Drews v. GoldOller Real Estate Investments

Background

Wendy Marie Drews, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Goldollar Real Estate Investments; Lynmark Group-Orange Avenue Apartments, LLC, doing business as The Sheldon at Suffern Station; and property manager Carla Hines Melcher. She alleged that, while she was away from her apartment on May 31, 2023, Hines unlocked the door and allowed police to remove Drews’s 16-year-old son. She also alleged various rental, credit-reporting, eviction, discrimination, and property-management issues.

Drews invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute allowing claims for deprivation of federal rights by someone acting under state authority; the Violence Against Women Act; federal criminal statutes; and state law. She listed her minor child, E.B., and her adult son, Roland Bristol, as additional plaintiffs, but neither signed the complaint or submitted the required filing-fee application.

Children’s Claims

The court held that Drews could not represent her minor child in federal court because she was not a lawyer. It dismissed without prejudice any claims asserted on E.B.’s behalf. The court also dismissed Roland Bristol as a plaintiff without prejudice because he had not signed the complaint or submitted an application concerning his own financial information. The court denied Bristol’s application for electronic-case filing privileges. Drews therefore remained the sole plaintiff, and her claims had to be based on her own injuries and rights.

Section 1983 Claims

The court dismissed Drews’s constitutional claims against Hines for failure to state a claim. A private person generally is not subject to § 1983 unless the person acted under state authority. The court found that Drews’s allegations indicated that police and child-services employees independently exercised their judgment in removing the child. They did not show that Hines shared a goal with government officials to violate Drews’s rights or that Hines and those officials had an agreement to cause an unconstitutional injury. The court therefore found no sufficient allegation of joint action or conspiracy.

Other Federal Claims

The court dismissed the Violence Against Women Act claims for failure to state a claim. It explained that the current federal civil remedy discussed in the opinion concerns disclosure of intimate images without consent, and Drews did not allege that any defendant disclosed such images.

The court also dismissed claims based on federal criminal statutes for failure to state a claim because a private person cannot initiate a criminal prosecution. The court stated that criminal prosecution decisions belong to prosecutors, although Drews could report alleged criminal activity to law enforcement.

The court treated Drews’s credit-report allegation as a possible claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. It explained that an individual cannot sue under the provision concerning inaccurate information, but can sue under the provision requiring a furnisher to investigate after receiving notice of a dispute from a credit-reporting agency. The court found that Drews did not allege that a defendant received such notice from a credit-reporting agency or failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. It dismissed any Fair Credit Reporting Act claim for failure to state a claim.

State-Law Claims

After dismissing the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority over related state-law claims, over any state-law claims Drews might be asserting.

Disposition and Leave to Amend

Judge Louis L. Stanton dismissed the action’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. The court stated that amendment might allow Drews to provide additional facts supporting a valid claim, but it did not decide that she could do so. The court cautioned her not to include claims already raised in her other lawsuits. If she did not file an amended complaint within the allowed period, the court stated that the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment. The court directed the Clerk to keep the matter open until a civil judgment was entered.