Griffin v. Corporation Counsel

Background

Jeremiah Jerome Griffin, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a Sixth Amended Complaint against the City of New York and several officers. He alleged multiple incidents during his detention, including an assault by another detainee, denial of law-library access, pepper spraying, an alleged assault involving another inmate, and a later assault with makeshift weapons. The claims addressed in this order against Officers Alima Yakubu, Patrick Fatorma, and Kasia Benoit-Jones concerned an alleged five-day period from July 24 through July 28, 2022, when Griffin said the officers confined him to his cell and denied him food, showers, clothing, and medications after he told other inmates that Yakubu had contracted HIV.

Griffin sought $9 million in damages. Defendants City of New York, Fatorma, Yakubu, and Benoit-Jones moved to dismiss. Griffin did not file a timely opposition. He later requested a three-week extension, explaining that he had been in solitary confinement from February 21 through March 13, 2025.

Extension Request

The court denied Griffin’s request for an extension. Although his confinement could explain why he missed the original March 11 deadline, he did not explain why he waited more than two months after leaving solitary confinement and regaining access to mail and legal resources before requesting additional time. The court found that the unexplained delay was significant and prejudiced defendants after multiple amendments and rounds of motion practice.

The court did not dismiss the case solely because Griffin failed to oppose the motion. Instead, it independently reviewed whether the complaint stated valid claims.

Administrative Exhaustion

Defendants argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act required dismissal because Griffin had not completed the correctional system’s grievance process. The court rejected that argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It held that Griffin adequately alleged that the grievance process was unavailable because the grievance coordinator allegedly refused to process his grievances and told him he did not have rights while detained. The court explained that prison remedies may be treated as unavailable when officials thwart an inmate’s use of them through misleading statements or other interference.

The ruling did not prevent defendants from raising exhaustion again after discovery, including on a later motion for summary judgment if the facts developed differently.

Claims Against the City

The court dismissed Griffin’s claims against the City of New York. A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when a constitutional violation was caused by a city policy, custom, practice, decision by an authorized policymaker, or failure to train. The court found that Griffin did not identify such a policy or custom. His allegations involved different incidents, different officers, and different harms, which did not establish the required citywide pattern or policy.

Claims Against Individual Officers

The court allowed Griffin’s § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against Yakubu, Fatorma, and Benoit-Jones to proceed. Because Griffin was a pretrial detainee, the court analyzed the claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against unconstitutional detention conditions. Griffin had to plausibly allege both that the deprivation was sufficiently serious and that the officers acted with deliberate indifference, meaning awareness of and disregard for a serious risk.

The court held that Griffin met both requirements at the pleading stage. He alleged that he received no food for five consecutive days and became malnourished, which was sufficiently serious. He also alleged that the officers deliberately denied him food in retaliation for his statements about Yakubu. The court concluded that the alleged risk of serious health problems from withholding food for five days was obvious enough to support an inference that the officers knew of the risk.

The court denied the officers’ request for dismissal based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known about. The officers did not dispute that detainees have a clearly established right to adequate basic conditions, including food. The court found that they had not shown at this stage why allegedly withholding all food for five days was objectively reasonable. The officers may raise qualified immunity again at summary judgment.

The court also denied the served officers’ attempt to dismiss claims against officers who had not been served. The served officers had not themselves moved to dismiss those claims, and the court stated that the unserved officers could later raise their own defenses after being served and notified of the claims.

Disposition

The court denied Griffin’s extension request. It granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss: Griffin’s § 1983 claims against the City were dismissed, while the food-deprivation claim against Yakubu, Fatorma, and Benoit-Jones remained. The court also denied qualified-immunity dismissal of that claim and denied the served officers’ attempt to dismiss claims against unserved officers. The court separately stated that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Griffin permission to appeal without paying filing fees.