Sharon U.

Background

Plaintiff Sharon U. applied for Title II disability insurance benefits on October 16, 2019, alleging a disability onset date that was later amended to May 1, 2019. The Social Security Administration denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. After an administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Nicholas Grey on May 11, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision on June 30, 2021, finding Sharon U. was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review in May 2022.

Sharon U. then filed a federal court action in 2022. That action was remanded by stipulation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner. On remand, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's 2021 decision and returned the case to ALJ Grey with specific instructions. A second administrative hearing was held on February 6, 2024. On March 14, 2024, ALJ Grey again denied benefits, concluding Sharon U. was not disabled during the relevant period. Sharon U. filed the present action on July 12, 2024.

ALJ's Five-Step Sequential Analysis

The Social Security disability evaluation proceeds through five sequential steps. At step one, the ALJ found Sharon U. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (work above a regulatory earnings threshold) during most of the relevant period, with the exception of the second quarter of 2022 through September 30, 2023. This finding was not challenged.

At step two, the ALJ found Sharon U.'s severe impairments were breast cancer and lymphedema (swelling from a damaged lymphatic system) in her left arm. Sharon U. challenged this finding, arguing the ALJ also should have identified her neuropathy (damage to the peripheral nervous system) as a severe impairment.

At step three, the ALJ found no impairment or combination met a listed, presumptively disabling impairment. This finding was not challenged.

At step four, the ALJ assessed Sharon U.'s residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most she could still do despite her impairments — as light work with limitations on climbing, left-arm handling, fingering, and overhead reaching. The ALJ found she could perform her past work as a customer service associate, office assistant, and receptionist, and therefore concluded she was not disabled. Because the step-four finding was sufficient, the ALJ did not reach step five.

Issues on Appeal

Sharon U. raised two main arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for discounting her subjective testimony about her symptoms, and (2) the ALJ erred at step two by not finding neuropathy to be a severe impairment.

The ALJ's Handling of Subjective Testimony

Social Security regulations and Eighth Circuit precedent require an ALJ who discounts a claimant's subjective symptom statements to provide specific, clearly articulated reasons supported by the record — not merely a conclusory finding. The ALJ must consider all relevant factors, including daily activities, the nature and intensity of symptoms, precipitating factors, medications, and other measures the claimant uses for relief. While the ALJ need not recite every factor, the decision must contain enough reasoning that a reviewing court can determine whether the evaluation is supported by substantial evidence (meaning more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance — the amount a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion).

Here, after summarizing Sharon U.'s testimony, the ALJ issued a single boilerplate paragraph stating that her statements about the intensity and limiting effects of her symptoms were 'not generally consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.' That was the entirety of the ALJ's analysis. The court found this wholly insufficient under binding authority, including Social Security Ruling 16-3p and Eighth Circuit decisions.

The court also considered whether the ALJ's subsequent summary of medical records elsewhere in the decision cured the deficiency, and concluded it did not, because that summary failed to correlate the evidence to any relevant factor or explain how the evidence contradicted Sharon U.'s statements.

Rejection of Government's Post-Hoc Rationales

The Commissioner defended the ALJ's decision by arguing (1) no medical professional recommended extended breaks or leg elevation, (2) the record did not show Sharon U. reported those needs to providers, and (3) Sharon U. engaged in substantial gainful activity for most of the adjudicated period. The court rejected all three arguments as improper post-hoc rationalizations — justifications offered by the government's lawyers that were not actually articulated by the ALJ. Under Chenery Corp. and Eighth Circuit precedent, a court reviews only the agency's stated rationale, not rationales counsel supplies later.

On the third argument, the court also found it rested on a scrivener's error in the ALJ's decision. Although the ALJ's decision at two points stated substantial gainful activity ran from April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2023, the ALJ's actual analysis found substantial gainful activity only from the second quarter of 2022 through September 30, 2023. Sharon U. did not, as the government argued, work for 'most' of the adjudicated period.

Harmless Error Analysis

Even when an ALJ errs, reversal is required only if the error was not harmless — meaning there is a reasonable chance the ALJ would have decided differently without the error. Here, the court found the error was not harmless for two independent reasons.

First, if Sharon U.'s testimony were credited and found to reflect medically determinable limitations, the independent vocational expert (IVE) testified at the February 2024 hearing that (a) needing to elevate her legs for one hour per day would preclude both light and sedentary work, and (b) needing a three-hour break after every two hours of work would be outside the tolerances of competitive employment. That testimony indicated a different outcome was possible if the ALJ had properly credited her subjective statements. Second, the error precluded meaningful judicial review, which independently renders it not harmless under Eighth Circuit authority.

Remand for Further Proceedings — Not Immediate Award of Benefits

Having found remand warranted, the court addressed whether to award benefits immediately or remand for further administrative proceedings. An immediate award of benefits is proper only when the proof of disability is overwhelming or strong with no contrary evidence; where conflicting evidence exists, remand for further consideration is appropriate.

The court declined to award benefits immediately. While the vocational expert's testimony supported Sharon U.'s position, the court found Sharon U.'s assertion that no contrary evidence existed in the record reflected only her interpretation of the evidence, not an undisputed factual conclusion.

The court also addressed a potentially significant development: a new Social Security Administration rule effective June 22, 2024, amended 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1)(i) to limit consideration of past relevant work to a five-year lookback period (down from fifteen years), and it appears under SSR 24-2P to apply retroactively to applications remanded after that date. The court noted that if this new rule applies on remand, it appears likely to result in a finding that Sharon U. has no past relevant work, and that applying Grid Rule 202.00 — which accounts for age, education, and lack of past relevant work — would ostensibly require a finding of disability, even if the ALJ were to again find capacity for light work. However, the court held that determination belongs to the Commissioner in the first instance, citing Papesh v. Colvin.

The court also declined to grant an immediate award based on the length of time the application has been pending (more than five and a half years), noting Sharon U. cited no legal authority establishing that passage of time alone is a sufficient basis for immediate award.

Disposition

Both parties' motions for summary judgment were stricken as filed in error because the Federal Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure governing Social Security appeals no longer permit summary judgment motions; the parties must present arguments through briefs only.

Plaintiff's request for relief was granted in part and denied in part: the request to remand for further administrative proceedings was granted; the request for an immediate award of benefits was denied. Defendant's request to affirm the ALJ's decision was denied. The case was remanded to the Social Security Administration under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the order.