Bryant v. Rice
- John Tunheim
- 0:24-cv-03687
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
In Bryant v. Rice, Judge Tunheim dismissed with prejudice three Liberian nationals' challenge to USCIS's denial of their immigration status adjustments, ruling the agency applied the correct, stricter waiver standard.
Liberian nationals who applied or may apply for adjustment of status (permanent residency) under the LRIF and were found inadmissible based on prior fraud or misrepresentation in immigration proceedings. Such applicants must seek waivers under the stricter § 1182(i) standard — requiring proof of extreme hardship to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful resident relative — rather than the more lenient refugee waiver standard.
What happened
Bryant v. Rice involves three Liberian nationals — Theophilus LC Bryant, Fanta Bamba, and Yei Gbalazeh — who applied for permanent resident status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), a law that created a path to citizenship for Liberians who had lived continuously in the United States since at least November 20, 2014. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each applicant on the ground that they had previously committed fraud or made willful misrepresentations in seeking immigration benefits, which makes a person inadmissible under federal law. USCIS told the plaintiffs they could seek a waiver of that inadmissibility bar under a provision (8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)) that requires showing extreme hardship to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful resident spouse or parent, but the plaintiffs instead sought a broader, more lenient waiver available to refugees under a different provision (8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)), which allows waivers for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or the public interest.
The central legal question was which waiver standard applies to LRIF applicants. The plaintiffs argued that because the LRIF is structurally similar to the refugee adjustment statute, Congress must have intended the more lenient refugee waiver to apply. The government argued that the LRIF contains no reference to the refugee waiver provision and that the standard fraud-based waiver (§ 1182(i)) therefore governs. The court analyzed the text of the LRIF, its structure, comparisons to other country-specific immigration statutes, and the law's legislative history, noting that Congress has explicitly incorporated the refugee waiver standard into other statutes in the past but did not do so here.
Judge Tunheim granted the government's motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs cannot refile this lawsuit. The court concluded that the LRIF's silence on waivers, combined with Congress's demonstrated ability to incorporate the refugee waiver standard when it chooses to, strongly suggests Congress intended the stricter § 1182(i) waiver — not the more lenient refugee waiver — to apply. Because USCIS applied the correct legal standard, the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law.
The detailed version
- Bryant v. Rice · No. 0:24-cv-03687
- John Tunheim
- Aug. 4, 2025
Background
Plaintiffs Theophilus LC Bryant, Fanta Bamba, and Yei Gbalazeh are Liberian nationals who sought adjustment of status (a change from temporary to permanent resident status) under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92. The LRIF created a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship for Liberian nationals who had been continuously present in the United States since November 20, 2014, and who were otherwise admissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
USCIS determined that each plaintiff was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which bars admission of any person who obtained or sought to obtain a visa or immigration benefit through fraud or willful misrepresentation. USCIS informed plaintiffs they could seek a waiver of that inadmissibility ground under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), which permits a waiver only if denial would result in "extreme hardship" to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful resident spouse or parent. Instead, plaintiffs applied for waivers under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c), the refugee adjustment statute, which allows waivers for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when otherwise in the public interest — a materially more lenient standard. USCIS denied the applications.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs sued USCIS and USCIS Minneapolis-St. Paul Field Office Director Steven G. Rice, alleging that USCIS's application of § 1182(i)'s waiver standard was contrary to law and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the federal statute governing judicial review of agency decisions. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment — a court ruling establishing their legal rights — that the § 1159(c) waiver standard should apply to LRIF applicants. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). Plaintiffs conceded that resolution of the waiver standard question was dispositive of the entire case.
Legal Framework
The LRIF The LRIF requires admissibility under § 1182 but is entirely silent on which waiver provision applies when an applicant is found inadmissible.
Section 1182(i) — the stricter waiver This provision allows waiver of fraud-based inadmissibility only upon a showing that denial would cause "extreme hardship" to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful resident spouse or parent. It requires a qualifying relative.
Section 1159(c) — the broader waiver This provision, part of the refugee adjustment statute, allows waiver of inadmissibility grounds for "humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." By its own terms, § 1159(c) applies only to individuals "seeking adjustment of status under this section" — i.e., under the refugee adjustment statute.
Analysis
Statutory Text and Structure
The court began with the plain language of the LRIF, finding it silent on waivers. It then examined statutory structure. The court observed that the LRIF neither incorporates nor cross-references § 1159 or § 1159(c). Section 1159(c) itself limits its reach to those adjusting status "under this section," which by its terms does not include LRIF applicants.
The court acknowledged structural similarities between the LRIF and § 1159 — both exempt certain inadmissibility grounds, impose similar eligibility restrictions, and retroactively date lawful status — but found those similarities insufficient to import § 1159(c)'s waiver standard. Crucially, Congress has explicitly incorporated § 1159(c) language into other country-specific adjustment statutes when it intended that standard to apply. See, e.g., Adjustment of Status for Certain Polish and Hungarian Parolees, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-709 (1996). The court applied the canon of statutory interpretation that Congress's omission of language it has used elsewhere is evidence of a deliberate choice.
The court also noted the weight of persuasive authority: the Eleventh Circuit has upheld USCIS's application of § 1182 waivers under analogous country-specific statutes (the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act). See Frech v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 491 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007); Alexis v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 431 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). The court treated these decisions as suggesting § 1182 functions as the default waiver standard where a country-specific adjustment act lacks an express waiver provision.
Legislative History
The court acknowledged that the LRIF was enacted to assist Liberians who had lived under temporary protections such as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), a presidential policy allowing certain foreign nationals to remain in the United States without fear of deportation. The court also acknowledged that DED did not impose inadmissibility consequences for fraud at the time the LRIF was drafted. However, the court found that the LRIF's purpose was not to codify DED but to create something new — a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship that DED did not offer. Congress's failure to expressly codify DED's fraud-inadmissibility exclusion was treated as further evidence that Congress intended to default to § 1182(i). The court noted that even a humanitarian statute could have included an explicit waiver provision had Congress chosen to do so.
Disposition
Judge Tunheim granted Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court held that USCIS correctly applied the § 1182(i) waiver standard to LRIF applicants, and because that was the only issue in dispute, the plaintiffs' claims necessarily failed as a matter of law.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.