Paulausky v. Mayo Clinic

Background

Plaintiff Nichole Paulausky has been employed by Mayo Clinic as a Health Information Services Specialist since August 2021, working remotely from her home in Illinois and, later, Tennessee. She has never lived or physically worked in Minnesota. Mayo Clinic is a non-profit corporation registered in Rochester, Minnesota.

Paulausky alleges she has multiple disabilities and that her job — which involves reviewing and categorizing documents in Mayo's electronic medical records system — caused a decline in her health beginning in September 2021. She made several requests for reasonable accommodations starting in September 2021, including intermittent leave, a laptop computer, and a sit/stand desk. She alleges Mayo denied or improperly handled these requests. She also alleges she discovered in December 2022 that she was being paid below minimum wage.

On December 15, 2022, Paulausky filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was cross-filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR). The EEOC found in October 2024 that Mayo violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and issued Paulausky a right-to-sue letter. She filed this lawsuit on January 14, 2025, asserting six counts: (1) Disability Discrimination under the MHRA; (2) Failure to Accommodate under the MHRA; (3) Disability Discrimination under the ADA; (4) Failure to Accommodate under the ADA; (5) Reprisal under the MHRA; and (6) Retaliation under the ADA.

Mayo's Motion

Mayo moved for partial dismissal of Counts 1, 2, and 5 (the MHRA claims) and of time-barred allegations under both the MHRA and ADA.

Analysis

MHRA Claims — Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1))

The MHRA defines "employee" as an individual who is employed by an employer and "resides or works in this state" (Minnesota). Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 15. It is undisputed that Paulausky never resided in Minnesota, so the question was whether she "works in" Minnesota.

The court applied the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Kuklenski v. Medtronic USA, Inc., 134 F.4th 528 (8th Cir. 2025), which held that a remote employee must have physical presence in Minnesota to satisfy the "works in" requirement. Virtual or electronic contacts — such as video calls, emails, and phone calls with Minnesota-based colleagues — are insufficient. The Eighth Circuit in Kuklenski also declined to certify this question to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Paulausky argued that because she accesses electronic medical records located in Minnesota and works exclusively within Mayo's records system, she is distinguishable from employees who merely sell merchandise or perform manufacturing work remotely. She also relied on district court decisions (Wilson v. CFMOTO Powersports, Inc. and Lapushner v. Admedus Ltd.) in which out-of-state employees were found to work in Minnesota.

The court rejected Paulausky's arguments. Unlike the plaintiffs in Wilson and Lapushner, Paulausky never physically traveled to Minnesota for any work-related purpose, and her alleged injuries occurred at her out-of-state home. The court noted that extraterritorial application of state statutes is generally disfavored, and that the MHRA expressly aims to protect "persons in this state." Because Paulausky has had no physical presence in Minnesota, she lacks standing under the MHRA, and her MHRA claims (Counts 1, 2, and 5) are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

Time-Barred Claims

MHRA Statute of Limitations

Under the MHRA, a plaintiff must file an administrative charge or civil action within 365 days of the allegedly discriminatory act. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3. Because Paulausky filed her EEOC/MDHR charge on December 15, 2022, any MHRA claims based on discriminatory acts before December 15, 2021 are time-barred. There is no "continuing violation" exception under the MHRA — each discrete act starts its own limitations clock.

The complaint alleges specific denials of accommodation in September and October 2021 (Compl. ¶¶ 13–15), which fall outside the 365-day window. Those claims are dismissed with prejudice. MHRA claims based on acts after December 15, 2021 are dismissed without prejudice.

The court noted a nuance regarding a laptop request: Paragraph 15 alleges a denial of a laptop on October 22, 2021 (time-barred), but Paragraph 17 alleges Mayo "continues to deny" the laptop request as of the date the complaint was filed (January 14, 2025), which is not time-barred.

ADA Statute of Limitations

Under the ADA, a discrimination charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Because Paulausky filed her EEOC charge on December 15, 2022, any ADA claims based on acts before February 18, 2022 are time-barred.

Paulausky argued that her ADA claims are timely because Mayo's denial of accommodations was repeated and continued through the date of the complaint, invoking the "continuing violation" doctrine. The court rejected this argument, relying in part on Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009) — a case Paulausky herself cited — which explains that a denial of a reasonable accommodation is a discrete discriminatory act that starts the limitations clock on the day it occurs, not a continuing violation. The continuing violation doctrine applies to claims like hostile work environment, which by nature involve repeated, cumulative conduct.

Accordingly, ADA claims based on events in September and October 2021 (Compl. ¶¶ 13–15) are time-barred and are dismissed with prejudice.

Disposition

Counts 3, 4, and 6 (ADA disability discrimination, ADA failure to accommodate, and ADA retaliation) remain pending, as do any timely MHRA allegations — though the MHRA claims were dismissed without prejudice only as to post-December 15, 2021 acts, and the standing issue would need to be revisited if Paulausky attempts to replead.