Perryman v. Bloomington

Background

On September 4, 2021, two suspects committed an aggravated robbery at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota. Both suspects were described as Black males in their early twenties with dreadlocks, wearing black shirts and medical face masks. Automated license plate readers identified their getaway car as stolen. Surveillance footage of the robbery was blurry and faces were not clearly identifiable.

One victim's stolen debit card was used at a Brooklyn Center Walmart shortly after the robbery. Bloomington Police Detective Andrew Risdall obtained surveillance footage from that Walmart. A crime analyst forwarded a still photo from that footage to the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, where facial recognition software found no match. However, a county analyst named Nicole Hughes noticed a resemblance between Suspect 1 and a prior booking photo of Kylese Perryman and relayed that observation to Risdall. Neither Hughes nor crime analyst Rachel Storlie made a positive identification; both deferred to Risdall as the investigating detective.

Risdall spent two to three minutes comparing the booking photo to the Walmart still photo. He also accessed a state arrest photo database (called MRAP, the Minnesota Repository of Arrest Photographs) and saw that Perryman had tattoos listed, though no photos of the tattoos were in the database. Risdall did not check the written tattoo descriptions. Based on this review, Risdall incorrectly identified Perryman as Suspect 1. He then issued a statewide law enforcement alert called a 'Keep Our Police Safe' (KOPS) alert with a 'pick up and hold' designation, which conveys that there is probable cause to detain the named individual.

On September 25, 2021, a Minnesota State Patrol trooper pulled Perryman over for a traffic violation, saw the KOPS alert, and contacted the Bloomington Police Department to verify it was still valid. Risdall confirmed through a dispatcher that it was. The trooper arrested Perryman, who spent the weekend in jail. A criminal complaint for first-degree aggravated robbery was filed against Perryman on September 28, 2021. Throughout October 2021, Perryman's attorney sent Risdall and the Hennepin County Attorney's Office exculpatory evidence: photos of Perryman's forearm tattoos (which Suspect 1 did not appear to have), a photo of Perryman at a family gathering on the day of the robbery, and a work timecard showing he was employed during the car theft. The charges were dismissed on November 16, 2021.

Perryman then filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — the federal civil rights statute that allows individuals to sue state and local officials for violations of constitutional rights. He alleged: (Count I) false arrest; (Count II) false imprisonment; (Count III) municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services for an unconstitutional departmental custom; (Count IV) civil conspiracy; (Count V) violation of the Fourth Amendment's Particularity Clause; (Counts VI and VII) state tort law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment; and (Count VIII) unreasonable search and seizure under the Minnesota Constitution.

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment (a ruling without a trial) is proper when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and one party is entitled to win as a matter of law. On cross-motions, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to whichever side is not moving.

Ruling on Unidentified Defendants (Does 1–10 and Does 11–20)

The court granted summary judgment for the unidentified 'Doe' defendants because their identities were never determined during discovery, and both parties agreed dismissal was appropriate. Those defendants were dismissed with prejudice and terminated from the case.

Counts I and II: False Arrest and False Imprisonment — Defendant Risdall

Risdall invoked qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that protects government officials from personal liability unless they violated a 'clearly established' constitutional right. To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show both that a constitutional right was violated and that the right was clearly established at the time.

The court found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Risdall's investigation was reasonable. Key disputed issues include:

- Whether Risdall failed to compare Perryman's known tattoos (scars, marks, and tattoos, or 'SMTs') against the suspect, despite it being generally accepted investigative practice to do so. The Walmart footage showed Suspect 1's forearm with no visible tattoo, while Perryman had forearm tattoos. Even without a photo, written tattoo descriptions were available in MRAP, and Defendants' own expert acknowledged those should be consulted. - Whether Risdall watched the Walmart surveillance video at all, and if so, how carefully. The still photo used for identification showed Suspect 1 wearing a face mask, making identification more difficult. If Risdall failed to review the full video — which showed Suspect 1's face more clearly — a jury could find that unreasonable.

Because a reasonable jury could decide either way on the reasonableness of Risdall's investigation, the court denied both Risdall's motion for summary judgment (on qualified immunity grounds) and Perryman's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II. These claims proceed to trial against Risdall.

Counts I and II: False Arrest and False Imprisonment — Defendant Bloomington

The court granted summary judgment for Bloomington on Counts I and II because Perryman did not argue that Bloomington bore Monell liability for the reasonableness of Risdall's investigation itself. His Monell arguments were directed solely at the KOPS alert system, addressed under Count III.

