Imhof v. New York CIty Housing Authority

Background

John Imhof, an employee of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), brought disability-discrimination claims against NYCHA and three individuals associated with the agency. His claims included alleged disparate treatment, retaliation, a hostile work environment, and failure to provide accommodations under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

Daniel Sherrod was a federal Department of Housing and Urban Development employee who was temporarily detailed to NYCHA under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. The opinion states that he served at NYCHA during two periods in 2022 and that Imhof alleged Sherrod became NYCHA’s Chief Operating Officer. Imhof was not a federal employee.

After limited discovery about Sherrod’s federal employment status, Sherrod moved for summary judgment on Imhof’s NYCHRL claims against him individually. Summary judgment is a decision entered when the moving party shows that no genuine dispute of important fact exists and that the law entitles that party to judgment.

Rehabilitation Act argument

Sherrod argued that the Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive remedy for disability discrimination in federal employment and therefore preempts, or displaces, Imhof’s NYCHRL claims against him. The court agreed with the general proposition that the Rehabilitation Act is the exclusive remedy for disability-discrimination claims brought by federal employees covered by that statute.

The court nevertheless rejected Sherrod’s argument as applied to Imhof. Because Imhof was not a federal employee and was not covered by the Rehabilitation Act’s federal-employment provisions, the court found no basis to conclude that Congress intended the Act to eliminate alternative remedies available to him. The court therefore held that Sherrod was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the Rehabilitation Act preempted Imhof’s NYCHRL claims.

Westfall Act argument

Sherrod also argued that the Westfall Act protected him from personal liability, required substitution of the United States as the defendant, and required dismissal because Imhof had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Westfall Act generally provides federal employees immunity from covered common-law tort claims arising from acts within the scope of federal employment and can require such claims to proceed against the United States instead.

The court focused on Second Circuit precedent stating that the Westfall Act applies to tort claims, not discrimination claims under New York State and New York City human-rights laws. Although the court recognized that Sherrod’s argument had some force under the statutory language and that the NYCHRL claims sought damages including emotional distress, it concluded that it was required to follow the Second Circuit’s approach.

The court applied the Second Circuit’s method of looking to New York law to determine whether the claims constituted “personal injury” for purposes of the Westfall Act. It relied particularly on New York decisions holding that human-rights discrimination claims are statutory claims rather than tort claims or personal-injury claims under statutes governing tort actions against government entities. The court therefore held that the Westfall Act did not apply and that substitution of the United States was not required.

Disposition

Judge John P. Cronan denied Sherrod’s motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of Court was directed to close Docket Number 105. The opinion addresses only Sherrod’s motion and the two legal grounds he raised; it does not decide whether Imhof ultimately proves the alleged discrimination.