Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:25-cv-01340
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 8
In Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation, Judge Bryan denied plaintiff Acker's motion to send the case back to state court and ordered the dispute to arbitration.
Consumers who purchase vehicles through financing arrangements and sign arbitration agreements as part of the transaction, particularly those who later seek to litigate disputes in court rather than through arbitration. Also relevant to litigants who file suit in state court and allege both state-law claims and federal statutory violations, affecting the question of which court — state or federal — has jurisdiction.
What happened
In Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation (No. 25-CV-01340), William Wade Acker sued Bridgecrest and related companies in Minnesota state court after Bridgecrest refused a 'negotiable instrument' he sent to pay off a roughly $50,000 car loan and continued trying to collect the debt. Acker alleged eight counts including unjust enrichment, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and defamation. Defendants removed the case to federal court and then moved to force the dispute into arbitration under an arbitration agreement Acker had signed as part of his car purchase.
Acker asked the federal court to send the case back to state court, arguing his lawsuit was based only on state law and that any reference to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act was merely incidental. The court rejected this argument, finding that Acker's own complaint clearly and explicitly alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and sought statutory damages under it — which is enough to give a federal court jurisdiction, regardless of whether the federal claim would ultimately succeed.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan denied Acker's motion to remand and his request for sanctions, and granted Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found the arbitration agreement valid and enforceable — it was signed by both parties, contained no allegations of fraud or duress, and Acker had not opted out within the allowed 30-day window. Because Acker's claims about the vehicle purchase, the loan, credit reporting, and debt collection all fell squarely within the agreement's scope, the court stayed the lawsuit and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.
The detailed version
- Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation · No. 0:25-cv-01340
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
- Sept. 18, 2025
Background
In November 2024, plaintiff William Wade Acker purchased a vehicle through Carvana LLC, financing part of the purchase price through Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation. As a condition of the purchase, Acker signed an Arbitration Agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The Agreement required the parties to resolve most disputes through binding arbitration, delegated all questions of arbitrability (i.e., whether a particular dispute belongs in arbitration) to the arbitrator rather than a court, and gave Acker 30 days to opt out of the arbitration obligation — an option he did not exercise.
In December 2024, Acker tendered a "negotiable instrument" to Bridgecrest purporting to satisfy his outstanding balance of $50,094.88. Bridgecrest refused the instrument and demanded payment in U.S. currency, and continued debt-collection efforts. In February 2025, Acker filed suit against Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation, Bridgecrest Lending Auto Securitization Trust 2024-4, Computershare Trust Company, N.A., and Bridgecrest Auto Funding, LLC in Washington County (Minnesota) District Court. The complaint alleged eight counts: unjust enrichment, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, and others. Within the defamation count, Acker expressly alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), and sought statutory damages under the FCRA.
Defendants were served on March 18, 2025, and removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota on April 9, 2025, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on the FCRA allegations.
Motions Before the Court
Two motions were pending: (1) Acker's motion to remand the case to state court and for sanctions against Defendants for costs associated with the remand motion; and (2) Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings under the FAA. Acker did not file a response to the motion to compel arbitration.
Motion to Remand
The court applied the "well-pleaded complaint rule," under which federal question jurisdiction exists when a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's own complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). Acker argued that his complaint was based purely on state and common law and that references to the FCRA were merely incidental. The court rejected this characterization on three grounds:
- Acker cited no legal authority for the proposition that "incidental" federal references do not create federal jurisdiction.
- The court distinguished between federal defenses (which do not confer jurisdiction) and federal claims affirmatively pleaded by a plaintiff (which do) — this was the latter.
- Acker's own complaint explicitly alleged FCRA violations and sought statutory damages under that federal statute, which plainly appeared on the face of the complaint.
The court held that the FCRA claim was not so insubstantial or frivolous as to defeat federal jurisdiction under Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). Accordingly, the court denied the motion to remand. Because the remand motion was denied, the court also denied Acker's request for sanctions.
The court also briefly noted, in a footnote, that Defendants had satisfied all notice requirements for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Under the FAA, courts must grant a motion to compel arbitration if (1) a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2) the agreement covers the dispute at issue. Triplet v. Menard, Inc., 42 F.4th 868 (8th Cir. 2022). The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of showing invalidity or that the claims fall outside the agreement's scope. Because Acker filed no opposition, he failed to carry that burden. The court nonetheless conducted its own analysis.
Validity of the Agreement
The court found the Agreement valid and enforceable. Both parties signed it; there were no allegations of fraud or duress in its execution; it contained a plain-language summary page explaining the rights being waived; and it gave Acker a 30-day opt-out window, which he did not use.
Scope of the Agreement
The Agreement covered claims "relating to or arising from" the vehicle, liens on the vehicle, the contracts and duties arising from them, credit reporting, servicing of the contracts, and collection of amounts owed. The court concluded that all of Acker's claims — arising from the vehicle purchase, the loan contract, the lien, credit reporting, and debt-collection efforts — plainly fell within this scope.
Disposition
The court: (1) denied Acker's motion to remand and for sanctions; (2) granted Defendants' motion to compel arbitration; (3) stayed all court proceedings pending arbitration; (4) directed the parties to commence arbitration under the procedures in their Agreement, with a warning that failure to do so may result in dismissal; and (5) ordered the parties to file a joint status letter within 90 days.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.