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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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MixedFiled Aug. 8, 2025

Handy Jones v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota

Judge
John Tunheim
Docket
0:20-cv-00707
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
33

Counsel of record
PLAINTIFF
Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C.
Kenneth R. White
O'Connor Law Firm, Ltd.
Kevin William O'Connor
Paul J. Bosman
DEFENDANT
Saint Paul City Attorney's Office
Anthony G. Edwards
Iverson Reuvers
Stephanie A. Angolkar

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

Civil RightsSection 1983Fee PetitionSummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Handy Jones v. City of St. Paul, Judge Tunheim denied a motion to reinstate a prior $10M jury award or grant a new trial, but awarded $1.74M in attorney's fees and prejudgment interest.

Who this affects

Family members of individuals killed by police who bring civil rights lawsuits, their attorneys (particularly those working on contingency in difficult-to-win cases), and civil rights defendants facing fee-shifting liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The ruling also affects litigants and courts on questions of remittitur, new trial standards, prejudgment interest calculations under Minnesota law, and lodestar multiplier analysis.

What happened

In Handy Jones v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, plaintiff Kim Diane Handy Jones sued the City of St. Paul and police officer Nathaniel Younce after Younce shot and killed her son, Cordale Quinn Handy, in 2017. After a first jury found Younce liable and awarded $10 million in compensatory damages plus $1.5 million in punitive damages, a prior judge reduced the compensatory damages to $2.5 million. Handy Jones rejected that reduction and proceeded to a second trial, where a new jury awarded $3.25 million in compensatory damages. Handy Jones then filed post-trial motions seeking to restore the original $10 million award or obtain a new trial, as well as attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.

The court evaluated five alleged trial errors that Handy Jones claimed warranted a new trial: improper questioning about gang affiliation, admission of a video from the night Handy was killed, improper statements during closing arguments, flawed jury instructions, and denial of a new category of pain and suffering damages. The court found that, while one statement in the defense closing argument was improper — suggesting Handy bore some responsibility for his own death — it was a minor, isolated comment that did not prejudice the outcome. The court rejected all other claims of error, finding the video was properly authenticated and admitted, the closing argument statements about gang affiliation were not improper golden rule arguments, the jury instructions were legally correct, and the law of the case barred the new damages category.

Judge Tunheim denied Handy Jones's motion to reinstate the original jury award or grant a new trial, finding no legal basis to override the second jury's verdict or reconsider the earlier remittitur order. However, the court granted in part Handy Jones's motion for attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, awarding $1,738,540.88 in attorney's fees (calculated using a lodestar method with reduced hourly rates and a 1.5x upward multiplier for the case's difficulty and undesirability), $480 in costs, and $490,132.33 in prejudgment interest on the $1 million past damages portion of the verdict — all to be paid by defendant Nathaniel Younce.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Handy Jones v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota · No. 0:20-cv-00707
Judge
John Tunheim
Date
Aug. 8, 2025

Background

Plaintiff Kim Diane Handy Jones sued the City of St. Paul and St. Paul Police Officer Nathaniel Younce after Younce shot and killed her son, Cordale Quinn Handy, in 2017. The case proceeded to a bifurcated trial (liability decided separately from damages). The first jury found Younce liable and awarded $10 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. U.S. District Judge David S. Doty subsequently granted a remittitur — a court-ordered reduction of an excessive jury award — reducing the compensatory damages to $2.5 million, while leaving liability and punitive damages intact.

Handy Jones rejected the remittitur amount and elected a new trial on compensatory damages only. After the case was reassigned to Judge Tunheim, a second jury awarded $3.25 million in compensatory damages: $1 million for past damages and $2.25 million for future damages. Handy Jones then filed two post-trial motions: (1) a motion to reinstate the original $10 million award, or alternatively for a new trial; and (2) a motion for attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (a federal civil rights fee-shifting statute).

Motion to Reinstate Original Award and Motion for New Trial

Reinstatement

The court declined to reinstate the original $10 million compensatory award. Handy Jones framed her request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a court to alter or amend a judgment, but the court found that the request effectively sought reconsideration of Judge Doty's remittitur order. The court found no precedent for such relief, characterized the request as "unquestionably unorthodox," and declined to substitute its judgment for that of the second jury. The motion to alter or amend the judgment on this ground was denied.

New Trial

Handy Jones argued that five cumulative errors tainted the second trial.

Gang Affiliation Questioning

Defendants cross-examined Handy Jones about her son's alleged gang affiliation. Handy Jones presented deposition testimony denying any gang affiliation, but the court found this insufficient to overcome the good faith basis supplied by press releases and a news article Defendants provided to the court. Even assuming the questioning was improper, the court found Handy Jones failed to demonstrate that the jury verdict was prejudicially influenced, because differences between the two trials (including four additional witnesses in the second) made any causal inference speculative.

Video Evidence

Defendants played a video of Handy's behavior the night he was killed. The court affirmed its earlier ruling that the video was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Although the witness who originally recorded the video did not testify at the second trial, the court held the video had been authenticated at the first trial and remained properly admitted. The court also found the jury instructions — which stated that liability had already been determined — adequately prevented juror confusion about the video's implications.

