Archilla v. Bondi

Background

Petitioner Sarail A. is a noncitizen detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Freeborn County Detention Center. On July 16, 2010, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. In June 2017, after his release from prison, ICE served him with a notice of intent to issue a final order of removal under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), which covers noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. A removal order was issued on August 18, 2017.

Sarail represented to ICE that he was a Canadian citizen born in Ontario to a Jamaican mother. ICE contacted Canadian authorities, who found no record of his birth there. ICE also contacted the Jamaican consulate for travel documents but received no response. After three years of detention with no successful removal, ICE released Sarail on November 23, 2020, under an Order of Supervision pursuant to a then-operative court order in another case. ICE claims Sarail failed to complete required biometric check-ins on four occasions between 2023 and 2025.

On May 6, 2025, ICE issued a Notice of Revocation of Release, re-detaining Sarail based on "changed circumstances" and a stated determination that there was "a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." The notice did not specify what circumstances had changed. An informal interview was held the same day. After the petition was filed, ICE received guidance that Jamaica was cooperating with ICE to issue travel documents, and ICE requested a query for Sarail's Jamaican birth certificate. However, the opinion notes that no record evidence established that Sarail is a Jamaican citizen.

Sarail filed a pro se (self-represented) petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 19, 2025, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which allows federal courts to order the release of someone held in violation of federal law or the Constitution. He argued: (1) ICE detained him without due process; (2) the detention violated the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) he was entitled to injunctive relief barring re-detention without court approval. He also sought attorneys' fees. On August 29, 2025, an attorney appeared on his behalf and filed motions for a temporary restraining order and expedited relief.

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the habeas petition be granted, that requests for injunctive relief be denied, and that respondent Lisa Monaco be terminated from the case. The magistrate judge identified two regulatory violations under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), which governs revocation of supervised release for noncitizens subject to a final order of removal.

First, the magistrate judge found that the Notice of Revocation failed to inform Sarail of the specific reasons for revoking his release. The regulation (8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3)) requires ICE to notify the noncitizen of "the reasons for revocation" and to conduct an informal interview so the person can respond. The magistrate judge reasoned that merely citing "changed circumstances" without identifying what changed was insufficient to allow a meaningful response.

Second, the magistrate judge found that ICE failed to properly determine whether there was a "significant likelihood" of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Drawing on the First Circuit's decision in Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608 (1st Cir. 2023), the magistrate judge concluded that ICE must consider the factors listed in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f) — including the alien's history of compliance, ICE's history of removing people to the relevant country, and the State Department's views — when making that determination.

The Government's Objections and the Court's Analysis

Respondents (the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and the ICE Field Office Director) objected to the R&R on four grounds.

Objections 1–3: Sufficiency of the Notice

The government argued that identifying "changed circumstances" as the basis for revocation was itself the "reason" required by the regulation — that the regulation required nothing more. The government invoked the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others), arguing that if the regulation had intended to require specific facts, it would have said so.

Judge Tostrud rejected this argument. Analyzing the plain text of the regulation, the court found that the ordinary meaning of "reason" — as both general and legal dictionaries define it — refers to an explanation that accounts for or justifies an action. Simply naming a category of revocation ("changed circumstances") does not explain what circumstances changed or why that supports a likelihood of removal. The court also applied the presumption of consistent usage: other subsections of § 241.13 use "reason" or "reasons" to refer to substantive factual information, not mere categories. The court further found that the procedural requirements of § 241.13(i)(3) — including the right to submit evidence and respond to the stated reasons — would be rendered meaningless if ICE only had to identify a category without specifying facts.

The court also rejected the expressio unius argument, finding that "changed circumstances" cannot reasonably be understood to exclude the specific circumstances that changed, and that context strongly suggested the opposite — that specific facts are required.

The court noted that every case it found addressing § 241.13(i)(3) treated the "reasons for revocation" as specific facts, not conclusions, citing Nguyen v. Hyde (D. Mass. 2025), Liu v. Carter (D. Kan. 2025), Roble v. Bondi (D. Minn. 2025), and Bailey v. Lynch (D.N.J. 2016). The government cited no contrary authority.

Objection 4: The Likelihood-of-Removal Determination

The government argued that Sarail had not squarely challenged ICE's underlying determination that his removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that the § 241.13(f) factors should not be imported into the § 241.13(i)(2) analysis.

Judge Tostrud overruled this objection as well. Reading Sarail's pro se petition liberally (as courts are required to do for self-represented parties, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)), the court found that Sarail did implicitly challenge the correctness of ICE's revocation determination by asserting that his detention was unlawful and citing the legal standard for revocation.

On the merits, the court agreed with the magistrate judge that the § 241.13(f) factors apply when ICE makes a likelihood-of-removal determination under § 241.13(i)(2). The court reasoned that subsection (f) provides the only regulatory guidance on how to properly assess foreseeability of removal, and that the more burdensome procedural steps in subsections (e) and (g) are distinct from the substantive factors in subsection (f). The Eighth Circuit has not ruled on this question, but the court found that all persuasive authority supported applying the § 241.13(f) factors, and that the government cited no case rejecting that approach.

Disposition

Judge Tostrud overruled all of the government's objections and accepted the magistrate judge's R&R. The court ordered: