McCoy v. Jacobson

Background

Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., is a Georgia resident and professional long-haul truck driver who travels throughout the 48 contiguous states, returning to his home state only a few times per year. He holds valid carry permits from both Florida and Georgia. Minnesota, however, does not grant reciprocity to either state's permits, because the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety has determined that Florida's and Georgia's permitting standards are not sufficiently similar to Minnesota's. As of August 2025, Minnesota grants reciprocity to 33 states and denies it to 15, including Florida and Georgia.

Minnesota Statute § 624.714 requires anyone carrying a firearm in public to hold either a Minnesota permit to carry or a permit from a state to which Minnesota has granted reciprocity. Violation can result in a gross misdemeanor or felony. Minnesota operates a 'shall-issue' permitting regime: the state must issue a permit to any applicant who meets objective statutory criteria (safety training, age, citizenship/residency, no disqualifying criminal history, not listed in a criminal gang database), and applications must be resolved within 30 days or automatically granted.

Johnson and a co-plaintiff, David A. McCoy II, filed suit on January 7, 2025, alleging that Minnesota's refusal to honor all out-of-state carry permits violates the Second Amendment. McCoy later voluntarily dismissed his own claim after Minnesota extended reciprocity to Texas (where he held his permit). Johnson's lawsuit proceeded alone.

Defendant Bob Jacobson, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), arguing both that Johnson lacked standing and that the law is constitutional.

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

The court first classified the nature of Johnson's challenge. Although Johnson argued his claim was 'as-applied' (i.e., directed only at how the law operates as to him), the court looked past that label to the scope of the relief Johnson actually sought. Johnson requested a declaration that Minnesota must recognize permits from all other states and a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the carry-without-permit law against anyone holding any valid out-of-state permit. Because this relief would reach far beyond Johnson's personal circumstances, the court classified the challenge as facial. As a result, Johnson bore the burden of showing that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications, not just as applied to him. See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024).

Standing Analysis

Article III standing (the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff have a concrete stake in the outcome before a federal court can hear the case) requires showing: (1) a concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct; and (3) redressability by a favorable court ruling. Only the injury-in-fact element was contested.

The Commissioner argued that Johnson had no imminent injury because his future travel to Minnesota was speculative — he did not know his upcoming delivery schedule in advance. The court disagreed. Johnson alleged he travels through or to Minnesota several times a year as part of his regular job duties. The court held that at the pleading stage, general factual allegations of recurring injury suffice, and that Johnson's allegations were enough to plausibly establish an imminent injury. The court therefore found Johnson had Article III standing.

Constitutional Analysis Under Bruen

The court applied the two-step framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Step One: Plain Text

At step one, the court asks whether the Second Amendment's plain text covers the individual's proposed conduct. The analysis considers: (1) whether the plaintiff is among 'the people' the Second Amendment protects; (2) whether the firearms at issue are weapons in common use for self-defense; and (3) whether the plain text covers the proposed conduct.

The Commissioner argued that because the reciprocity provision regulates what permits the state recognizes — not individual conduct directly — it falls outside the Second Amendment's textual scope. The court rejected this argument, finding that the provision conditions individuals' ability to carry firearms in Minnesota and thus does regulate individual conduct.

The Commissioner also argued, relying on decisions from the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, that shall-issue permitting regimes should be treated as presumptively constitutional at step one — meaning they do not 'infringe' Second Amendment rights and therefore the analysis ends there. The court declined to adopt this approach absent clearer direction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has not yet adopted that framework. The court found this inquiry more appropriate at step two.

The court concluded that Johnson's proposed conduct — publicly carrying a firearm in Minnesota for self-defense — is covered by the Second Amendment's plain text. The conduct is therefore presumptively protected, and the analysis proceeded to step two.

Step Two: Historical Tradition

At step two, the government must demonstrate that its regulation is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Courts ask 'how and why' the regulation burdens the right to armed self-defense, requiring that both the burden and its justification be comparable to historical analogues.

Johnson also argued that the reciprocity provision specifically lacked historical support. The court disagreed, finding that the reciprocity provision does not independently burden Second Amendment rights — it extends recognition to out-of-state permits where standards are comparable, potentially making it easier for non-residents to carry in Minnesota. The court further stated that nothing in Bruen or the Constitution requires states to defer to other states' licensing standards, and states retain police-power authority to regulate who may carry firearms within their borders.

Disposition

Because Johnson's facial challenge requires showing the law is unconstitutional in all its applications, and because the court found the permitting regime and reciprocity provision consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, the court held that Johnson failed to state a viable Second Amendment claim. The court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.