Terrell v. City of Brentwood

Background

Jeremy Ryan Terrell sued the City of Brentwood, Officers Dustin Greene, Doug Morrison, and former Officer Ryan Rezentes. He alleged that, during an April 16, 2019 incident, the officers entered his parents’ home without a warrant, consent, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or another lawful justification. According to the First Amended Complaint, the officers ordered Terrell—who was naked and disoriented—to open his locked bedroom door at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and searched the room with a police dog. The officers later learned that Terrell did not match the burglary suspect’s description, released him, apologized to his family, and left.

Terrell alleged that the incident caused severe psychological harm, including hospitalization, inpatient psychiatric treatment, and diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, dissociation, and depression. He alleged that he could not consult counsel or begin litigation until December 2024. He filed suit in state court in April 2025, and defendants removed the action to federal court.

The First Amended Complaint asserted: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations; (2) a § 1983 municipal-liability claim against the City; (3) a claim under California’s Bane Act; and (4) a California common-law trespass claim.

Requests for Default, Striking, and Consolidation

The court denied Terrell’s request for entry of default against the officer defendants. Although the motions’ captions referred mainly to the City, the docket showed that all defendants filed the motions, all defendants were represented by the same counsel, and all defendants opposed the default request. The court construed the motions as filed by all defendants and concluded that the officers had indicated their intent to defend the lawsuit.

The court also denied defendants’ request to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint. Defendants had not shown that Terrell’s comments about removal and the statute-of-limitations defense were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant striking them.

The court denied defendants’ apparent request to consolidate this federal action with Terrell’s related state-court case. The state-court case had already been dismissed, and the court stated that it lacked authority to consolidate a state-court case with a federal case.

Federal Claims and Statute of Limitations

The court held that California’s two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to Terrell’s § 1983 claims. It rejected his argument for equitable tolling because he did not allege that he had timely pursued another legal remedy or notified defendants during the limitations period.

The court considered California’s tolling rule for mental incapacity. Terrell alleged that the 2019 incident caused psychological incapacity and that he remained unable to understand the legal significance of the incident or begin litigation until December 2024. The court found those allegations sufficient to address when the incapacity began, but insufficient to plausibly show that he continuously lacked the capacity to care for his property, transact business, make decisions, or understand the nature and effects of his actions throughout the entire period. His allegation that he returned to work in 2021 also suggested that he had regained capacity for at least part of that year.

The court rejected Terrell’s delayed-discovery argument. Under federal law, the § 1983 claims accrued when the alleged search, seizure, and detention occurred, even if Terrell did not yet understand that the conduct was unconstitutional. The court therefore dismissed the § 1983 claims concerning the April 2019 incident without prejudice as untimely. It dismissed the portion alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation with prejudice.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against the Officers

The court held that Terrell’s allegations about the home entry, search, detention, handcuffing, firearms, and police dog were the type of conduct governed by the Fourth Amendment. Because the Fourth Amendment specifically addresses that kind of government intrusion, the court dismissed the claim to the extent it was based on substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, with prejudice. The order did not dismiss the Fourth Amendment theory with prejudice; the conclusion states that the officer defendants’ Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim was dismissed without prejudice.

Municipal Liability Claim Against the City

Terrell alleged that the City had a longstanding practice of allowing warrantless entries and excessive force, failed to train or discipline officers, and concealed police-misconduct records. A municipal-liability claim under § 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that a City policy, custom, training failure, discipline failure, or ratification was the moving force behind a constitutional injury.

The court found that Terrell had plausibly alleged an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, but not enough facts to establish municipal liability. His allegations about two other incidents involving Officer Rezentes and the same police dog were insufficient to show a longstanding custom of warrantless entries. The court nevertheless found the two incidents sufficiently similar to support, at the pleading stage, a possible theory that the City had a practice or custom involving excessively forceful use of police dogs in non-emergency situations. The court dismissed that municipal-liability theory without prejudice, allowing amendment.

The court likewise dismissed without prejudice the failure-to-train and failure-to-discipline theories because two other incidents did not plausibly show the pattern of similar constitutional violations generally required for those theories. To the extent Terrell alleged that police chiefs ratified the officers’ conduct, the court found his allegations conclusory but allowed him to amend with supporting facts.

The court also dismissed without prejudice the claim that the City was liable for withholding police records. Terrell did not explain what constitutional right the records practices violated. The court stated that a cover-up theory is premature while the underlying claims remain pending unless the alleged cover-up itself deprives the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

California Claims

Defendants argued that Terrell’s Bane Act and trespass claims were barred because he had not first presented them to the City under the California Government Claims Act. The court rejected that argument because Terrell primarily sought declaratory and injunctive relief, not money or damages. The court denied dismissal of the state-law claims on that ground and did not decide whether they were barred by their own statutes of limitations.

The court also denied dismissal of the Bane Act claim. Terrell alleged that defendants entered his home, pointed weapons at him, used a barking police dog, handcuffed him while naked, and acted with specific intent to interfere with his constitutional rights. The court held that he did not need to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the alleged Fourth Amendment violation at this pleading stage.

Disposition

The court denied in part and granted in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. It denied the motion as to Terrell’s state-law claims. It dismissed without prejudice the § 1983 municipal-liability claim and the officers’ § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim. It dismissed with prejudice the officers’ § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot, denied the motion to strike, denied the request to consolidate, and denied Terrell’s request for entry of default. The court set September 29, 2025, as the deadline for Terrell’s second amended complaint.