Castagna v. Daniel P. Driscoll

Background

Joanne Castagna sued Daniel P. Driscoll, Secretary of the Army, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She alleged that she was discriminated against because of her disability when she was denied leave. After earlier rulings limited her claims, the remaining claim was based on alleged discriminatory denial of sick leave.

Castagna worked as a Public Affairs Specialist for the United States Army Corps of Engineers in the New York District. In November 2020, she requested three days of annual leave because she did not feel comfortable traveling to work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Her supervisor, Kenneth Wells, denied the request based on the Corps’ mission needs and the Public Affairs Office’s ability to complete upcoming assignments. Castagna was allowed to use four hours of sick leave for a doctor’s appointment and was permitted to work remotely for the rest of that month.

In January 2021, after learning that a Corps commander had been exposed to COVID-19, Castagna told Wells that she was uncomfortable going into the office. After Wells determined that she had not been exposed to the commander, Castagna requested one day of sick leave to avoid the office while the risk of further virus spread subsided. Wells denied the request because it did not fit any of the categories authorized by the Office of Personnel Management sick-leave policy. The policy allowed sick leave for medical treatment, incapacity caused by illness or certain other conditions, or exposure to a communicable disease that would make the employee’s presence at work a health risk.

Motion and legal standard

Driscoll moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is proper when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For a disability-discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff generally must show that the employer is covered by the statute, that she has a disability, that she is qualified for the position, and that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. The court stated that the disability must be the but-for cause of the adverse action.

The court noted that Driscoll did not contest the first three elements, including that Castagna was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The court therefore focused on whether Castagna had evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that either leave denial occurred because of her disability.

Court’s analysis

Regarding the November 2020 annual-leave request, Castagna testified that Wells never mentioned her disability in connection with the request. She presented no evidence that Wells or anyone else made negative remarks about her disability, that annual leave was approved for similarly situated employees without disabilities, or that otherwise supported an inference of discriminatory intent.

The court also found that Driscoll offered a nondiscriminatory reason for denying the annual leave: the Corps’ mission needs and Castagna’s assignment to cover a high-profile event. Castagna did not dispute that Wells gave those reasons. She did not present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that those reasons were a pretext, meaning a false explanation masking discrimination. The court also noted that Wells testified he made the decision based on the information available to him about Castagna’s accommodation request, and that Castagna later received limited sick leave and permission to work remotely.

Regarding the January 2021 sick-leave request, Castagna admitted that she sought leave to avoid the office while possible virus spread subsided and that Wells denied the request because it did not fall within the three categories in the Office of Personnel Management policy. She also admitted that Wells did not mention her disability. She did not identify a non-disabled employee who received sick leave outside the policy or provide other evidence of discriminatory intent.

The court stated that even if Wells misunderstood or incorrectly applied the sick-leave policy, that would not change the undisputed evidence that he denied the request because he believed it was not covered by the policy. Castagna therefore did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the sick-leave denial was because of her disability.

Disposition

Judge Stewart D. Aaron granted Driscoll’s motion for summary judgment. The court directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Driscoll and close the case.