Osorio-Calderon v. Warden FCI Sandstone

Background

Jose Osorio-Calderon was sentenced on January 30, 2018, to 151 months in federal prison for coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), by a federal court in the District of Puerto Rico. He is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota (FCI-Sandstone).

Under the First Step Act (FSA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(h), 3632(d), federal prisoners can earn time credits (FTCs) by participating in needs-based programming. These credits can shorten the time until supervised release and can also be applied toward placement in prerelease custody — meaning a residential reentry center (RRC, also known as a halfway house) or home confinement — before final release. As of April 2, 2025, Osorio-Calderon had earned 1,095 days of FTCs. Of those, 365 days were applied to reduce his prison sentence, moving his release date from July 3, 2027 to July 3, 2026. The remaining 730 days were to be applied toward prerelease custody, making him eligible for that transfer as of July 3, 2024.

Despite that eligibility, Osorio-Calderon remained incarcerated at FCI-Sandstone at the time of this ruling. His initial request to serve prerelease custody in New York (where his sister lives) was rejected in March 2024 by U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services for the Northern District of New York, which found his sister's residence unsuitable for supervision. The BOP then sought placement in Puerto Rico, but the BOP's Residential Reentry Manager field office there rejected that request in November 2024, citing local ordinances restricting sex offenders' proximity to schools and daycare centers. A second attempt in April 2025 was also rejected by the Puerto Rico field office.

After exhausting administrative remedies, Osorio-Calderon filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a type of habeas corpus — a court challenge to the lawfulness of one's custody or confinement), asking the court either to order his immediate transfer to prerelease custody under the FSA, or alternatively to issue a writ of mandamus (a court order compelling a government officer to perform a legal duty) under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on June 18, 2025, recommending that the petition be granted. The R&R acknowledged that Eighth Circuit precedent — particularly Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996), and Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2014) — has long held that federal courts lack jurisdiction (i.e., legal authority to hear a case) over habeas petitions challenging an inmate's place of confinement, as opposed to the validity of a conviction or the length of a sentence. Because prerelease custody is a place of confinement rather than a release from custody, prior courts in this district had routinely dismissed FSA prerelease transfer claims for lack of jurisdiction.

However, the R&R concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670 (2025) — which held that detained noncitizens facing removal under the Alien Enemies Act must bring their claims as habeas petitions, and that habeas is proper even where the relief sought is not immediate physical release — complicated or upended that prior precedent. On that basis, the R&R found jurisdiction and then concluded on the merits that the FSA's mandatory language required the BOP to transfer Osorio-Calderon to prerelease custody.

Alternatively, the R&R reasoned that because the FSA uses mandatory language requiring the BOP to transfer eligible inmates to prerelease custody (18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C)), the BOP's failure to do so constituted a violation of federal law, independently supplying jurisdiction under Eighth Circuit habeas law.

Court's Analysis

Binding Circuit Precedent

Judge Provinzino declined to adopt the R&R, sustained the government's objections, and dismissed the petition without prejudice. The court began by reaffirming the rule that district courts are bound by Eighth Circuit precedent unless the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc overrules it. Even where a later Supreme Court decision "arguably undermines" an Eighth Circuit precedent, district courts must still apply the Eighth Circuit rule if it has "direct application" to the case. Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2018).

The court found that Kruger and Spencer have direct application here, because Osorio-Calderon's petition — seeking transfer to prerelease custody — is unambiguously a challenge to his place of confinement, not to the validity of his conviction or the duration of his sentence. Numerous prior decisions from this district had dismissed identical FSA prerelease custody claims on this basis.

J.G.G. Does Not Override Circuit Precedent

The court acknowledged that J.G.G. could potentially undermine the reasoning of Kruger and Spencer, but emphasized that the two cases arise from entirely different factual and legal contexts. J.G.G. involved civil immigration detention and a challenge to removal under the Alien Enemies Act, an eighteenth-century immigration statute. Osorio-Calderon's case involves criminal incarceration under a twenty-first century federal criminal sentencing law. Because Kruger and Spencer still have direct application, the court held it was not free to depart from them based on J.G.G. alone. That determination belongs to the Eighth Circuit or the Supreme Court, not the district court.

Section 3621(b) Bars Judicial Review

Independently, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) — which states that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court" — forecloses jurisdiction. The "notwithstanding" clause means that even the FSA's mandatory transfer language does not override Section 3621(b)'s bar on judicial review of BOP placement decisions. The court cited a D.D.C. opinion, Crowe v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 24-cv-3582, 2025 WL 1635392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2025), for the proposition that Section 3632(d)(4)(C) does not displace the BOP's statutory discretion under Section 3621(b) to designate a place of imprisonment.

Mandamus Claim Also Foreclosed

The court also rejected Osorio-Calderon's alternative request for mandamus relief. A writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is available only in extraordinary circumstances and requires the petitioner to show, among other things, a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought and a nondiscretionary duty by the government officer. Here, Section 3621(b)'s explicit bar on judicial review of BOP placement decisions means there is no such right or nondiscretionary duty. The court noted that Section 3621(b)'s bar applies regardless of the cause of action asserted.

The Court's Closing Remarks

Judge Provinzino concluded by expressing sympathy for Osorio-Calderon, who had earned substantial time credits only to remain imprisoned for more than a year past his prerelease eligibility date due to what the court called "bureaucratic finger-pointing." The court observed that prerelease programs benefit the criminal justice system by facilitating reintegration and reducing recidivism. While acknowledging the unique placement challenges arising from Osorio-Calderon's conviction for a sex offense, the court expressed hope that the BOP would work diligently and expeditiously to find a suitable placement — though it lacked authority to order such action.

Disposition

The court sustained the government's objections, rejected the R&R, and dismissed the amended petition without prejudice.