Closing Arguments

Handy Jones challenged three categories of defense statements. As to alleged "golden rule" arguments (asking jurors to put themselves in a party's shoes), the court found that in context, the statements were directed at witness credibility, not improper jury identification with a party. As to alleged "per diem" arguments (quantifying damages by a daily rate), the court found no such argument was made; defense counsel used gift values as a starting point and urged upward adjustment for intangibles. As to an implication that Handy bore responsibility for his own death, the court agreed the statement was improper but found it was an isolated, minor aberration that did not prejudice the outcome.

Jury Instructions

The court instructed the jury on all twelve statutory factors for wrongful death damages, though Handy Jones sought only non-economic damages. The court found the instructions were legally correct and not misleading; the fact that defendants used the full instruction to highlight Handy Jones's litigation strategy did not render it erroneous.

Conscious Pain and Suffering Damages

Handy Jones argued she should have been permitted to seek damages for Handy's pain and suffering before death, permitted under a recently amended Minnesota statute. The court applied the law of the case doctrine, noting that Handy Jones had previously acknowledged she deliberately chose not to seek amendment before the first trial, and presented no new basis to change that ruling.

Because only one improper statement was identified and it caused no demonstrable prejudice, the court found no cumulative effect warranting a new trial. The motion to alter or amend the judgment seeking a new trial was denied.

Attorney's Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Law of the Case and Prior Denial

After the first trial, Judge Doty denied attorney's fees on the ground that the contingency fee agreement adequately compensated counsel. The court here found that ruling was clearly erroneous: under § 1988, the fee-shifting inquiry focuses on what the losing defendant must pay, not on what counsel receives under a contingency agreement. The earlier denial did not bar reconsideration.

Lodestar Calculation

The court used the "lodestar" method — multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate — as the starting point.

Hourly Rates

The court applied the Minnesota (Twin Cities) market rate, rejecting a national rate argument. Rates were set as follows: - Kenneth White: $390/hour (undisputed; approximately 40 years of experience) - Kevin O'Connor: reduced from $750 to $550/hour (30 years' experience, national § 1983 practice, roughly 80 trials, but insufficient documentation for the higher rate) - Paul Bosman: reduced from $550 to $450/hour (17 years' litigation experience, but only 5 in civil rights) - Brianna Long: reduced from $350 to $275/hour (5 years of experience, never filed a notice of appearance, work treated as more analogous to a law clerk) - Nathaniel Cobbett: reduced from $400 to $275/hour (same rationale as Long; fewer than 3 years of experience, no notice of appearance)

Hours Expended

With the exception of White's records, the court found billing records to be vague (e.g., eight hours described as "review of file material"), to include block billing (e.g., 300 hours in a single entry for 2019), and to include clerical tasks (e.g., preparing exhibit books, creating PowerPoint presentations). The court applied a 15% reduction to hours billed by O'Connor, Bosman, Long, and Cobbett. After reduction: O'Connor 1,282.86 hours; Bosman 803.25 hours; Cobbett 120.66 hours; Long 80.83 hours; White 93.8 hours (unreduced).

Success

The court found that Handy Jones achieved excellent results. Dismissed claims were not factually distinct from surviving claims. Handy Jones obtained a liability verdict under unusually difficult circumstances (no video evidence; decedent was armed) and two multimillion-dollar awards from two separate juries. No reduction for limited success was applied.

Upward Multiplier

The court applied a 1.5x upward multiplier (Handy Jones sought 2.5x). The lodestar is presumed reasonable, but upward adjustment is permitted in exceptional cases. The court found this case exceptional due to: (a) documented difficulty obtaining competent local counsel — a prior attorney filed a voluntary dismissal, Handy Jones refiled just three weeks before the statute of limitations expired, and out-of-town counsel was required; and (b) factual difficulty in proving the claims, which the court described as potentially the first-ever plaintiff liability verdict in a police shooting case where the decedent was armed and there was no video evidence.

Total Fees

The base lodestar was $1,159,027.25. Multiplied by 1.5, the total fee award is $1,738,540.88, payable by Nathaniel Younce.

Costs

Handy Jones sought $49,387.22 in costs. The Clerk of Court had previously taxed only $480, and Handy Jones did not appeal that judgment. The court found the request overstated recoverable costs: attorney travel expenses, shipping expenses, expert fees, and undocumented transcript fees are not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The court awarded $480 in costs.

Prejudgment Interest

Handy Jones sought prejudgment interest on the $1 million past damages award under Minnesota Statute § 549.09. The court held that prejudgment interest was available, rejecting defendants' argument that damages must be "reasonably ascertainable" before interest can run — a standard the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously rejected in Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1988). The court also rejected defendants' argument that because the City must indemnify Younce, the lower interest rate applicable to governmental entities should apply; the judgment is against Younce individually, so the 10% rate applies.

Prejudgment interest runs from February 21, 2020 (when the state court complaint was filed) through January 13, 2025 (the date of the second verdict), a period of 1,789 days. At $273.97 per day (10% of $1 million divided by 365), the total prejudgment interest is $490,132.33. No prejudgment interest was awarded on the $1.5 million punitive damages award, as Minnesota law excludes punitive damages from prejudgment interest.

Disposition

  1. Plaintiff's Second Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 207] is GRANTED in part: attorney's fees of $1,738,540.88, costs of $480, and prejudgment interest of $490,132.33, all payable by Defendant Nathaniel Younce.
  2. Plaintiff's Motion to Alter/Amend/Correct Judgment [Docket No. 220] is DENIED.
  3. Documents referencing gang affiliation provided by Defendants are entered into the trial record as sealed Court Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
The authoritative version

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