Cookware Sustainability Alliance v. Kessler

Background

In 2023, the Minnesota Legislature enacted 'Amara's Law,' codified at Minn. Stat. § 116.943, which bans the sale or distribution of cookware containing intentionally added PFAS (per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances). Violations can result in criminal prosecution (up to a misdemeanor) and civil penalties of up to $15,000 per day per violation. Defendant Katrina Kessler, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, is authorized to enforce the statute.

Plaintiff Cookware Sustainability Alliance (CSA) is a non-profit industry group whose members — Meyer Corporation U.S., Groupe SEB, and Tramontina — are all headquartered outside Minnesota and all manufacture cookware containing PFAS. Together, CSA members supply approximately 47% of fluoropolymer nonstick products sold nationwide and 57% of those sold in Minnesota. The only Minnesota-based cookware manufacturer, Nordic Ware, discontinued its PFAS-containing product line rather than litigate, meaning 100% of fluoropolymer nonstick products on the global market are now manufactured outside Minnesota.

Procedural History

CSA filed its complaint on January 6, 2025, asserting claims under the dormant Commerce Clause (Counts 1 and 2), the First Amendment (Count 3), and the Supremacy Clause (Count 4). CSA sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court denied CSA's motion for a preliminary injunction on February 25, 2025, finding CSA was highly unlikely to succeed on the merits of its dormant Commerce Clause claims. The Commissioner then moved to dismiss the entire complaint. In response, CSA voluntarily agreed to dismiss the First Amendment and Supremacy Clause claims without prejudice, leaving only the dormant Commerce Clause claims at issue.

Legal Framework: The Dormant Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to regulate interstate commerce. Its 'dormant' or negative implication bars states from enacting laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. The court identified three ways a state statute can violate the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) it clearly discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of in-state commerce; (2) it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that outweighs any benefits; or (3) it has the practical effect of extraterritorial control over interstate commerce. CSA pursued only the first two theories.

Laws that overtly discriminate — facially, in purpose, or in effect — are subject to strict scrutiny (an extremely demanding standard). Non-discriminatory laws that nonetheless burden interstate commerce are evaluated under the Pike balancing test, which asks whether the burden on interstate commerce is 'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

Count 1: Discrimination Against Out-of-State Interests

CSA conceded that Amara's Law is facially neutral and was not enacted with discriminatory intent. The legislative record showed legislators were motivated by public health concerns about PFAS contamination, not protection of in-state industry. The court noted the absurdity of claiming protectionist intent given that Minnesota is home to 3M, one of the primary defendants in major PFAS litigation nationwide.

CSA's sole argument on this count was that the law has the discriminatory effect of burdening only out-of-state manufacturers (because Nordic Ware has complied). The court rejected this, explaining two key points. First, Nordic Ware's voluntary compliance does not remove it from the statute's reach — it remains prohibited from reintroducing PFAS cookware, bearing the same legal burden as any other manufacturer. Second, and more fundamentally, the court distinguished between a law's disparate impact on particular out-of-state businesses and a structural discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), the court held that a state may prohibit the sale of products manufactured entirely outside its borders, so long as the purpose is not to confer a competitive advantage on in-state entities. The court used a thought experiment: if a CSA member relocated to Minnesota, the statute would burden that company identically — demonstrating no structural market preference for in-state location. Count 1 was dismissed.

Count 2: Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce (Pike Balancing)

The court began by addressing the threshold question under the Supreme Court's 2023 decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023): whether CSA had plausibly alleged a substantial burden on interstate commerce (as opposed to a burden on individual businesses). This threshold must be met before Pike balancing is even reached.

CSA's core allegation was that the statute forces its members to choose among three costly options: (1) exit the Minnesota market; (2) overhaul their entire product lines globally; or (3) build separate Minnesota-specific production capacity. Accepting these allegations as true (as required at the motion to dismiss stage), the court nonetheless found them insufficient. Pork Producers directly forecloses such arguments: the Supreme Court held that compelling businesses to change their practices — even at significant cost — does not constitute a burden on interstate commerce itself. The burden falls on firms, not on the flow of commerce between states.

The court provided three additional reasons why CSA's Pike balancing argument fails even if a substantial burden were assumed:

Pike Balancing: Local Benefits The court must take the legislature's stated public health justifications at face value. Substituting judicial cost-benefit analysis for the legislature's policy judgment is precisely what the dormant Commerce Clause does not authorize. Pork Producers, 598 U.S. at 380.

Pike Balancing: In-State Consumer Costs Pork Producers also established that costs borne by in-state consumers under a law they democratically adopted do not count against the state in Pike balancing. The primary burden here — loss of access to PFAS-containing nonstick cookware — falls on Minnesota consumers, not out-of-state commerce.

Discrimination Failure Compounds the Burden Test Pork Producers clarified that the discrimination and undue-burden tests exist on a spectrum. A plaintiff that cannot prove discrimination faces an even higher bar under Pike. Having failed to show discrimination, CSA's Pike claim was further weakened.

The court emphasized that even accepting CSA's contested allegation that PFAS in cookware poses no appreciable risk to Minnesotans' health or the environment — something the Commissioner disputed with an internal report (which the court could not consider at the motion to dismiss stage) — CSA still failed to state a claim.

Disposition

The court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss in full: - Counts 1 and 2 (dormant Commerce Clause claims): dismissed with prejudice, barring refiling. - Counts 3 and 4 (First Amendment and Supremacy Clause claims, voluntarily dropped by CSA): dismissed without prejudice, preserving the theoretical ability to refile.

Judgment was ordered entered accordingly.