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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Aug. 4, 2025

Laatz v. Zazzle, Inc.

Judge
Beth Freeman
Docket
5:22-cv-04844
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
8
Intellectual PropertySummary JudgmentCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Laatz v. Zazzle, Judge Freeman granted reconsideration and summary judgment against Laatz’s federal copyright-infringement claim.

Who this affects

Nicky Laatz’s federal copyright-infringement claim against Zazzle, Inc. and Mohamed Alkhatib was affected; the court granted the defendants’ reconsideration motion and summary judgment on Claim 4.

What happened

In Laatz v. Zazzle, Inc., the defendants asked the court to reconsider an earlier summary-judgment ruling on Claim 4, which alleged federal copyright infringement. The reconsideration was limited to whether Nicky Laatz could bring the claim without a valid copyright registration or a refusal to register.

Laazt applied to register the BE fonts as computer programs, but the Copyright Office registered them as “font data” after rejecting computer-program registration. The court had previously found the font-data registrations invalid but allowed the claim to continue based on disputed questions about whether the fonts could qualify as computer programs.

Judge Beth Freeman ruled that the claim could not proceed because Laatz had neither a valid registration nor a refusal to register the BE works as computer programs. The court granted the defendants’ motion for reconsideration, granted summary judgment that the asserted copyrights were invalid, and granted summary judgment on Claim 4.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Laatz v. Zazzle, Inc. · No. 5:22-cv-04844
Judge
Beth Freeman
Date
Aug. 4, 2025

Background

Nicky Laatz sued Zazzle, Inc. and Mohamed Alkhatib, asserting, among other claims, federal copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 101. Laatz had applied for copyright registrations for the BE Software associated with three fonts in the BE Trio. The Copyright Office told Laatz’s attorney that the deposits appeared to contain font data rather than computer programs, and that computer-program registration required source code. Laatz authorized changing the applications’ authorship description from “computer program” to “font data.” The Copyright Office then issued three registrations identifying the author-created material as “font data.”

In an earlier summary-judgment order, the court found that the BE Trio was not copyrightable as font data and invalidated the registrations on that basis. But the court allowed Claim 4 to proceed because it found disputed facts about whether the BE works might qualify as copyrightable computer programs. The defendants sought reconsideration of that ruling. The court limited reconsideration to whether Laatz could assert copyright infringement without a valid registration or a refusal of registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).

Parties’ Arguments

The defendants argued that once the court invalidated the font-data registrations, Laatz no longer satisfied § 411(a), which requires registration or refusal to register before a civil copyright-infringement action may be filed. They also argued that Laatz could not rely on computer-program copyrights because the Copyright Office had not registered the works as computer programs and had rejected that registration category during the application process.

Laatz argued that she had registrations when she filed the lawsuit, that the defendants had not shown fraud on the Copyright Office, and that she had registered the BE works as literary works. She also argued that the defendants’ position was untimely because it was raised after the earlier summary-judgment order.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that § 411(a) requires an action by the Copyright Office: either registration or refusal to register the copyright claim. The court found that Laatz’s font-data registrations had been invalidated and therefore could not satisfy that requirement. It rejected the argument that merely having registrations when the lawsuit began was enough after those registrations were found invalid.

The court also held that Laatz could not assert computer-program registrations that she never received. The Copyright Office had expressly rejected registration of the BE works as computer programs during the application process, and Laatz accepted registrations as font data instead. The court said it could not allow suit based on a copyright registration that the Copyright Office had not issued.

The court further found that the change from computer program to font data was not a clerical error. It stated that, if Laatz disagreed with the refusal to register the works as computer programs, she could have accepted the refusal, filed an infringement action with the Copyright Office’s participation, and asked the court to decide whether the works were copyrightable as computer programs. According to the court, she did not take that route.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier summary-judgment order. It granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Laatz’s asserted copyrights were invalid and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Claim 4 for federal copyright infringement.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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