Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Yvette Bowen applied for Social Security Disability benefits, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2015. An administrative law judge initially found that Bowen was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review. Bowen then filed this federal case. After Bowen moved for judgment on the pleadings, the parties agreed to remand the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings, and judgment was entered on May 15, 2020.

On remand, the administrative law judge again found that Bowen was not disabled. After Bowen requested review, the Appeals Council found on January 27, 2025, that Bowen had been disabled since June 26, 2015. The Social Security Administration’s March 1, 2025 Notice of Award stated that $41,394.50—about 25% of Bowen’s past-due benefits—was being withheld for attorney’s fees.

Bowen’s retainer agreement provided that, if the federal court remanded the case and Bowen later received past-due benefits, counsel could receive up to 25% of those benefits. Counsel sought $41,394.50 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which authorizes reasonable fees for representation in federal court in a successful Social Security case. Counsel acknowledged that, if the court approved the § 406(b) fee, counsel would have to refund the smaller previously awarded fee of $5,488.70 under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Court’s analysis

The court first found the application timely. Fee applications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) generally must be filed within 14 days after judgment, but that period may be extended when the court must wait for the Social Security Administration to calculate benefits after a remand. In that situation, the period begins when the claimant receives the Notice of Award. Counsel filed the motion three days after the Notice of Award, and the defendant did not contest timeliness.

The court then evaluated whether the requested contingency fee was reasonable. It considered whether the fee was within the 25% statutory limit, whether there was fraud or overreaching, and whether the fee would be an improper windfall. It also considered the character of the representation and result, whether counsel caused delay, and whether the benefits were large compared with the time counsel spent on the case.

The court found that the fee did not exceed the 25% limit, and found no evidence of fraud or overreaching. Although the requested fee produced an effective hourly rate of $1,473.11 for 28.1 hours of work, the court found that amount reasonable because counsel had expertise in Social Security law, represented Bowen for years, efficiently obtained a favorable result, and faced uncertainty because the administrative law judge had initially found Bowen not disabled. The court also found that counsel had not unreasonably delayed the case.

Disposition

Judge Victoria Reznik granted the motion for attorney’s fees. Counsel was awarded $41,394.50, to be paid from Bowen’s past-due benefits, and was ordered to promptly refund $5,488.70 to Bowen representing the previously awarded Equal Access to Justice Act fees.