Caponetto v. Mullen

Background

Rossana Caponetto, acting without a lawyer, filed this federal action on December 9, 2022, against Larry Mullen, Ann Acheson, and RZO Productions, Inc. The action followed an earlier employment-discrimination case that Caponetto had filed in New York State Supreme Court, Rockland County. In that earlier case, she asserted claims involving national-origin discrimination, harassment, hostile work environment, retaliation, wrongful termination, negligent hiring and supervision, breach of contract-related duties, and emotional distress. Justice Sherri L. Eisenpress granted summary judgment for Mullen and Acheson and dismissed that action on June 29, 2022. The opinion states that RZO Productions, Inc. did not appear in the state-court case because Caponetto did not show that it had been served.

Caponetto’s federal complaint sought to vacate the state-court judgment. She alleged fraud on the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), deprivation of rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242, and conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. She also sought monetary damages and other relief, including actions against people involved in the state-court proceeding and an order concerning alleged hacking.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s power to hear a case; Rule 12(b)(5) concerns defective service; and Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Caponetto did not oppose the motion. She instead submitted requests that Judge Rearden recuse herself and that another judge be assigned.

Rulings

The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Caponetto’s request to undo the state-court judgment. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from reviewing and rejecting a final state-court judgment. The court found that the requirements were met: Caponetto had lost in state court, alleged injuries connected to that judgment, asked the federal court to reject it, and filed the federal case after the state court entered its judgment. The court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Rule 60(d) claim.

The court also held that Caponetto could not use 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242 to obtain the criminal prosecution of the defendants. Decisions to bring criminal prosecutions belong to prosecutors, not private plaintiffs. The court therefore dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction any claims seeking criminal prosecution of the defendants, including claims under those statutes.

The court denied Caponetto’s recusal motion because the allegations did not provide a basis to question the court’s impartiality. It declined to grant leave to amend because it concluded that the defects in the complaint could not be fixed by amendment. The court also stated that, because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it did not need to address the defendants’ arguments under Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6).

Disposition

Judge Jennifer H. Rearden dismissed the complaint without prejudice, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the case, and ruled that any pending motions were moot. The opinion states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss had been granted on September 30, 2023, and that this opinion explained the bases for that ruling. The dismissal was jurisdictional; the federal court did not decide the underlying merits of Caponetto’s allegations.