De Ciel v. Porter

Background

Reine A. De Ciel, representing herself, brought a single claim for “defamation and slander” against Michael Lamar Porter. The complaint invoked 28 U.S.C. § 4101 and sought $100,000 in damages. According to the complaint, De Ciel had an online relationship with Porter for three years. She alleged that when Porter met her at the “Kimbilio Hotel” on December 15, 2024, he deliberately misrepresented their relationship, causing hotel staff to mistreat her. She also alleged that Porter falsely accused her of extortion and later sent her a cease-and-desist letter.

Porter moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, improper service of process, and failure to state a claim. He also filed a motion to strike under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute, which allows certain claims based on protected speech or petitioning activity to be challenged at an early stage.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The court held that § 4101 does not provide a private right of action. Instead, it defines “defamation” for purposes of laws concerning recognition of foreign defamation judgments. Because De Ciel’s claim under § 4101 was not a legally valid federal claim, it could not provide federal-question jurisdiction.

The court nevertheless found that De Ciel plausibly alleged diversity jurisdiction. The complaint sought more than $75,000, and the allegations plausibly supported an inference that De Ciel was a California citizen and that Porter was not a California resident. The court therefore denied Porter’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Personal Jurisdiction

The court denied dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. De Ciel had not shown that Porter was “at home” in California for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. But the court found that her allegations plausibly supported specific personal jurisdiction. She alleged that Porter committed the alleged defamation while present at the Kimbilio Hotel in California, which satisfied the first two parts of the relevant test: an intentional act directed at the forum state. Porter did not present a compelling showing that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

Venue

The court granted dismissal for improper venue. De Ciel did not allege that Porter resided in California or the Northern District of California, and she did not allege facts showing that a substantial part of the events occurred in that district. The complaint placed the underlying events at the Kimbilio Hotel in Sacramento. The court stated that Sacramento is in the Eastern District of California, not the Northern District of California.

Service of Process

The court granted dismissal for improper service. The summons served by the U.S. Marshal was addressed to the Wolf Law Firm concerning Porter. Porter submitted a declaration stating that the firm was not authorized to accept service for him. The court also rejected De Ciel’s argument that emailing the original documents was sufficient, explaining that email is not a proper method of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2).

Failure to State a Claim

The court granted dismissal for failure to state a claim. The complaint’s asserted federal basis, § 4101, does not create a private right of action. The court explained that De Ciel could potentially bring a defamation claim under California law, but that such a claim would need to identify the allegedly defamatory statements specifically. The complaint, in its current form, did not plead an actionable claim.

Anti-SLAPP Motion

The court denied Porter’s motion to strike under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute without prejudice. The court explained that the action had been dismissed for improper venue, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim, and that the Anti-SLAPP statute applies to state-law claims rather than the federal claim De Ciel pleaded.

Disposition and Amendment

The court granted Porter’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, improper service of process, and failure to state a claim, and otherwise denied the motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion to strike without prejudice. Any amended complaint was due September 19, 2025. The court stated that an amended complaint must separately plead each claim and the facts supporting each claim. If De Ciel filed an amended complaint, the court would screen it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 before ordering service. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 10 and 22.