Terrell v. City of Brentwood

Background

Jeremy Ryan Terrell sued the City of Brentwood, Officers Dustin Greene, Doug Morrison, and former Officer Ryan Rezentes. He alleged that, early on April 16, 2019, the officers entered his parents’ home with a police dog, ordered him to open his locked bedroom door while he was nude, pointed guns at him, handcuffed him, and searched the room. The officers later learned that Terrell did not match the description of the burglary suspect, released him, apologized to his family, and left.

Terrell alleged that the incident caused severe psychological harm, including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, dissociation, and depression. He claimed that he could not consult a lawyer or begin litigation until December 2024. He filed this action in state court in April 2025, and the defendants removed it to federal court.

The First Amended Complaint asserted four claims: a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; a § 1983 municipal-liability claim against the City; a California Bane Act claim; and a California common-law trespass claim. The defendants moved to dismiss, asked the court to strike parts of the complaint, and sought consolidation with another state-court case. Terrell separately requested entry of default against the officers.

Default, Motion to Strike, and Consolidation

The court denied Terrell’s request for entry of default against the officer defendants. Although the motion captions were not clear, the court found that the docket showed that all defendants had filed and defended the motions through common counsel. The court also concluded that any default would likely have been set aside because the unclear drafting was not culpable conduct by the officers, the defendants had potentially meritorious defenses, and setting aside default would not prejudice Terrell.

The court denied the defendants’ request to strike parts of the First Amended Complaint. Although the challenged paragraphs largely consisted of commentary about the case, the defendants had not shown that the commentary was prejudicial.

The court denied the apparent request to consolidate this action with Terrell’s state-court case. That state-court case had been dismissed, and the court stated that it lacked authority to consolidate a dismissed state-court case with a federal action.

Federal Claims and Statute of Limitations

The defendants argued that Terrell’s § 1983 claims were barred by California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. The court held that the federal claims accrued on April 16, 2019, when the alleged search and seizure occurred. Terrell’s later understanding of the legal significance of the incident did not delay accrual.

The court rejected Terrell’s argument for equitable tolling because he did not allege that he had pursued another legal remedy during the limitations period or that he had given the defendants timely notice of a possible claim.

The court also considered California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a), which can toll the limitations period for mental incapacity. The court accepted Terrell’s factual allegations as true at the pleading stage and found that his allegations plausibly connected the alleged incapacity to the 2019 incident. But the court found that he had not plausibly alleged continuous incapacity for the entire relevant period. In particular, his allegations that he returned to work in 2021 suggested that he had regained at least some capacity, and his allegations of psychological distress did not by themselves show that he could not care for his property, transact business, or understand his actions.

The court therefore dismissed the § 1983 claims concerning the April 2019 incident without prejudice as untimely. It dismissed the portion based on the Fourteenth Amendment with prejudice for the separate reason that conduct covered by the Fourth Amendment must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than substantive due process.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against the Officers

The court held that Terrell’s allegations plausibly stated that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. The alleged warrantless entry, detention, handcuffing, pointing of firearms, and use of a police dog involved the type of intrusive governmental conduct governed by the Fourth Amendment. The court did not resolve whether the alleged conduct actually violated the Fourth Amendment; it dismissed the claim without prejudice based on the statute of limitations.

The court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment theory with prejudice because the alleged entry and detention were covered by the more specific protections of the Fourth Amendment.

Municipal-Liability Claim Against the City

The court dismissed Terrell’s § 1983 claim against the City without prejudice. Terrell alleged that the City had a longstanding practice of allowing warrantless entries and excessive force, failed to train or discipline officers, and concealed police-misconduct records.

The court found that Terrell plausibly alleged an underlying Fourth Amendment violation but did not allege enough incidents to establish a longstanding custom of warrantless entries or excessive force. His allegations concerning two other incidents involving Officer Rezentes and the police dog Marco were insufficient to establish a practice or custom at that stage, although the court found the incidents sufficiently similar to the alleged use of excessive force in Terrell’s case to support possible amendment.

The court likewise found that the two incidents did not plausibly establish the pattern of similar constitutional violations generally required for a failure-to-train or failure-to-discipline theory. To the extent Terrell alleged that police chiefs ratified the officers’ conduct, the court found his allegations conclusory but allowed him to amend that theory.

The court also dismissed without prejudice the claim based on withholding police records. Terrell did not explain what constitutional right the records conduct violated. The court stated that a records-delay or cover-up theory would require facts showing that the conduct itself deprived him of constitutional rights.

California Claims

The court denied dismissal of Terrell’s California Bane Act and trespass claims based on the California Government Claims Act. Because Terrell primarily sought declaratory and injunctive relief rather than money damages, the court held that he was not required to present those claims to the City before filing suit. The court did not otherwise decide whether those claims were timely.

The court also denied dismissal of the Bane Act claim for failure to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Terrell alleged that the defendants intentionally entered his home, pointed weapons at him, used a barking police dog, and handcuffed him while he was naked, and that they acted with specific intent to interfere with his constitutional rights. The court held that these allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage.

Disposition

The court denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. It denied dismissal of the state-law claims and granted dismissal of the § 1983 claims. The § 1983 municipal-liability claim and the officers’ § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim were dismissed without prejudice. The officers’ § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim was dismissed with prejudice.

The court denied the requests to strike portions of the complaint and to consolidate this case with the prior state case. It denied as moot the motion to dismiss the original complaint and denied Terrell’s request for entry of default. The court gave Terrell until September 29, 2025, to file a second amended complaint.