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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 8, 2025

Eletson Holdings Inc. v. Levona Holdings Ltd.

Judge
Lewis Liman
Docket
1:23-cv-07331
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
28
DiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Eletson Holdings v. Levona Holdings, Judge Liman denied intervenors’ motion to compel discovery from counsel and granted counsel’s motion to quash a deposition subpoena.

Who this affects

The ruling affected Intervenors Apargo Limited, Fentalon Limited, and Desimusco Trading Limited by denying their motion to compel discovery, and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Levona Holdings Ltd. by granting the motion to quash Quinn Emanuel’s deposition subpoena.

What happened

In Eletson Holdings Inc. v. Levona Holdings Ltd., intervenors sought documents and testimony from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, Levona’s counsel, about when Levona learned of documents potentially supporting its effort to challenge an arbitration award.

The intervenors argued that Levona’s request for additional time to challenge the award made its lawyers’ communications relevant. Quinn Emanuel opposed the requests, citing the burden of investigating opposing counsel, the availability of information from Levona and other witnesses, and attorney-client and work-product protections.

Judge Lewis J. Liman denied the motion to compel, except for documents Quinn Emanuel had already produced showing when it first received the documents, and granted Quinn Emanuel’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Eletson Holdings Inc. v. Levona Holdings Ltd. · No. 1:23-cv-07331
Judge
Lewis Liman
Date
Aug. 8, 2025

Background

Intervenors Apargo Limited, Fentalon Limited, and Desimusco Trading Limited sought discovery from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for Levona Holdings Ltd. The discovery concerned documents that Levona said could support its challenge to an arbitration award and its claim that the time limit for seeking that relief should be extended because extraordinary circumstances prevented an earlier filing.

The requested information included when Quinn Emanuel learned about the documents, what it and Levona did to obtain and use them, and alleged obstacles to raising fraud-related arguments earlier. Intervenors also served a deposition subpoena seeking testimony from Quinn Emanuel about the documents, their relationship to Peter Kanelos, and Quinn Emanuel’s diligence and timing.

Legal standards

The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which limits discovery to relevant and proportional, nonprivileged information. It also applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which requires a court to quash or modify a subpoena that requires protected material or creates an undue burden.

Because the discovery was directed to opposing counsel, the court applied the Second Circuit’s flexible approach for attorney discovery. Relevant considerations included the need for discovery from the lawyer, the lawyer’s role in the litigation, the risk of attorney-client privilege and work-product problems, and the amount of discovery already conducted. Attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications made to obtain or provide legal advice. The work-product doctrine protects materials prepared for litigation, including counsel’s legal strategies and mental impressions.

Motion to compel

The court held that Intervenors did not show that the need for discovery from Quinn Emanuel justified the burden and intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. The court reasoned that Levona was the real party in interest and that many, if not all, of the requested documents could have been sought from Levona itself. Information about when Levona learned of the documents could also be obtained from Levona, its representatives, and other witnesses.

The court further found that the requested communications had limited relevance. Intervenors could argue from what Levona knew at earlier points that Levona should have acted sooner, without obtaining confidential communications between Levona and its lawyers. The court also stated that Levona could not have used the documents for its challenge until the bankruptcy court permitted their use. The court found that the relevant efforts to obtain and disclose the documents were documented in the public record.

The court rejected Intervenors’ argument that Levona had waived attorney-client privilege by relying on equitable tolling. Levona had not testified about legal advice, placed its attorney-client relationship directly at issue, or claimed that it should be excused because it relied on its lawyers’ advice or because of attorney error. The court also found that Intervenors had not shown a substantial need for protected work product.

The motion to compel Quinn Emanuel’s response to Requests for Production 4 and 19–25 was denied, with the narrow exception of documents Quinn Emanuel had already produced that were sufficient to show when it first received the documents at issue.

Motion to quash

The court granted Quinn Emanuel’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena. It found no reason to believe that Quinn Emanuel knew about the documents before Levona or had independent knowledge unavailable from Levona and other witnesses. A deposition of current trial counsel also posed a greater risk of intruding on the attorney-client relationship and revealing privileged information than document discovery.

Disposition

The court denied Intervenors’ motion to compel and granted Quinn Emanuel’s motion to quash. The Clerk of Court was directed to close Docket Nos. 474 and 512.

The authoritative version

Read the full 28-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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