Count V: Particularity Clause — Defendant Risdall

The Fourth Amendment's Particularity Clause requires that arrests be based on proper probable cause determinations. The court applied the Eighth Circuit's holding in Furlow v. Belmar (2022), which established that a warrantless arrest based on a notice from one officer to another is unconstitutional unless either (1) the arresting officer independently finds probable cause or (2) the arresting officer worked closely with the issuing officer on a joint investigation.

Here, the state trooper and Risdall never spoke directly; communication went through a dispatcher. This did not satisfy the 'close working relationship' requirement. The trooper made no independent probable cause finding. Therefore, Perryman's constitutional rights were violated.

However, the court found that Risdall was entitled to qualified immunity on this count because no court had specifically ruled that an officer cannot issue a 'pick up and hold' KOPS alert. While Voss v. Feine and Furlow v. Belmar established related principles about alert-based arrests generally, neither 'squarely governed' the specific act of issuing such a KOPS alert. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count V was granted, and Count V was dismissed with prejudice.

Count III: Monell Liability — Defendant Bloomington (Unofficial Custom)

Even when an individual officer is shielded by qualified immunity, a municipality (city or county government) can still be held liable under § 1983 if an official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberate failure to train caused the constitutional violation. This is called Monell liability, named after Monell v. Department of Social Services.

Perryman argued that Bloomington had an unofficial custom of treating 'pick up and hold' KOPS alerts as standalone probable cause for warrantless arrests. To establish an unofficial custom, a plaintiff must show a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct so pervasive it effectively has the force of law, along with deliberate indifference or tacit authorization by policymaking officials.

The court found sufficient evidence of a pattern: Bloomington issued 1,794 KOPS alerts over five years, 331 of which carried the 'pick up and hold' designation. Bloomington employees testified that such alerts were understood to provide authority to detain. The court found that this evidence, combined with a lack of training on the constitutional limits of the KOPS system, established a widespread pattern that was similar to what happened to Perryman. Anyone arrested based solely on verification of one officer's probable cause finding suffered the same constitutional violation.

The court also found Bloomington was deliberately indifferent to this pattern, noting that the widespread use of the system should have prompted training to ensure constitutional use. Defendants failed to respond to Perryman's arguments on deliberate indifference and causation in their briefing, which the court treated as a waiver of those arguments. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count III was denied; this Monell claim proceeds.

Counts VI and VII: State Tort Claims — Risdall and Bloomington

Under Minnesota law, public officials are entitled to 'official immunity' for discretionary acts (acts requiring judgment) unless they acted with malice. An act is not malicious if it was objectively legally reasonable, performed in good faith, or did not violate a clearly established right.

The court found a genuine dispute about reasonableness (so the first and third prongs were not satisfied), but ruled that Risdall acted in good faith because as soon as exculpatory information was provided to him, he immediately forwarded it to the county attorney's office. Perryman did not address the issue of bad faith in his briefing. The court therefore found Risdall entitled to official immunity on the state tort claims.

Because Risdall was protected by official immunity, Bloomington was entitled to vicarious official immunity on the state tort claims as well. Although Perryman argued that extending vicarious immunity would 'reward' Bloomington for its unconstitutional KOPS practices, the court rejected this because Bloomington remains exposed to liability on Count III. Defendants' motion on Counts VI and VII was granted; those counts were dismissed with prejudice.

Count IV: Civil Conspiracy

Perryman voluntarily acknowledged that this claim was moot due to a settlement agreement. The court dismissed Count IV with prejudice.

Count VIII: Minnesota Constitutional Claim

The court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Count VIII because Perryman's state constitutional claim was coextensive with his federal § 1983 claims, meaning the same relief was available under federal law. The court declined to separately analyze the state constitutional claim, and Count VIII was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary of Dispositions

- Counts I and II (federal false arrest/false imprisonment) against Risdall: Both motions denied; claims proceed to trial. - Counts I and II against Bloomington: Defendants' motion granted. - Count III (Monell/KOPS custom) against Bloomington: Defendants' motion denied; claim proceeds. - Count IV (civil conspiracy): Dismissed with prejudice (settlement). - Count V (Particularity Clause against Risdall): Defendants' motion granted; dismissed with prejudice. - Counts VI and VII (state tort claims): Defendants' motion granted; dismissed with prejudice. - Count VIII (Minnesota Constitution): Defendants' motion granted; dismissed with prejudice. - Does 1–10 and Does 11–20: Dismissed with prejudice. - Defendants' request for costs and disbursements: Denied.