Pineda v. Does 1-2
- Clarke
- 7:25-cv-04552
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Pineda v. Does 1-2, Judge Clarke dismissed some civil-rights claims while ordering service and identification of remaining defendants.
Jose Pineda’s Section 1983 claims were dismissed against Judge Edward McLoughlin individually and against the defendants in their official capacities, while claims involving the DOCCS Commissioner and unidentified parole officers remained subject to service, identification, and further screening.
What happened
In Pineda v. Does 1-2, Jose Pineda, who is representing himself, sued unidentified New York parole officers, the state corrections commissioner, and Judge Edward McLoughlin under a federal civil-rights law. He sought money, court orders, and declarations about alleged constitutional violations.
The court dismissed Pineda’s claims against Judge McLoughlin in his individual capacity because judges are generally protected from lawsuits over actions taken as judges. It dismissed claims against all defendants in their official capacities based on state immunity, except that the prospective-injunction claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court ordered service on the corrections commissioner and required the New York Attorney General to identify the unnamed parole officers.
Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke also directed Pineda to file an amended complaint after receiving the officers’ identities. The court denied permission to proceed without paying fees for any appeal, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Pineda v. Does 1-2 · No. 7:25-cv-04552
- Clarke
- July 29, 2025
Background
Jose Pineda, proceeding without a lawyer, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. He sued two unidentified male New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision parole officers, six unidentified female parole officers, the DOCCS Commissioner, and Dutchess County Court Judge Edward McLoughlin. The court understood the complaint to assert claims against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Pineda had already been permitted to proceed without prepaying filing fees. The court therefore screened the complaint under the statute governing complaints filed by people proceeding without prepayment of fees. That statute requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, seek money from an immune defendant, or otherwise fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Claims Against Judge McLoughlin
The court dismissed all of Pineda’s Section 1983 claims against Judge McLoughlin in his individual capacity. It applied judicial immunity, which generally protects judges from individual-capacity damages claims and related claims for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities. The court stated that Pineda alleged no facts showing that Judge McLoughlin acted outside his judicial responsibilities or without jurisdiction. The claims involved actions or decisions made while presiding over Pineda’s proceedings after his parole-violation arrest.
The court applied the same immunity analysis to Pineda’s requests for damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. It also stated that Section 1983 generally limits injunctive relief against a judicial officer and that retrospective declaratory relief was barred here.
Official-Capacity Claims
The court dismissed Pineda’s Section 1983 claims against all defendants in their official capacities for damages, retrospective injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. It held that the Eleventh Amendment generally protects states and state officials sued in their official capacities from those forms of relief. The court concluded that New York had not waived that immunity and that Congress had not removed it for Section 1983 claims. It dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court separately dismissed Pineda’s claims for prospective injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities without prejudice and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court stated that Pineda lacked standing to assert generalized claims and appeared to be attempting to raise claims on behalf of others. The opinion explained that prospective relief can sometimes proceed against state officials when a complaint alleges an ongoing federal-law violation, but concluded that Pineda’s prospective claims did not satisfy the requirements identified by the court.
Service and Identification of Defendants
Because Pineda was allowed to proceed without prepaying fees, the court directed the Clerk of Court to issue a summons for the DOCCS Commissioner, complete the required service form, and send the necessary papers to the United States Marshals Service for service of the summons and complaint. The court stated that service should occur within 90 days after the summons is issued, and that Pineda should request an extension if service is not completed within that period.
The court also directed the New York Attorney General to provide Pineda and the court, within 60 days, with the identities, and when appropriate badge numbers and service addresses, of the unidentified DOCCS parole officers who participated in the detention and arrest described in the complaint. Within 30 days after receiving that information, Pineda must file an amended complaint naming the newly identified defendants and providing their service addresses. The amended complaint will replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint, and the court will screen it before deciding whether to direct service on the newly identified defendants.
Disposition
The court dismissed all claims against Judge McLoughlin and all claims against the remaining defendants in their official capacities, with the prospective-injunctive-relief claims dismissed without prejudice. It directed service on the DOCCS Commissioner and directed the state Attorney General to identify the unnamed defendants. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.