Demaria v. New York State Unified Court System

Background

Vince DeMaria was a senior court clerk employed by the New York State Unified Court System (UCS). The New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) was UCS’s administrative arm. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, UCS required personnel to be vaccinated unless they received a medical or religious exemption.

DeMaria requested a religious exemption. He said that receiving a COVID-19 vaccine would conflict with his religious beliefs because of the vaccines’ connection to fetal cell lines. The exemption committee asked him about his prior and expected use of other medicines and vaccines that had been tested using fetal cell lines. DeMaria acknowledged using some of those products, including Tylenol, Advil, atorvastatin, and certain vaccines. The committee denied his exemption request, and UCS terminated him on August 4, 2022, after he did not provide proof of vaccination.

UCS discontinued the vaccination requirement in February 2023 and later reinstated DeMaria to his former position in May 2024. The reinstatement did not provide backpay or benefits for the period between his termination and reinstatement, apart from two months of unemployment benefits.

DeMaria sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims for failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and for disparate treatment because of his religion. Both sides moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence leaves any important factual dispute for a trial.

Failure-to-Accommodate Claim

Title VII generally requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practice unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship. The parties agreed that DeMaria informed UCS of a religious belief conflicting with the vaccination requirement and that he was terminated for not complying. They disputed whether his belief was religious and sincerely held, and whether accommodating him would have imposed an undue hardship.

The court denied summary judgment on whether DeMaria’s beliefs were religious in nature. DeMaria presented evidence that his Christian faith guided his conduct, that he viewed abortion as a sin, and that receiving a vaccine connected to fetal cell lines would violate his beliefs. The defendants pointed to his use of other products that had been tested using fetal cell lines. The court held that a reasonable jury could credit either side’s evidence. Because the issue involved DeMaria’s motivations and credibility, it could not be resolved on summary judgment.

The court also denied the defendants’ request for summary judgment based on a lack of sincerity. Although the defendants could rely on DeMaria’s inconsistent conduct, the court found that the record also contained substantial evidence supporting his claim that his beliefs were sincerely held. A jury therefore had to resolve the conflict.

The court granted DeMaria’s motion for summary judgment on the defendants’ undue-hardship defense. The defendants relied on the costs of accommodating other unvaccinated employees, including paid time for testing and related overtime or reduced work completion. The court held that this evidence did not show a substantial, individualized burden attributable to accommodating DeMaria. The defendants also did not provide evidence that DeMaria’s work presented the kinds of safety risks associated with healthcare workers or employees serving highly vulnerable populations.

Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim and granted in part and denied in part DeMaria’s partial motion for summary judgment. The court resolved the undue-hardship issue for DeMaria but left the religious-nature and sincerity issues for a jury.

Disparate-Treatment Claim

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on DeMaria’s separate Title VII disparate-treatment claim. DeMaria argued that his termination occurred under circumstances suggesting discriminatory intent.

The court found no direct evidence of discriminatory intent. It also rejected DeMaria’s argument that the exemption committee’s lawyer-heavy membership showed discrimination. The evidence showed that the committee had granted many religious exemptions, including more religious than medical exemptions, and that the defendants provided a neutral explanation for including lawyers on the committee.

DeMaria’s proposed comparator, another senior court clerk, was also Christian and therefore belonged to the same protected class. The court further found that the available evidence did not show the two employees were similarly situated in all material respects. The court rejected as speculative DeMaria’s arguments that the supplemental affidavit request was unusually probing or departed from normal procedure.

The court also held that, even if DeMaria had established an initial case of disparate treatment, the defendants had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him: he did not comply with the vaccination requirement after his exemption request was denied and after UCS gave him additional time to provide proof of vaccination. The court found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that this reason was a pretext for religious discrimination.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ motions for summary judgment. It granted DeMaria’s motion on the undue-hardship issue, denied the defendants’ motion on the failure-to-accommodate claim, and granted the defendants’ motion on the disparate-treatment claim. The case will proceed to trial on the remaining failure-to-accommodate claim.