Nguyen v. Marshall

Background

Trang Nguyen, a federal prisoner proceeding without an attorney, filed claims based on events at the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, and the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California. She alleged constitutional violations involving medical care and due process, along with claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and a constitutional damages theory recognized under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents. Her additional allegations included false imprisonment, denial of access to courts, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of property, and denial of medical care.

The court construed the complaint as naming William K. Marshall, identified as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; Melissa Rios-Marquez, identified as the Director of the Bureau’s Western Regional Office; and the United States. Nearly all of Nguyen’s factual allegations concerned her confinement in the secured housing unit at the Miami facility. The court stated that the only allegation concerning Dublin was that Nguyen reported several medical symptoms and was examined nearly three months later by a doctor who was not named as a defendant. Nguyen’s requested damages also concerned alleged harm at the Miami facility.

Venue Analysis

For Nguyen’s Bivens claims, the court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which generally permits a federal civil case to proceed where a defendant resides, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or, if no other district is available, where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. The court found that not all defendants resided in the Northern District of California, that a substantial part of the relevant events did not occur there, and that the case could be brought in another district. Because the events occurred principally at the Miami facility, the court held that the Southern District of Florida was the proper venue for the Bivens claims.

For the Federal Tort Claims Act claims, the court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b), which allows those claims only in the district where the plaintiff resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred. The court stated that Nguyen did not reside in the Northern District of California and that her state-law tort claims arose from events at the Miami facility. It also stated that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not cover constitutional torts and that the Dublin-related claim was a constitutional tort rather than a Federal Tort Claims Act claim.

Ruling

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may dismiss a case filed in the wrong venue or transfer it to a proper federal court in the interest of justice. The court chose transfer because the Southern District of Florida was a proper venue for both the Bivens and Federal Tort Claims Act claims. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

The Northern District of California deferred to the Florida court on Nguyen’s application to proceed without paying filing fees. The clerk was directed to transfer the case and terminate the specified docket entry from the California court’s docket. The order did not decide the merits of Nguyen’s claims.