Urbaniak v.Bisignano

Background

Plaintiff Sharon U. filed a Title II application for Social Security disability insurance benefits on October 16, 2019, alleging a disability onset date that was later amended to May 1, 2019. Her claimed impairments included breast cancer and lymphedema (fluid-buildup swelling) in her left arm, as well as neuropathy (damage to peripheral nerves causing functional disturbances). The Social Security Administration denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. After a telephonic administrative hearing on May 11, 2021, Administrative Law Judge Nicholas Grey (the "ALJ") denied her claim on June 30, 2021.

Sharon U. challenged that denial in a prior federal court action in 2022. That case was remanded by stipulation to the agency, and the Appeals Council in turn vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded for further proceedings with specific instructions. ALJ Grey held a second hearing on February 6, 2024, at which Sharon U. and an independent vocational expert (IVE) testified. The ALJ again denied benefits on March 14, 2024, finding Sharon U. not disabled during the adjudicated period (May 1, 2019, through the date of decision). Sharon U. filed the current federal action on July 12, 2024.

The ALJ's Five-Step Analysis

The Social Security disability determination follows a five-step sequential process. At step one, the ALJ found Sharon U. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (i.e., meaningful paid work above regulatory thresholds) throughout most of the adjudicated period, except from the second quarter of 2022 through September 30, 2023. This finding was not disputed.

At step two, the ALJ identified breast cancer and left-arm lymphedema as severe impairments — those that significantly limit ability to work — but did not identify neuropathy as a severe impairment. Sharon U. challenged this omission.

At step three, the ALJ found her impairments did not meet or equal any listing in the Social Security regulations that would automatically qualify her for benefits. Sharon U. did not challenge this finding.

At step four, the ALJ assessed Sharon U.'s residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most she can still do despite her limitations — and found she could perform "light" work with restrictions on climbing, left-hand handling, fingering, and overhead reaching. Relying on the IVE's testimony, the ALJ concluded she could perform her past relevant work as a customer service associate, office assistant, and receptionist. Because he found she could perform past relevant work, the ALJ ended the analysis at step four (never reaching step five, which would have placed the burden on the government to show other available jobs).

Issues on Appeal

Sharon U. raised two arguments:

1. Subjective symptom evaluation: The ALJ failed to adequately explain why he discounted her testimony about needing to work only two hours at a time, take a three-hour break (including one hour of leg elevation), before resuming work. She argued this error was not harmless.

2. Step two neuropathy omission: The ALJ failed to evaluate whether neuropathy constituted a severe impairment.

Court's Analysis — Subjective Symptom Evaluation

When evaluating a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider the claimant's own descriptions of pain and limitations and may discount them only if they are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole — not merely because objective medical evidence does not fully support them. When discounting subjective statements, the ALJ must provide specific, clearly articulated reasons supported by the record. Relevant factors include daily activities; location, duration, frequency, and intensity of symptoms; aggravating factors; medications and their side effects; and other functional limitation evidence. See Social Security Ruling 16-3p; Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984).

Here, after summarizing Sharon U.'s testimony, the ALJ wrote only a single conclusory sentence: that her statements were "not generally consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence." The court found this plainly insufficient. The ALJ identified no specific factors, pointed to no specific inconsistencies, and provided no analysis connecting the evidence to any recognized evaluative criterion. A subsequent summary of medical history elsewhere in the ALJ's decision did not cure this deficiency because it likewise failed to connect the evidence to any credibility factor or explain how it contradicted Sharon U.'s testimony.

The government argued the record itself supplied "good reasons" — specifically, that no medical professional had recommended that Sharon U. take extended breaks or elevate her legs, and that she engaged in substantial gainful activity for most of the adjudicated period. The court rejected both arguments as improper post-hoc rationalizations — justifications supplied by the government's lawyers on appeal that the ALJ himself never articulated. Under settled administrative law principles (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)), an agency decision must stand or fall on the rationale the agency itself provided. The court also noted that the government's "most of the period" claim was itself based on a scrivener's error in the ALJ's decision: the ALJ actually found substantial gainful activity only from the second quarter of 2022 through September 30, 2023 — a fraction, not most, of the adjudicated period.

Harmless Error Analysis

An ALJ error requires remand only if it is not harmless. An error is harmless if there is no indication the ALJ would have decided differently absent the error. Here, the IVE testified at the 2024 hearing that (1) needing to elevate her legs for one hour per day would preclude even sedentary work, and (2) needing a three-hour break after every two hours of work would be outside the tolerances of competitive employment. If Sharon U.'s subjective testimony is credited and found to reflect medically determinable impairments, no competitive work would be available to her, and a disability finding would be required. Because the flawed credibility analysis was central to the RFC determination and could have changed the outcome, the error was not harmless. The error also independently required remand because it prevented meaningful judicial review.

Because this error independently justified remand, the court declined to address the step two neuropathy argument.

Type of Remand — Further Proceedings, Not Immediate Award

A court may award benefits directly only when "the proof of disability is overwhelming or where the proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). Where conflicting evidence exists, remand for further agency consideration is appropriate.

Sharon U. argued for an immediate award on two grounds:

First, she contended no record evidence refuted her need for extended breaks, combined with the IVE's testimony. The court found this characterization reflected only Sharon U.'s interpretation of the evidence. The court acknowledged evidence "strongly suggesting" she may be entitled to benefits, but found it insufficient to meet the "overwhelming" standard.

Second, Sharon U. pointed to a new Social Security Administration rule effective June 22, 2024, that limits consideration of "past relevant work" to the prior five years (down from fifteen years). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1)(i); SSR 24-2P. The rule appears to apply retroactively to applications remanded after its effective date. If it applies, Sharon U. would likely have no past relevant work on remand — and under "Grid Rule" 202.00 (a regulatory table that directs disability findings based on age, education, and work experience), she would appear to qualify as disabled even if the ALJ again finds her capable of light work. The court acknowledged this but held that making such a determination is for the Commissioner, not the court, in the first instance. The court cited Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1136 (8th Cir. 2015), in which the Eighth Circuit faced a similarly controlling Grid Rule but still remanded rather than awarding benefits directly.

The court also declined to treat the five-and-a-half year pendency of Sharon U.'s application as an independent basis for an immediate award, noting she cited no legal authority for that proposition.

Disposition

The court: - Struck both parties' motions for summary judgment as procedurally improper (the current Federal Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure governing Social Security appeals require decision on briefs, not summary judgment motions); - Granted in part Sharon U.'s request for relief — remanding the case to the Social Security Administration for further administrative proceedings consistent with the opinion; - Denied in part Sharon U.'s request for an immediate award of benefits; - Denied the Commissioner's request to affirm the ALJ's decision and dismiss the action.