Solomon v. NY Office of the Professions

Background

Professor Abraham Solomon, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the NY Office of Professional Discipline; Elizabeth Carr; Dr. Gerard Brogan; Thania Fernandez, Esq.; and James V. McDonald. The court understood the NY Office of Professional Discipline to refer to the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct (BPMC), the entity that can revoke a physician’s license. Solomon alleged that the BPMC revoked his New York medical license on June 7, 2001, based on ten cases involving alleged negligence, gross negligence, incompetence, and fraudulent practice. He disputed those allegations and claimed that Brogan gave false testimony and that the Board failed to provide documents and properly address his complaints.

Solomon asserted claims for breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing, suborning perjury, denial of due process, negligence, fraud, pain and suffering, defamation, and wrongdoing. He sought $25 million in damages. The action was filed on February 19, 2025. The operative pleading was an amended complaint filed after the court directed Solomon to address the filing-fee requirement.

Legal standards

Because Solomon was allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees, the court was required to screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous or malicious, failed to state a legally valid claim, or sought money from a defendant immune from that relief. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented pleadings generously, Rule 8 still requires enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

Rulings on the claims

Criminal-law theories. The court dismissed claims based on alleged criminal violations, including suborning perjury, practicing law without a license, criminal fraud, and obstruction of justice. A private plaintiff cannot make a federal court or prosecutors arrest or prosecute another person; the decision whether to prosecute belongs to prosecutors.

Claims against the BPMC. The court dismissed the claims against the BPMC because the Board is an arm of New York State and is protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court. The court stated that New York had not waived that protection and Congress had not removed it through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court added that the same protection would apply to the NY Office of Professional Discipline if Solomon intended to sue that entity instead.

Claims based on participation in the disciplinary hearing. The court dismissed Solomon’s damages claims against Brogan under § 1983 to the extent they arose from Brogan’s role as a witness in the BPMC hearing. It held that participants in comparable administrative proceedings, including witnesses, have absolute immunity for their participation. The court said the same result applied to claims against Carr, Fernandez, or McDonald to the extent those claims also arose from their participation as witnesses.

Due-process claim and timeliness. The court identified a possible federal claim under § 1983 for denial of constitutional due process. It concluded that, even if the individual defendants were not immune, the claim appeared untimely. New York’s limitations period for § 1983 claims is three years, and such a claim generally begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Solomon alleged that his license was revoked on June 7, 2001, more than 23 years before he filed this action. The court found no allegations supporting equitable tolling, which is a limited extension of the filing deadline in compelling circumstances. It therefore dismissed any § 1983 due-process claims against a non-immune defendant as untimely and for failure to state a claim.

The court granted Solomon 30 days to replead his constitutional due-process claims in a second amended complaint. Any such pleading must name a non-immune individual who denied him due process and allege facts showing that the claim was timely or that equitable tolling should apply.

State-law claims and jurisdiction

Solomon also asserted state-law claims, including negligence, defamation, fraud, and breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that he had not adequately alleged diversity jurisdiction because, although he alleged that he resides in Florida, he provided only employment addresses for the defendants and did not sufficiently allege that the parties were citizens of different states. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the federal court’s ability to hear related state-law claims—because it had dismissed the federal claims. The court stated that it might consider the state-law claims if a second amended complaint states a viable federal claim or adequately alleges diversity jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim and under the doctrines of Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute immunity, with 30 days’ leave to replead. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The court directed that the case remain open until a civil judgment is entered and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, so fee-free status was denied for purposes of an appeal. If Solomon does not file a second amended complaint within the permitted time, the Clerk will be directed to enter judgment.