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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 5, 2025

Lee v. Foris Dax, Inc.

Judge
William Orrick
Docket
3:24-cv-06194
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
24
Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Lee v. Foris Dax, Judge Orrick dismissed claims against FDIC-R and Evans, dismissed most claims against Crypto.com, and let one unfair-competition theory proceed.

Who this affects

Jung Min Lee’s claims against FDIC-R and Catherine Evans were dismissed with prejudice; her aiding-and-abetting and receiving-stolen-property claims against Crypto.com were dismissed, while her unlawful UCL claim based on alleged Bank Secrecy Act violations remained.

What happened

In Lee v. Foris Dax, Jung Min Lee alleged that scammers used Crypto.com and First Republic Bank accounts to take almost $1 million from her husband, Patz, and that the defendants helped the scammers, received stolen property, or violated California’s unfair-competition law.

Judge Orrick ruled that Lee filed her claim against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver for First Republic Bank too late under the federal bank-receivership law. He also dismissed her claims against Catherine Evans, a former First Republic employee, because they were based on conduct covered by that law. As to Crypto.com, he found that Lee did not plausibly allege that Crypto.com actually knew about the fraud or substantially helped it, but he found plausible her theory that Crypto.com violated the Bank Secrecy Act’s anti-money-laundering requirements.

Judge William H. Orrick granted the FDIC-R and Evans motions to dismiss and dismissed Lee’s claims against them with prejudice. He granted Crypto.com’s motion to dismiss the aiding-and-abetting and receiving-stolen-property claims, but denied it as to Lee’s unlawful-prong unfair-competition claim based on alleged Bank Secrecy Act violations.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Lee v. Foris Dax, Inc. · No. 3:24-cv-06194
Judge
William Orrick
Date
Sept. 5, 2025

Background

Lee alleged that unknown cryptocurrency scammers persuaded her husband, Patz, who was over 65, to withdraw community-property funds from accounts at First Republic Bank and invest them in fraudulent cryptocurrency schemes. She alleged losses of close to $1 million and claimed that Foris DAX, Inc., doing business as Crypto.com, First Republic Bank as receiver through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC-R), and First Republic employee Catherine Evans aided and abetted fraud, unlawfully received stolen property, and violated the unlawful prong of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL).

The court had previously dismissed most claims and allowed Lee to amend her aiding-and-abetting and unlawful UCL theories. In her second amended complaint, Lee clarified that the alleged underlying torts were fraud, conversion, and trespass to chattels; added a claim for receiving stolen property under California Penal Code section 496(c); and added alleged violations of various statutes as possible bases for the unlawful UCL claim.

Crypto.com’s Motion

The court assumed, without deciding, that Lee had standing to bring the remaining claims because she alleged that the lost funds were community property. It dismissed the aiding-and-abetting claim because Lee did not plead facts showing that Crypto.com had the actual knowledge required for liability. Under the court’s analysis, actual knowledge could be inferred from circumstances only when the defendant “must have known” of the specific underlying wrong, rather than merely “should have known.”

The court found that Lee’s allegations about Crypto.com’s transaction data, security tools, knowledge of cryptocurrency scams, and allegedly flagged wallets did not meet that standard. The court also noted that Patz had no prior history with Crypto.com, making it difficult for the exchange to identify his transactions as unusual compared with his prior behavior, and that Crypto.com had asked him questions about his account activity. The court separately found that Lee had not shown the required substantial assistance. Because Lee had already received two opportunities to amend, the aiding-and-abetting claim was dismissed with prejudice.

The court also found the receiving-stolen-property claim implausible. Lee had to allege that the property was already stolen when Crypto.com received it, that Crypto.com knew it was stolen, and that Crypto.com received or possessed it. The court concluded that the complaint did not adequately allege either that the money was already stolen when Crypto.com received it or that Crypto.com had actual knowledge of that fact.

The court dismissed several proposed unlawful UCL predicates involving misrepresentations or consumer deception because Lee never had a Crypto.com account and therefore could not allege that she relied on Crypto.com’s representations. It rejected dismissal of the UCL theory based on alleged violations of the federal Bank Secrecy Act and related anti-money-laundering rules. The court reasoned that Lee was using those alleged violations as a predicate for the UCL claim, not asserting a free-standing Bank Secrecy Act claim, and that Crypto.com had not shown that the Bank Secrecy Act barred this use. The allegations that Crypto.com failed to maintain an effective anti-money-laundering program were therefore plausible at the pleading stage.

FDIC-R and Evans’ Motions

The court held that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) makes the administrative claims process jurisdictional for claims involving a failed bank and its receiver. Lee filed her administrative claim more than a year after the September 5, 2023 claims deadline, and the FDIC-R disallowed it as untimely.

FIRREA contains a narrow exception for a late claim when the claimant did not receive notice of the receiver’s appointment in time to file. The court concluded that the exception did not apply. It explained that lack of mailed notice of the claims deadline does not excuse exhaustion, and that published notices and Lee’s own pleadings showed that she had adequate notice, or at least enough information to trigger an obligation to investigate the receivership. The court also applied the jurisdictional bar to Evans because Lee’s claims against her were based on alleged wrongdoing in her capacity as a First Republic employee.

Disposition

The court granted the FDIC-R and Evans motions to dismiss, and Lee’s claims against those defendants were dismissed with prejudice. The court granted Crypto.com’s motion to dismiss all of Lee’s claims except the unlawful UCL claim based on alleged Bank Secrecy Act violations. The court denied Crypto.com’s motion as to that remaining UCL theory. The case management conference remained scheduled for September 30, 2025.

The authoritative version

Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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