources or security.
The court found that prior Eighth Circuit and District of Minnesota precedent characterizes MSOP restrictions on outside vendor access and electronics as "de minimis" (minimal enough to not trigger constitutional concern). Courts in this district have specifically held that MSOP's limitations on computer, email, and internet access raise no constitutional concerns. The court therefore dismissed all First Amendment claims related to the two-way email restrictions and device-type policies.
As for the censored Taylor Swift songs, the court acknowledged that content-based censorship does implicate the First Amendment. However, plaintiffs failed to allege that the restriction was substantial or that they lacked alternative means — and indeed, plaintiffs themselves alleged they could purchase the full album at Walmart. The court also noted prior approval of MSOP's limitations on certain content as reasonably related to therapeutic and security interests.
Fifth Amendment Due Process
The Fifth Amendment's due process protections apply only to actions by the federal government. Because plaintiffs sued only state officials and a private contractor — not any federal actor — their Fifth Amendment claims were dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show a protected property or liberty interest. The court found no federal or state law creating a property right for MSOP clients to possess particular electronics or digital content. For substantive due process, only conduct that is "egregious" and "shocks the conscience" in a constitutional sense qualifies. The court found the MSOP's device and content policies do not meet that standard.
Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly situated individuals be treated alike. Plaintiffs argued they were treated worse than DOC inmates regarding JPay access. The court held that MSOP clients and DOC inmates are not similarly situated: DOC houses individuals serving criminal sentences, while MSOP houses and treats civilly committed sex offenders under a different legal framework with distinct therapeutic and security concerns. Even plaintiffs' own complaint quoted MSOP officials explaining that the two programs operate under different governing bodies and have different security concerns. Further, plaintiffs did not allege any invidious or discriminatory purpose behind the differential treatment — only that DOC inmates received more JPay features.
JPay's Motion to Dismiss
Section 1983 liability requires that the defendant be a "state actor" — a government body or someone acting "under color of law" (under the authority of the government). JPay is a private company. The court acknowledged one exception: a private party may be treated as a state actor if it "willfully participates in joint activity" with the state such that its conduct is "fairly attributable" to the state. This requires showing the state delegated traditionally exclusive state powers to the private party, a willful joint activity with the state, or pervasive entwinement between the private entity and the state.
The court found that merely contracting with the state is insufficient to make a private party a state actor. Plaintiffs' own complaint repeatedly stated that the state defendants — not JPay — "implemented, retained and carried out" the challenged policies. Plaintiffs alleged that "JPay implemented what MSOP Defendants wanted," which the court characterized as a legal conclusion unsupported by factual allegations about any joint decision-making. JPay did not make decisions about which devices facilities could use. Accordingly, the court dismissed all claims against JPay.
Temporary Restraining Order
Because all claims against all defendants were dismissed, the court denied plaintiffs' TRO motion as moot.
Disposition
The State Defendants' and JPay's motions to dismiss were granted. Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot.
Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.