Erickson v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation

Background

Bridget Erickson and Erica Stevenson purchased Huggies Simply Clean Fragrance Free Baby Wipes. They alleged that testing of a representative sample found PFAS at 305 parts per trillion. The packaging described the wipes as “simply clean,” “hypoallergenic,” “dermatologically tested,” “alcohol free,” and “paraben free,” and also described them as “plant-based,” with an asterisk stating “70%+ by weight.”

Plaintiffs alleged that Kimberly-Clark’s failure to disclose PFAS made the product’s advertising misleading. They asserted claims under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law; a breach-of-express-warranty claim; and an unjust-enrichment claim. The case was brought as a proposed nationwide and California class action.

Kimberly-Clark moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. The court also granted Kimberly-Clark’s unopposed request for judicial notice of certain public documents and government-webpage materials.

Court’s reasoning

Consumer-protection claims

The court analyzed the claims under the reasonable-consumer test, which asks whether an advertisement is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. Because the claims sounded in fraud, the complaint also had to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires specific details about the alleged misconduct and why the statements were misleading.

The court rejected the theory that “plant-based” plausibly represented that the wipes contained no synthetic ingredients. The prominent “70%+ by weight” qualification indicated that the product was not entirely plant-based. The court also concluded that similar terms such as “natural” or “filtered” do not necessarily promise the complete absence of chemicals.

The court found that the combined packaging statements could plausibly suggest that the wipes were free from harmful or toxic ingredients. But plaintiffs still had to allege, with sufficient specificity, that the amount of PFAS in the wipes was harmful or toxic. The court concluded they had not done so. The cited exposure levels concerned PFOA and PFOS in drinking water, plaintiffs did not allege that either substance was present in the wipes, and they did not explain why those water levels applied to a product used on skin. Allegations about infants’ vulnerability to chemicals did not fill that gap.

The court also rejected both omission theories. Plaintiffs did not allege that the wipes were labeled “PFAS-free,” so the PFAS omission was not contrary to a representation actually made. Plaintiffs also failed to plausibly allege that PFAS affected the wipes’ central function, such as preventing the wipes from being used or impairing their cleaning function. The court distinguished concerns about product safety from effects on a product’s central function and noted that plaintiffs had not advanced an adequately supported unreasonable-safety-hazard theory.

The court dismissed the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and fraudulent-prong Unfair Competition Law claims. It also dismissed the Unfair Competition Law claims under the unlawful and unfair prongs. The unlawful-prong claims lacked a predicate legal violation after the other claims failed. The unfair-prong allegations were conclusory and did not provide a separate factual basis for unfair conduct.

Express warranty

Plaintiffs alleged that the packaging created an express warranty that the wipes were free of toxic chemicals. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the packaging could qualify as an affirmation of fact, promise, or product description. It nevertheless dismissed the claim because plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that the wipes contained PFAS at levels toxic to infants.

Unjust enrichment

The unjust-enrichment claim relied on the same alleged misrepresentations as the fraud-based claims. Because plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged wrongful conduct in the advertising, the court concluded that the unjust-enrichment claim also lacked a basis.

Disposition

The court granted Kimberly-Clark’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, with leave to amend all claims. Plaintiffs were permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint within 21 days of the order. The court also vacated the July 31, 2025 hearing and stated that the order disposed of Docket No. 19.