Bakambia v. Ghebre

Background

Marc Amouri Bakambia is a prisoner housed at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater (MCF-Stillwater). He filed a pro se (self-represented) civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes against more than twenty defendants divided into two groups.

The first group — the 'DOC Defendants' — are employees of the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC), including Commissioner Paul Schnell, Warden William Bolin, correctional officers, medical personnel in the Health Services Unit, a case worker, and an ombudsman. The second group — the 'Centurion Defendants' — are Genet Ghebre, Stephen Craane, and Louis Shicker, employees of Centurion, a private Texas company that contracts with the DOC to provide medical services to prisoners.

Bakambia's complaint asserted claims for: (1) deliberate indifference to his chronic medical conditions (Eighth Amendment); (2) First Amendment retaliation for filing prior lawsuits; (3) excessive force; (4) procedural due process violations related to a disciplinary proceeding; and (5) violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA).

Both defendant groups moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on May 23, 2025, recommending that all claims be dismissed except Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against three DOC defendants — Reid, Oliveras, and Oberembt. Bakambia timely objected, triggering de novo (fresh, independent) review by District Judge Provinzino under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Bakambia's Objections and the Court's Rulings

Objection 1: Alleged Fraud in Meet-and-Confer Statement

Bakambia argued that counsel for the Centurion Defendants committed fraud by falsely certifying in a procedural filing that he had attempted to confer with Bakambia before filing the motion to dismiss. The court found no reversible error. Bakambia offered no argument that the alleged misstatement affected the outcome of the motion, and the court noted that Bakambia himself had raised mail-delivery problems at MCF-Stillwater — problems the court had already acknowledged when extending Bakambia's deadline to file objections. The objection was overruled.

Objection 2: Centurion Defendants' Failure to Address All Allegations

Bakambia argued that the Centurion Defendants' motion to dismiss should have failed because they did not rebut every allegation in the complaint, citing Kelsey v. Ewing, 652 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1981). The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, Bakambia did not identify which specific allegations the Centurion Defendants failed to address. Second, Kelsey addressed summary judgment (a different procedural stage requiring the moving party to rebut material factual disputes), not a motion to dismiss. On a motion to dismiss, defendants need not rebut every factual allegation; rather, the plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a plausible claim. The objection was overruled.

Objection 3: 'Normalizing' Fraudulent Conduct

Bakambia argued that the magistrate judge 'normalized' allegedly false statements by Ghebre regarding medical records and by Anderson and Cerney regarding incident reports. The court found this objection too vague and undeveloped to address — Bakambia did not explain what error was made or how a different approach would change the outcome. The objection was overruled.

Objection 4: Conspiracy Claims (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3))

Bakambia alleged that multiple defendants conspired against him. The court analyzed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which requires a plaintiff to show: (1) a conspiracy; (2) whose purpose was to deny equal protection of the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) resulting injury. The claim also requires proof of 'class-based animus' — i.e., that the conspiracy was motivated by discriminatory intent toward a protected class.

The magistrate judge found two independent grounds for dismissal: (a) for most defendants, Bakambia made no particularized allegation of an agreement; and (b) for the subset of defendants (Reid, Renstrom, and Corrado) where an agreement could arguably be inferred, the 'intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine' barred the claim — that doctrine holds that agents of the same governmental entity acting within the scope of their employment cannot legally conspire with each other. Additionally, Bakambia failed to allege class-based discriminatory motive as to any defendant.

Bakambia also argued that the magistrate judge wrongly analyzed the claim under § 1985(3) rather than § 1983. The court found this argument forfeited because Bakambia had not raised it before the magistrate judge. The court also noted in a footnote that even under § 1983, Bakambia's conspiracy claim would fail because his underlying First Amendment retaliation claim — the constitutional violation on which the conspiracy rested — was itself not viable. The objection was overruled.

Objection 4 (continued): First Amendment Retaliation

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Bakambia had to plausibly allege: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity (here, filing prior lawsuits); (2) defendants took adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the protected activity.

Bakambia alleged that he was placed in disciplinary segregation following an incident in the Health Services Unit in which he argued with Ghebre over an X-ray order, and that the notice of violation (NOV) issued against him for disorderly conduct contained false information. However, the court applied the rule from Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008), and Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186 (8th Cir. 2014): a retaliation claim based on a disciplinary charge fails if the disciplinary decision is supported by 'some evidence' that the prisoner actually committed the violation. Even a single officer's report — if reviewed by an impartial decision-maker — constitutes 'some evidence.'

Here, the court found that Bakambia's own pleadings and attached exhibits provided 'some evidence': a correctional officer told Bakambia he could not speak to staff the way he was speaking; a second officer (Cerney) documented that Bakambia raised his voice and made her concerned for staff safety; and Bakambia himself signed a 'Waiver of Hearing' form stating 'I ADMIT TO THE VIOLATION AS LISTED ABOVE AND WAIVE MY RIGHT TO ALL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS INCLUDING APPEAL.' Because the disciplinary decision was supported by some evidence, the retaliation claim was legally foreclosed. The objection was overruled.

Objection 5: Due Process Claims (Fourteenth Amendment)

Bakambia argued that Warner withheld exculpatory evidence and denied him the right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (the constitutional guarantee that the government cannot deprive a person of liberty without fair procedures).

The court identified two independent reasons to dismiss this claim. First, prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison officials following internal prison regulations or in the procedures used to place them in segregation. Any protected liberty interest must relate to the nature of confinement itself — specifically, whether it imposes 'atypical and significant hardship' compared to ordinary prison life. Second, and more fundamentally, Bakambia signed a 'Waiver of Hearing' admitting the violation and expressly waiving all procedural rights including appeal; he cannot claim a due process violation for rights he voluntarily surrendered.

The court further noted that the Eighth Circuit has held that prisoners transferred to administrative segregation are entitled only to 'informal, nonadversary' procedures — notice of the reasons, time to prepare, and an opportunity to present their views to a neutral decision-maker. There is no constitutional right to call witnesses or to an evidentiary hearing. The objection was overruled.

Objection 6: 'Use of Force' Standard

Bakambia argued that the magistrate judge erred by recharacterizing his claims for 'misuse of force' and 'aiding and abetting misuse of force' as 'excessive use of force' claims under the Eighth Amendment, which he claimed applied a higher legal standard. The court found this objection undeveloped: Bakambia cited no authority and did not explain what standard he believed should apply. The court noted it is proper — indeed required — for courts to construe pro se complaints within the appropriate legal framework. The objection was overruled.

Objection 7: Constitutionality of DOC Disciplinary Policy

Bakambia argued that the DOC's policy for disciplinary proceedings was unconstitutional because it denied him legal representation and the right to call witnesses, and that officials deliberately classified his charge as 'minor' (rather than 'major') to avoid procedural requirements. The court rejected this argument. Under Spann v. Lombardi, 65 F.4th 987 (8th Cir. 2023), a transfer to administrative segregation requires only informal due process — notice, time to prepare, and a chance to present views to a neutral decision-maker. Inmates have no constitutional right to call witnesses or to a formal hearing. Bakambia received a pre-hearing with Sergeant Hammer in which the charge was discussed, and he then executed a voluntary waiver of all further rights. The objection was overruled.

Disposition

Judge Provinzino overruled all seven categories of objections and adopted the R&R in its entirety. The order provides:

Surviving Claims

The only claims that remain active are Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims: Reid and Oberembt face both injunctive and monetary-relief claims; Oliveras faces only a monetary-relief claim. None of those three defendants objected to the R&R's conclusion that those claims may proceed.