Myers v. Itasca County HRA
- John Tunheim
- 0:24-cv-01395
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Judge Tunheim granted summary judgment for the housing agency, finding Myers waived her right to a hearing before her Section 8 vouchers were terminated.
Individuals receiving federally funded Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, particularly those facing termination of vouchers due to lease or program violations. The ruling underscores that explicitly declining an informal hearing offer in writing — even while protesting a termination — can constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the termination in court.
What happened
In Myers v. Itasca County HRA (Civil No. 24-1395), Tricia Marie Myers sued the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority and three of its employees after her Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher — a federally funded rental assistance program — was terminated in early 2024. The HRA terminated her vouchers after she admitted to illegal drug use following a December 2023 arrest. Myers claimed the termination violated her constitutional right to procedural due process — meaning she was entitled to proper notice and a fair opportunity to challenge the decision before it took effect.
Myers raised three main arguments. First, she said the hearing officer in an earlier, unrelated dispute was not neutral — but the court found no evidence supporting that claim and noted she had settled that dispute voluntarily. Second, she argued she never waived her right to a hearing on the drug-use termination — but a February 9, 2024 letter she wrote to the agency explicitly stated, 'I do not need to be heard further on this issue nor do I request an informal hearing.' The court rejected her explanation that the letter referred to something else, finding the letter clearly addressed the termination at issue. Third, she argued the HRA should have sent separate notices to her adult son — but federal regulations require notice to the household as a family unit, not to each individual member separately.
Judge Tunheim granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the HRA gave Myers the legally required notice and opportunity to be heard, and that Myers herself declined that opportunity. Her separate motion asking the court to reconsider an earlier ruling was denied as moot because the case was resolved on other grounds.
The detailed version
- Myers v. Itasca County HRA · No. 0:24-cv-01395
- John Tunheim
- Aug. 19, 2025
Background
Plaintiff Tricia Marie Myers, appearing without a lawyer (pro se), sued the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) and three of its employees — Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg — in both their official and individual capacities. Myers had been receiving Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV Program vouchers), a federally funded rental assistance benefit, beginning in October 2022.
The case involves two separate termination proceedings. The first arose in November 2023, when the HRA sought to terminate Myers's vouchers for failing to report increased household income. An informal hearing was held on January 9, 2024, and the dispute was resolved by settlement: Myers could keep her vouchers in exchange for repaying excess benefits she had received.
The second and central termination arose on January 31, 2024, when the HRA notified Myers it was terminating her vouchers effective February 29, 2024, because she had confessed to illicit drug use in a post-Miranda statement (a statement made after receiving constitutional warnings about the right to remain silent) following a December 2023 arrest. The notice informed Myers she could request an informal hearing to challenge the termination, with a deadline of February 14, 2024.
On February 9, 2024, Myers wrote a two-page letter to the HRA protesting the termination. Despite raising objections, the letter stated: 'I do not need to be heard further on this issue nor do I request an informal hearing.' On February 28, 2024 — after the deadline — Myers sent another letter requesting a hearing 'ASAP.' The HRA did not hold a hearing because the deadline had passed.
Claims
Myers alleged violations of her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in connection with the loss of her housing vouchers. She also made a passing reference to an equal protection claim, which the court declined to address substantively because Myers provided no basis for it.
Myers also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to stop the Itasca County District Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals from proceeding with criminal cases she alleged were in retaliation for this lawsuit. That motion was denied in May 2025 because those entities were not parties to the case. Myers then moved for reconsideration of that denial.
Legal Standard
The court applied the standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Myers as the nonmoving party, but Myers was required to present admissible evidence — not mere allegations — showing a genuine issue for trial.
Analysis
Procedural Due Process Framework
Before terminating a housing voucher, the HRA must provide the participant with an informal hearing that includes: timely and adequate notice of the reasons for termination; an opportunity to challenge adverse evidence and present arguments; the right to retain counsel; an impartial decision-maker; a decision based solely on the evidence and applicable rules; and a written statement of reasons. The court cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), as the governing framework.
First Argument: Neutral Hearing Officer
Myers argued that the January 9, 2024 informal hearing — on the income-reporting issue — was conducted by a biased reviewer. The court found no evidentiary support for this claim. Under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(4)(i), the HRA has broad authority to designate a hearing reviewer, subject only to the limitation that the reviewer cannot be the person who made or approved the challenged decision. The court also noted that Myers had voluntarily settled that dispute and therefore waived any right to seek judicial relief regarding it. The court found no procedural due process violation on this point.
Second Argument: Waiver of Hearing on Drug-Use Termination
Myers argued she never waived her right to an informal hearing on the February 2024 drug-use termination. Federal regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1)(iv) require the HRA to offer an informal hearing before terminating a family's voucher for such reasons.
The court rejected Myers's argument. Her February 9, 2024 letter — titled 'Termination of Assistance' and explicitly responding to the termination notice — stated she did not need a hearing. Myers argued in response that this language referred to a separate issue involving her adult son, not her own termination. The court disagreed, finding the letter's subject line, opening sentence, and substance all addressed the drug-use termination at the heart of the case. The HRA fulfilled its regulatory obligation by offering a hearing; Myers declined it. The court found no procedural due process violation.
Third Argument: Separate Notice for Adult Son
Myers argued that because none of the termination letters were addressed to her adult son specifically, he suffered an independent procedural due process violation. The court rejected this argument, citing HUD regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1), (c), (d), and (e)(2)(i), which consistently refer to notice to 'a participant family' rather than requiring separate notice and hearing opportunities for each household member. The court noted Myers had the ability to advocate on her son's behalf — as she did in this very litigation — when the family received the termination notices. The court found no procedural due process violation on this basis.
The court noted in a footnote that a party may in some circumstances assert the rights of a third party, but because no party briefed that third-party standing issue, the court did not resolve it.
Equal Protection
Myers made a passing reference to an equal protection claim. The court declined to develop or sustain that claim on her behalf, finding no substantive basis presented.
Disposition
The court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims. The court also denied Myers's Motion to Reconsider as moot in light of the summary judgment ruling. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.