Freeman v. Bisignano

Background

Plaintiff Kaylee F. applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act on January 5, 2022, alleging disability onset on October 4, 2019. Her date last insured — the last date by which she had to be found disabled to qualify for DIB — was March 30, 2020. Her alleged impairments included PTSD, depression with anxiety and panic attacks, bone spurs on her right foot, ankle problems, memory loss, fear of men, and glaucomatous optic atrophy of the left eye.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her claim at the initial determination and again on reconsideration. An ALJ held a hearing on December 9, 2022, at which both Kaylee F. and a Vocational Expert (VE), Pauline Pegram-Wargel, testified. On January 5, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding Kaylee F. not disabled.

ALJ's Findings

The ALJ found a long list of severe impairments, including glaucomatous optic atrophy of the left eye, multiple orthopedic conditions, PTSD, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, borderline personality disorder, and ADHD, among others. However, the ALJ found that none of these impairments, individually or in combination, met or equaled a listed impairment under the SSA's Listing of Impairments.

The ALJ determined Kaylee F.'s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) — the most she could do despite her limitations — allowed her to perform light work, with the following restrictions: no crawling or climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no work in extreme heat, humid environments, at unprotected heights, or around moving mechanical parts; no production-rate pace; occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers but no interaction with the public; occasional exposure to atmospheric conditions; work with large objects; simple tasks and simple work-related decisions; and occasional adaptation to changes in work routine.

At step five of the five-step disability analysis — where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform — the ALJ relied on the VE's testimony. The VE identified three light-work jobs (Marking Clerk, DOT No. 209.587-034; Routing Clerk, DOT No. 222.687-022; and Photo-Copy Machine Operator, DOT No. 207.685-014) and three sedentary-work jobs (Document Preparation Clerk, DOT No. 249.587-018; Sorter, DOT No. 521.687-086; and Assembler, DOT No. 669.687-014) that a person with Kaylee F.'s RFC could perform. The ALJ found Kaylee F. not disabled.

The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Kaylee F. then sought review in federal district court. Both parties consented to disposition by the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Plaintiff's Arguments

Reasoning Level Conflict

Kaylee F. argued that the ALJ erred by adopting VE-identified jobs whose descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) — a Labor Department publication defining occupational requirements — require reasoning levels that exceed her RFC. Specifically: - Marking Clerk, Routing Clerk, and Photo-Copy Machine Operator carry Reasoning Level 2, defined as requiring a worker to apply commonsense understanding to carry out "detailed but uninvolved" instructions and deal with "a few concrete variables" in standardized situations. - Document Preparation Clerk carries Reasoning Level 3, defined as applying commonsense understanding to carry out instructions in written, oral, or diagrammatic form and dealing with "several concrete variables."

Kaylee F. argued these requirements are inconsistent with an RFC that limits her to simple tasks, simple work-related decisions, and occasional adaptation to changes.

Visual Acuity Conflict

Kaylee F. also argued that Marking Clerk, Routing Clerk, and Sorter require "near frequent acuity" — a vision-related job requirement — which is incompatible with her severe impairment of glaucomatous optic atrophy of the left eye. She argued the ALJ's failure to include vision-related limitations in the RFC and hypothetical to the VE was error.

Court's Analysis and Holdings

Reasoning Level Challenge

The court denied relief on this ground. It noted that the DOT describes maximum requirements for a generic job, not requirements tailored to a specific claimant. The RFC determination (step four) and the jobs-in-the-national-economy determination (step five) are separate processes, with different parties bearing the burden of proof at each step. Because the RFC is determined before potential jobs are identified, some incongruence between RFC language and DOT job descriptions is inherent and expected.

The court found that the ALJ acted within permissible discretion in relying on the VE's expert testimony. The VE testified that Kaylee F. could perform the listed jobs, acknowledged that her testimony was not entirely consistent with DOT definitions, and explained that her professional experience and master's degree in Rehabilitation Counseling supported her conclusions where the DOT did not. Under Eighth Circuit precedent (Welsh v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2014)), an ALJ is entitled to rely on such VE testimony, and the court must accept it as substantial evidence. The court also noted that the VE stated the listed jobs were examples, and that other jobs matching Kaylee F.'s RFC also existed.

Visual Acuity Challenge

The court also denied relief on this ground. While the ALJ did list glaucomatous optic atrophy of the left eye as a severe impairment, the court noted that a finding of "severe" impairment at step two does not automatically require corresponding RFC limitations. An impairment may be severe yet not translate into a functional work limitation if the record does not support such a connection. Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2006).

The medical record contained no substantive documentation of vision problems affecting Kaylee F.'s ability to work. A 2017 referral for glaucoma testing resulted in "no diagnosis" at that time, and there were no further records of testing or treatment. The court found that because the record contained no basis for a vision-related work limitation, the ALJ's decision not to include one in the RFC was supported by substantial evidence. The court also observed that Kaylee F. appeared to raise the vision issue for the first time in her federal court briefing.

Disposition

The court denied the relief requested in Plaintiff's Brief, granted the relief requested in Defendant's Brief, and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.