Williams v. New York State

Background

Alexander Williams, Jr., proceeding without a lawyer and without paying filing fees, sued Pasko Delovic, Timothy Maid, Joseph Bermann, Vito Marsico, and Monifa Jack. Williams was an inmate at Sing Sing Correctional Facility in 2024. He alleged that, while he witnessed an incident between two other prisoners, several officers strip-searched him even after Jack told them he was not involved. Williams further alleged that, after he objected to the search and mentioned a book he had written about Rikers Island prison, Maid grabbed him by the throat and lifted him from the ground, Delovic sprayed a chemical agent into his mouth, and several defendants ignored his requests for medical attention.

Williams asserted twelve claims: excessive force; deliberate indifference to medical needs; violation of free speech; retaliation related to free speech; failure to intervene; failure to supervise; failure to train, retention, and hiring; abuse of power, authority, and process; denial of due process; negligence; respondeat superior; and municipal liability. He stated that he was suing the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

The State of New York and the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision had previously been dismissed as defendants. Williams’s claims against the City of New York had previously been severed. The court stated that the State and the Department were the only named defendants for the seventh claim, and that the State, the Department, and the City were the only named defendants for the twelfth claim.

Motion and standards

The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning its legal power to hear a case. Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Although the defendants’ notice cited only Rule 12(b)(6), the court treated the motion as also seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) because the defendants’ brief raised subject-matter jurisdiction arguments.

The court applied the more flexible pleading standard used for complaints filed by people without lawyers. It accepted well-supported factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for Williams, but it did not accept legal conclusions without supporting facts.

Official-capacity claims

The court dismissed Williams’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities under Rule 12(b)(1). It held that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims because New York had not waived its immunity and Congress had not removed it for these claims. The court stated that this ruling did not affect Williams’s claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.

Federal claims

The court treated Williams’s fourth, eighth, and ninth claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for certain constitutional violations.

The court dismissed the fourth claim, alleging First Amendment retaliation, as duplicative. It found no material difference between that claim and the third claim because both alleged violations of Williams’s free-speech rights, relied on the same alleged conduct, named the same defendants, and sought the same relief. The court also rejected Williams’s argument that the claim should instead be treated as an equal-protection claim, explaining that such a claim would still duplicate the First Amendment retaliation claim.

The court dismissed the eighth claim for abuse of power, authority, and process. Williams did not contest the defendants’ argument that this type of claim was not cognizable under Section 1983 and conceded its dismissal.

The court dismissed the ninth claim for denial of due process. It understood Williams to assert both procedural and substantive due-process theories. His procedural theory was based on alleged failures to follow state law, prison procedures, and Department regulations. The court held that Section 1983 does not create a federal constitutional right to have prison officials follow those rules. His substantive due-process theory was based on the same allegations as his excessive-force and medical-care claims, so the court held that it duplicated claims protected by other constitutional provisions. The court did not decide the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument concerning this claim.

State-law claims

The court treated the sixth, tenth, and eleventh claims—failure to supervise, negligence, and respondeat superior—as claims under New York law. It held that New York Correction Law § 24 barred those claims because Williams alleged that the defendants were employees of the Department and nothing in the complaint suggested that they acted outside the scope of their employment. The court also dismissed any negligence claim or failure-to-supervise or respondeat-superior claim brought under Section 1983 for failure to state a claim.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Williams’s fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth claims. Williams’s first, second, third, and fifth claims were allowed to proceed to discovery. The defendants were directed to answer the complaint within 14 days, and the clerk was directed to terminate the motion and mail Williams a copy of the opinion and order.