Roble v. Bondi

Background

Mahamed Abdi Roble is a Somali national who came to the United States as a refugee in 1995 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1997. Following criminal convictions for a drug offense, violation of a no-contact order, and two domestic-assault offenses (one felony), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him in 2017.

An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Roble removed but initially granted him withholding of removal to Somalia, finding he faced a likely threat to his life because his half-brother — a prominent secular political activist — had been condemned to death by al-Shabaab and other Islamist militant groups through a fatwa. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed that grant, finding a felony domestic-assault conviction made Roble ineligible for withholding of removal, but later granted him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) — a separate form of relief available when a person shows it is more likely than not they would be tortured if removed. The final result was an order of removal to Somalia with CAT deferral preventing enforcement. The parties agree that CAT deferral remains in place.

Because ICE could not remove Roble to Somalia (due to the CAT deferral) and could not find a willing third country, it released him in October 2019 on an Order of Supervision — a conditional release with ongoing requirements. Roble complied with all conditions for nearly six years.

On July 18, 2025, ICE arrested Roble and revoked his Order of Supervision. The written notice given to him stated only that "ICE has determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future" and that "based on changed circumstances" he would be returned to custody. No specific changed circumstances were identified. Roble has been held at the Freeborn County Adult Detention Center in Albert Lea, Minnesota.

Roble filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a request for a court to determine whether the government's detention of a person is lawful — on August 11, 2025, together with a motion for a temporary restraining order. The Government filed its opposition, and the court resolved the matter on the papers.

Legal Framework

Federal courts have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions from persons who claim to be detained in violation of federal law or the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that immigration detainees may invoke this authority.

Under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the government cannot detain a noncitizen with a final removal order indefinitely if there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The relevant implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, requires ICE to release such a person on an Order of Supervision. Once released, ICE may re-detain the person only if "on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future." 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Upon re-detention, ICE must notify the person of the "reasons for revocation" and promptly hold an informal interview to allow the person to respond. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Relevant factors for assessing likelihood of removal include ICE's history of removal efforts, the ongoing nature of those efforts, the noncitizen's cooperation, the foreseeable results of removal attempts, and the State Department's views on removability. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).

Roble's Three Claims

Roble raised three grounds for relief: (1) ICE violated its own regulations by providing inadequate notice and failing to demonstrate changed circumstances; (2) ICE's conduct was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) his detention violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court granted relief on the first ground and declined to reach the APA and constitutional claims, citing the well-established principle that courts avoid deciding constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on other grounds.

Holding on Regulatory Claims

Inadequate Notice

The court found that ICE's notice failed to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Rather than stating the actual reasons for revocation, the notice merely parroted the statutory/regulatory standard — that removal was "significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future" based on "changed circumstances." The court observed that this language is not individualized to Roble; the same words would apply verbatim to any noncitizen re-detained under this regulation.

The court analogized to basic due process principles: a person cannot meaningfully respond to reasons for adverse government action if no actual reasons are given. It cited another recent District of Minnesota case, Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-2144, where a magistrate judge similarly recommended habeas relief on identical facts. The court concluded that a notice which only recites the regulatory standard does not satisfy the regulatory requirement to provide "reasons."

Failure to Demonstrate Changed Circumstances

The court also found that ICE failed its burden to demonstrate that changed circumstances made removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Although the ultimate burden in habeas proceedings ordinarily falls on the petitioner, the court held that the regulations place the initial burden on ICE to establish changed circumstances before re-detaining someone — applying the default principle that the burden rests on the party seeking to change the existing state of affairs. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).

The only evidence of changed circumstances the Government offered was a statement, in its brief filed roughly three weeks after Roble's arrest, that ICE had "requested third country removal assistance from [Enforcement and Removal Operations] HQ" on August 11, 2025. The court found this wholly insufficient. It provided no information about what assistance was requested, the history of ICE's prior third-country removal efforts for similarly situated individuals, the ongoing nature of efforts specifically for Roble, Roble's cooperation with those efforts, or any realistic prospect of success. The court cited and relied on analogous recent cases — Nguyen v. Hyde, 2025 WL 1725791 (D. Mass.), and Hoac v. Becerra, 2025 WL 1993771 (E.D. Cal.) — where courts similarly rejected the government's reliance on pending travel document requests as insufficient to demonstrate changed circumstances. The court also noted that ICE had been unable to find a third country for Roble as far back as 2019, and the Government offered no explanation for why the current effort was more likely to succeed.

The court described the case as "not a close call," finding that ICE both gave a deficient notice and, even after holding Roble for over a month, failed to show his removal was any more likely than the day he was first released.

Remedy

The court granted the habeas petition and ordered Roble released by 5:00 p.m. CDT on August 27, 2025, subject to the conditions of his existing October 21, 2019 Order of Supervision. The Government's counsel was separately ordered to file a sworn declaration by 10:00 a.m. CDT on August 28, 2025, confirming compliance.

The court denied Roble's requests for broader injunctive relief. It declined to issue an injunction indefinitely restricting ICE's ability to re-detain Roble in the future, finding any such harm speculative and therefore insufficient to support injunctive relief. It also declined to enter a class-wide injunction prohibiting ICE from detaining other similarly situated noncitizens in Minnesota, noting that Roble did not bring this as a class action and made no showing that the Government's conduct affected anyone beyond himself.

Roble's motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot.

Note on Scope

The court explicitly did not decide Roble's APA claim or his Fifth Amendment due process claim. It also did not decide what impact a pending class action in the District of Massachusetts might have on any broader injunctive relief, since the speculative nature of that request provided an independent basis for denial.