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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 6, 2025

McCright v. Andes

Judge
Lin
Docket
3:24-cv-08695
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
3
Civil ProcedureADA / DisabilityPro Se
In one sentence

In McCright v. Weaver, Judge Lin denied requests for single-cell status, protection from disciplinary reports, and appointed counsel.

Who this affects

The order affects Colvin McCright’s requests for temporary emergency relief and appointed counsel in his action against E. Weaver and the other defendants. It denied the single-cell request, denied without prejudice the request concerning disciplinary reports, and denied appointment of counsel.

What happened

Colvin McCright asked the court to order jail officials to give him a single cell and stop issuing disciplinary reports. He argued that sharing a cell interfered with sleep and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, and that disciplinary reports could lead to a transfer.

The court denied the single-cell request because the case was too early and the record was not developed enough to show that McCright was likely to win or face irreparable harm. It denied the request concerning disciplinary reports without prejudice because the possibility of transfer was speculative; McCright may file another request if a transfer becomes reasonably imminent and he explains the harm it would cause.

Judge Rita F. Lin also denied McCright’s request for appointed counsel, finding no exceptional circumstances, no unusually complex legal issues, and that McCright had been able to pursue the case without a lawyer.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
McCright v. Andes · No. 3:24-cv-08695
Judge
Lin
Date
Aug. 6, 2025

Background

Colvin McCright moved for a temporary restraining order directing jail officials to stop allegedly violating his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act by refusing to grant him single-cell status and to stop issuing disciplinary reports. He argued that having a cellmate prevented him from sleeping, which he described as a major life activity under the Act. He also argued that disciplinary reports could increase his classification score, support a transfer to a higher-level institution, or create the impression that he was a program failure.

McCright separately moved for appointment of counsel, asking the court to appoint Michael Bien, an attorney litigating another case and familiar with the facts, or another attorney.

Temporary Restraining Order

The court applied the preliminary-injunction standard from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under that standard, the person seeking relief must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of hardships favors relief, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. The court also described a sliding-scale version of the same test, but explained that irreparable harm must be shown under either version.

The court denied the request for single-cell status. It found the request premature because the litigation was at an early stage and the record was too undeveloped to determine whether McCright was entitled to single-cell status. The court concluded that he had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. It also found that, although extreme ongoing sleep deprivation could constitute irreparable harm, the record did not support that finding here.

The court denied without prejudice the request concerning disciplinary reports. It found that any transfer resulting from the reports was speculative and that McCright had not shown how a transfer to another prison would harm him. The court stated that he may file another request to prevent a transfer if future circumstances create a reasonable fear that a transfer is actually about to occur. It instructed him to explain why the transfer should be prevented and how being in another prison would harm him.

Appointment of Counsel

The court explained that appointing counsel for an indigent litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is discretionary and generally requires exceptional circumstances. The relevant considerations include the likelihood of success on the merits and the litigant’s ability to present claims without a lawyer given the complexity of the legal issues.

The court denied McCright’s motion for appointment of counsel. It found that he had not shown exceptional circumstances, that the action did not present complex legal issues, and that he had ably prosecuted the case without assistance. The Clerk was directed to terminate docket entries 17 and 18.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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