Riley v. Baggu Corporation

Background

Amanie Riley, who is legally blind, alleged that she relies on screen-reading software and could not use Baggu Corporation’s website to purchase a lunch bag on November 4, 2024. She identified alleged barriers including inaccurate website structure, poor focus order, inaccurate alternative text for graphics, unclear links and labels, inaccessible contact information and drop-down menus, changes in content without warning, and redundant links.

Riley asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York State Civil Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. She also sought certification of a nationwide class and a New York subclass consisting of legally blind people who had attempted to use Baggu’s website.

Motion and governing standard

Baggu moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court noted, however, that Baggu’s brief argued only that Riley lacked standing, so the court considered the motion only under Rule 12(b)(1). Standing is the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury, that the defendant likely caused it, and that a court can likely remedy it. At the pleading stage, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

For an accessibility claim seeking an order requiring future access, the court applied a three-part test: the plaintiff must allege a past injury, it must be reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment will continue, and it must be reasonable to infer that the plaintiff intends to return to the website or location.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that Riley adequately alleged a past injury. She stated when she visited Baggu’s website, what she attempted to do, and the specific barriers that prevented her from completing the purchase. The court rejected Baggu’s comparison to a prior case involving a person who only browsed websites to test compliance and did not intend to become a customer. Riley instead alleged that she wanted to purchase a lunch bag for travel and picnics.

The court also found that Riley adequately alleged that the barriers would continue. Riley alleged that Baggu had not removed the barriers, and Baggu did not dispute their existence or deny that they continued to exist. The court therefore found it reasonable to infer that Riley would again be unable to make a purchase if she returned before the website became accessible.

Finally, the court found that Riley adequately alleged an intent to return. She alleged an ongoing interest in buying Baggu’s lunch bag and other products, including products that would qualify for free shipping, and stated that she would return to the website if it became accessible. The court rejected Baggu’s arguments concerning alleged inconsistencies about the products’ style, whether Riley added an item to her cart, her interest in visiting a physical store, and whether she lived in Westchester or the Bronx. The court said these issues did not defeat the plausibility of her allegations at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that their truth could be examined during discovery.

Disposition

The court denied Baggu’s motion to dismiss. Because the motion was decided on standing under Rule 12(b)(1), the ruling did not decide the ultimate merits of Riley’s discrimination claims. The court also noted that discovery had previously been stayed and that a separate order would schedule an initial case-management conference.