Keamu v. Noem
- Patrick Schiltz
- 0:24-cv-03134
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Prince K. v. Noem, Judge Schiltz dismissed with prejudice a Liberian immigrant's challenge to the denial of his application to adjust his immigration status, finding his misrepresentations about his marital history were legally material.
Liberian nationals and other immigrants who applied for lawful permanent resident status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF) and who have been found inadmissible for misrepresenting facts about their marital or family history to immigration authorities. The ruling also affects anyone seeking to argue that the § 1159(c) waiver of inadmissibility applies to LRIF applicants.
What happened
In Prince K. v. Noem (Case No. 24-CV-3134), a man identified as Prince K., a citizen of Liberia living in Minnesota, sued the Department of Homeland Security and related immigration officials after they denied his application to adjust his immigration status to permanent resident. Prince applied under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, but immigration officials found him inadmissible because he had repeatedly and willfully lied about his marital history — specifically, concealing his first marriage to a woman named Fredricklyn — on his application and in interviews. He argued that his lies were not legally "material" because his subsequent marriage was valid under Minnesota law and no finding of marriage fraud had been made.
The central legal dispute was over what makes a misrepresented fact "material" under federal immigration law. Prince argued that his lies were immaterial because, even if the truth had been known, it would not have changed the outcome of his eligibility determination. The government argued that a fact is material if concealing it tends to cut off a line of inquiry relevant to admissibility — regardless of what that inquiry would ultimately have found. The court agreed with the government's interpretation, finding that Prince's concealment of his first marriage would naturally have led investigators to scrutinize whether his marriages were entered into for legitimate reasons or to gain immigration benefits.
Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz also rejected Prince's separate argument that immigration officials directed him to file the wrong type of waiver petition, and that he should now be allowed to seek a waiver under a different provision of the law (8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)). The court found that this waiver provision applies only to refugees and people granted asylum — categories that do not include Prince. Because neither of his claims had legal merit, Judge Schiltz granted the government's motion to dismiss and dismissed Prince K.'s amended petition with prejudice and on the merits.
The detailed version
- Keamu v. Noem · No. 0:24-cv-03134
- Patrick Schiltz
- Sept. 22, 2025
Background
Petitioner Prince K. ("Prince") is a citizen of Liberia and a resident of Minnesota. He brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., alleging that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") violated the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act ("LRIF"), and the APA when it denied his application to adjust his immigration status to lawful permanent resident.
Factual History
Prince and a woman identified as Fredricklyn J. were joined in a traditional marriage in Liberia in August 2013. Six months later, Prince applied for a non-immigrant visa, representing on the application and in a consular interview that he was married to Fredricklyn. He entered the United States in April 2014. Shortly after Fredricklyn gave birth to his first child in May 2014, Prince moved out of her home to live with another woman who claimed he was her husband. He later returned, asked Fredricklyn to file a Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative) on his behalf, and then moved out again as soon as she did so.
In January 2015, while still listed as married to Fredricklyn, Prince applied for temporary protected status and work authorization. He and Fredricklyn divorced about a month after those applications were approved in June 2015. Prince married a woman identified as Kartumu K. in August 2016. In August 2018, Kartumu filed a Form I-130 on Prince's behalf, and Prince filed a Form I-485 (Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status). On that Form I-485, Prince declared he had been married only once (to Kartumu) and identified Fredricklyn only as a former girlfriend, not a former wife. At a July 2019 USCIS interview, Prince again declared under oath he had never been married to Fredricklyn or any other person. USCIS denied Kartumu's Form I-130 in January 2020 and denied Prince's Form I-485 in March 2020.
In April 2020, Prince filed a second Form I-485 under the LRIF. This time he acknowledged two marriages. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny and recommended he file a Form I-601 (Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility). Prince filed the Form I-601 in January 2021. In January 2024, USCIS denied both the second Form I-485 and the Form I-601, finding Prince inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for repeatedly misrepresenting his marital status, and finding he had not shown a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship. An administrative appeal was denied. This federal court action followed.
Claims
The amended petition contained four counts: - Count I: USCIS misinterpreted § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the second Form I-485. - Count II: USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by directing Prince to file the wrong waiver petition after issuing its Notice of Intent to Deny. - Counts III and IV: Sought declaratory relief that Prince is eligible to adjust his status under the LRIF based on the errors alleged in Counts I and II, respectively.
USCIS moved to dismiss the amended petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Standard of Review
The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Prince's favor. The court also considered documents outside the petition that were "necessarily embraced" by it — specifically, USCIS's January 2024 denial decisions, Prince's motion for reconsideration and supporting materials, and USCIS's denial of that motion — without converting the motion into one for summary judgment (a more demanding standard requiring no genuine dispute of material fact).
Analysis: Materiality (Counts I and III)
The sole disputed legal question for Counts I and III was whether the facts Prince misrepresented were "material" under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which bars admission for anyone who "by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure" a visa or other immigration benefit. Prince conceded the misrepresentations were willful.
Prince argued for a "but-for" materiality standard: a misrepresented fact is material only if knowing the truth would have actually affected the ultimate eligibility determination. He contended his lies were immaterial because Minnesota recognizes his cultural divorce from Fredricklyn, his marriage to Kartumu was therefore lawful, and USCIS never made a formal finding of marriage fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).
USCIS argued for the standard established in Matter of D-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. 105 (BIA 2017): a fact is material if its misrepresentation or concealment "tends to shut off a line of inquiry that is relevant to the alien's admissibility and that would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his or her eligibility." The parties stipulated at oral argument that whoever had the correct legal standard should prevail.
The court adopted USCIS's standard, relying on Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), United States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2016), and Matter of D-R. The court found Prince's concealment of his first marriage was material because it had a "natural tendency to produce the conclusion" that his marriage to Kartumu was bona fide and that he was qualified to adjust his status. Disclosure would have predictably led USCIS to investigate, among other things, the circumstances surrounding Prince's first marriage, his immigration applications during that marriage, his pattern of moving between households, and the timing of his divorce from Fredricklyn (shortly after obtaining temporary status and work authorization). These facts could have triggered investigation into the bona fides of either or both marriages, and a finding of marriage fraud under § 1154(c) could have rendered Prince permanently inadmissible. The court dismissed Counts I and III.
Analysis: Waiver of Inadmissibility (Counts II and IV)
Prince argued that USCIS should have instructed him to file a waiver petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) rather than § 1182(i). Section 1159(c) applies specifically to aliens adjusting status "under this section" — meaning § 1159 — which covers only those admitted as refugees under § 1157 or granted asylum under § 1158. Prince was neither. He argued that because the LRIF contains the word "Refugee" in its title, Congress must have intended LRIF applicants to be eligible for § 1159(c) waivers.
The court rejected this argument based on the statutory text of both § 1159 and the LRIF. Section 1159(c)'s waiver provision is expressly limited to aliens seeking adjustment under § 1159, which does not encompass LRIF applicants. The LRIF itself exempts applicants from only four enumerated grounds of inadmissibility — §§ 1182(a)(4), (5), (6)(A), and (7)(A) — none of which applied to Prince. Section 1182(a)(6)(C), the misrepresentation ground, was not included. The court noted that Congress has explicitly incorporated the § 1159(c) waiver standard into other adjustment-of-status statutes when it intended to do so, and it did not do so in the LRIF. The court dismissed Counts II and IV.
Disposition
The court granted USCIS's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) and dismissed plaintiff's amended petition (ECF No. 15) with prejudice and on the merits. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.