Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation

Background

Charles B. Udoh, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York City Department of Probation (DOP), Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa D’Ambrosia. He alleged discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability, along with retaliation, constitutional violations, and a claim under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act.

Udoh alleged that he was hired as a probation officer in September 2022 and was assigned substantial work without equipment. He claimed that supervisors harassed him, denied him overtime and requested lunch accommodations, failed to accommodate medical and religious practices, used racial and other abusive language, treated non-Black employees more favorably, and threatened him. He also alleged that he was hospitalized, requested a transfer, and was terminated on June 21, 2023. He filed a charge with the New York State Division of Human Rights and later filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The DOP moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim, to dismiss portions of the complaint. The DOP did not move to dismiss the race-discrimination, national-origin-discrimination, age-discrimination, and hostile-work-environment claims.

Rulings

Claims against the DOP. The court held that the New York City Department of Probation is not a suable entity under the New York City Charter. It therefore granted the motion to dismiss all claims against the DOP.

Administrative exhaustion. The court dismissed Udoh’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. His Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge did not identify sex discrimination, and the court found that the charge’s reference to a young female officer taking his office did not provide adequate notice of a sex-discrimination claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the retaliation claim on exhaustion grounds because Udoh had identified retaliation in his charge and described retaliation for his complaints and transfer requests.

The court also denied any request to dismiss the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law sex-discrimination and retaliation claims for failure to exhaust, because those laws do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court noted that Udoh had not identified religion as a basis in his federal charge, but found his religion claim reasonably related to the charge because he alleged a failure to accommodate his religious practices. The court nevertheless dismissed the religion claim on the merits.

Disability claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss Udoh’s disability-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. It found that his references to medical conditions, medication, medical reasons, and medical issues did not plausibly identify a qualifying disability. The court also found that his later references to high blood pressure, chest pain, back pain, anxiety, panic attacks, physical disability, emotional distress, mental abuse, and cardiac issues did not sufficiently state a qualifying disability.

The court separately held that Udoh had not adequately pleaded a failure-to-accommodate claim. It found that he had not sufficiently alleged a disability or shown that the DOP had notice of a disability requiring accommodation. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss those claims.

Religious discrimination. The court granted the motion to dismiss Udoh’s religious-discrimination claims. His complaint stated only that the DOP denied accommodation for his “African religion fasting and practices.” The court found that he did not provide nonconclusory facts describing his religious beliefs, explain how those beliefs conflicted with a work requirement, or allege facts showing that he suffered an adverse employment action or was treated worse because of religion.

Sex discrimination. The court granted the motion to dismiss the sex-discrimination claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Udoh alleged only that a young female probation officer under age forty took his office on the day he was terminated. The court found that this allegation, without more, did not plausibly show that he was terminated, replaced, or treated worse because of sex.

Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss Udoh’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. As to due process, the court held that Udoh, whom the DOP described as a probationary employee, had not shown a protected property interest in continued employment. As to equal protection, the court held that he had not identified a discriminatory law or policy or alleged facts showing that a facially neutral law or policy was applied with discriminatory intent.

Whistleblower Protection Act claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss Udoh’s claim under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act. That law applies to retaliation claims by federal employees against federal employers, while Udoh worked for the City of New York.

Claims against individual defendants. The court held that Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act do not impose personal liability on individual supervisors for employment discrimination. It also dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Segers, Brown, and D’Ambrosia because Udoh had not adequately pleaded constitutional violations.

The court dismissed the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law claims against D’Ambrosia because Udoh did not provide facts showing that she was personally involved in or participated in the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss the Title VII, Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against each individual defendant, as well as the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law claims against D’Ambrosia.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the DOP’s motion to partially dismiss the complaint. It directed the parties to appear for a conference on August 11, 2025, and directed the clerk to terminate the motion.