Brikman v. Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C.

Background

Igor Brikman, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C. (WestMed), Angelica Poniros, Mat Gawronski, and Gabbie Fried. He alleged nineteen claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York Labor Law.

Brikman alleged that he worked as a vascular technologist from July 2017 until WestMed terminated him on December 8, 2021. He claimed that the defendants discriminated against him based on age, Ukrainian national origin, and actual or perceived disabilities, failed to provide accommodations, retaliated against him for complaints and requests for accommodations, interfered with his family-leave rights, and labeled his termination as “time theft” to hide discriminatory or retaliatory motives. He also alleged that the defendants failed to pay timely wages, mileage expenses, and accrued paid time off.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. On that motion, the court generally accepted well-supported factual allegations as true and decided whether they plausibly stated claims. The court considered the EEOC right-to-sue notice but declined to consider most of the other documents submitted outside the complaint. It also declined to convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment.

Analysis and Holdings

Limitations and administrative exhaustion. The court denied dismissal of the claims as untimely because the complaint alleged conduct within the applicable limitations periods, and older allegations could be considered as background. The court also denied dismissal of the first eight claims for failure to complete the required administrative process. The pleadings raised factual questions about which EEOC submissions were received and considered before the agency issued the right-to-sue notice. At this stage, Brikman sufficiently alleged that he had exhausted his federal discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims.

Federal hostile-work-environment claims. The court granted dismissal of Claims One and Eight under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Although Brikman alleged discriminatory comments, criticism, treatment of other employees, problems involving accommodations, and comments about his medical conditions, the court concluded that the allegations did not plausibly show conduct severe or pervasive enough for a reasonable person to find the workplace hostile or abusive.

New York hostile-work-environment claims. The court denied dismissal of Claims Eleven and Seventeen under the New York State Human Rights Law. The court explained that amendments effective October 11, 2019, eliminated the requirement that harassment be severe or pervasive and instead ask whether the plaintiff was treated less well because of a protected characteristic. The court concluded that Brikman’s allegations plausibly met that more protective standard.

Retaliation. The court denied dismissal of Claims Seven and Twelve. Brikman alleged that, shortly before his termination, he requested disability accommodations, complained about workplace discrimination, sought an investigation into another employee’s termination, and reported a pattern involving older employees, foreign-born employees, and employees with actual or perceived disabilities. The court found these allegations sufficient at the pleading stage to show protected activity and a possible connection to his termination based on the short time between the complaints and the termination.

Disability discrimination and accommodations. The court denied dismissal of ADA Claims Five and Six. Brikman alleged anxiety, sleep disorders, and cervical stenosis that affected sleep, breathing during severe anxiety, and the ability to perform manual tasks. The court found that these allegations plausibly described disabilities under the ADA. It also found plausible his allegation that he requested adjusted work hours, more balanced off-site coverage, and time off after a severe car accident and that Poniros responded that his anxiety was causing a problem and told him to deal with it. The court likewise denied dismissal of the related NYSHRL disability-discrimination and accommodation claims, identified as Claims Thirteen and Fourteen.

Family and Medical Leave Act claims. The court denied dismissal of Claims Nine and Ten. It found that Brikman plausibly alleged that Poniros, Gawronski, and Fried exercised sufficient supervisory authority to potentially be individually liable under the statute. It also found that his allegations about severe anxiety and sleep disorders, medical follow-ups, inability to get out of bed, notice of an intended leave request, and termination five days after notifying Fried of his plan to submit paperwork were sufficient to plead family-leave interference and retaliation claims.

Age and national-origin discrimination under New York law. The court denied dismissal of Claims Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen. Applying the amended New York standard, the court found that Brikman plausibly alleged that he was treated less well because of age and national origin, including through his termination and alleged replacement by a person in their mid-twenties who was born in the United States. The court also found those allegations sufficient at this stage to suggest that the defendants’ stated reason of “time theft” could have been a pretext. The court declined to dismiss Claim Eighteen, the NYSHRL aiding-and-abetting claim against the individual defendants, because it found an underlying discrimination claim was plausibly pleaded.

Wage and paid-time-off claims. The court partly dismissed Claim Nineteen. It allowed the NYLL claim for untimely payment of wages to proceed because Brikman plausibly alleged that his work involved enough physical labor to qualify him as a manual worker. It also allowed his NYLL claim for unpaid accrued paid time off to proceed because the court declined to consider the defendants’ employment-policy documents at this stage. The court dismissed the unpaid-paid-time-off claim under the FLSA, the mileage-reimbursement claims under the FLSA and NYLL section 193, and any claim under NYLL section 195(5), which the court held has no private right of action.

Other requests and final disposition. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, it granted dismissal of Claims One and Eight and the portions of Claim Nineteen concerning mileage reimbursement under the FLSA and NYLL section 193, paid time off under the FLSA, and NYLL section 195(5). It denied dismissal of the remaining claims. The court denied Brikman’s request for further leave to amend because the request was made only in his opposition brief and did not explain how the dismissed claims could be corrected. The court also denied his request to strike documents at that stage, but directed the clerk to strike one improperly filed document. The defendants were directed to answer the Second Amended Complaint within 14 days. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees.