Aziz v. Butt

Background

Javaid Aziz, proceeding without a lawyer, filed claims for himself and as attorney-in-fact for Jamila K. Butt. He alleged that Neelofar K. Butt, Jamila’s daughter, worked with an attorney to obtain control over Jamila’s affairs and assets through a power of attorney. The complaint alleged that Neelofar isolated Jamila from Aziz and other family members, obtained temporary restraining orders against Aziz in family court through false or fraudulent means, changed the mailing addresses on Jamila’s accounts, locked Jamila out of her bank accounts, and sold Jamila’s Westchester home without her knowledge or against her wishes.

The complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, along with claims for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and elder abuse. Aziz moved for a preliminary injunction and an emergency temporary restraining order, stating that he feared Neelofar would continue preventing him from interacting with Jamila and might move her to a more remote nursing facility.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the standards governing preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Those standards require a clear showing of likely success on the merits and irreparable harm, along with consideration of the balance of equities and the public interest.

The court denied the preliminary-injunction request because the defendants had not yet been served and therefore had not received notice or a fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments. Summonses had only recently been issued, and the court lacked the defendants’ arguments, affidavits, appearances, or other evidence.

The court also denied the request for an emergency temporary restraining order without notice. It concluded that the complaint did not clearly show that immediate, irreparable injury would occur before the defendants could be heard. The court stated that the Section 1983, due-process, and First Amendment claims were unlikely to succeed because they were alleged against private individuals, while those claims require government involvement. The court also explained that attempting to base government involvement on orders allegedly induced from family-court judges would face judicial immunity issues.

The court identified additional problems with the state-law claims. It stated that New York does not recognize a claim for elder abuse and exploitation without a specific statutory basis; that the abuse-of-process, malicious-prosecution, and fraud claims appeared to center on family-court filings and orders that could raise limits on federal jurisdiction; that the fraud claim also appeared not to meet the heightened detail required by federal pleading rules; and that the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and civil-conspiracy claims were unlikely to succeed. The court further noted possible standing problems because Aziz sought to act as Jamila’s attorney-in-fact, and a power-of-attorney relationship generally does not by itself establish the required personal injury.

Disposition

Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke denied both the preliminary-injunction motion and the emergency temporary-restraining-order motion. The Clerk was directed to terminate ECF Nos. 6, 7, and 12. The order addressed the requests for emergency relief and did not state a final disposition of the underlying claims.