Keamu v. Noem

Background

Plaintiff Prince K. ("Prince") is a citizen of Liberia and resident of Minnesota. He brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., challenging the denial of his application to adjust his immigration status to lawful permanent residence under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 116-92, § 7611.

Defendants are Kristi Noem (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), Kika Scott (Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, or USCIS), and Steven Rice (Field Office Director of the USCIS St. Paul-Minneapolis Field Office). The court notes the opinion identifies Prince and his wives only by first names and last initials because this is an immigration case.

Factual History

Prince was traditionally married to Fredricklyn J. in Liberia in August 2013. In February 2014, he applied for a non-immigrant visa, representing he was married to Fredricklyn. After arriving in the United States in April 2014, Prince left Fredricklyn's home two months later to live with another woman who claimed he was her husband. Prince later returned to Fredricklyn, persuaded her to file an immigration petition (Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative) on his behalf, and then left again for the other woman as soon as she filed. Fredricklyn withdrew her petition and wrote to USCIS explaining the circumstances. Prince applied for temporary protected status in January 2015, again representing he was married to Fredricklyn. He received that status in June 2015, and he and Fredricklyn divorced the following month.

In August 2016, Prince married Kartumu K. in Minnesota. In 2018, Kartumu filed a new Form I-130 on Prince's behalf, and Prince concurrently filed a Form I-485 (Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status). On that form, Prince stated he had been married only once (to Kartumu), identified Fredricklyn as a former girlfriend rather than a former wife, and did not disclose his prior marriage. At a July 2019 USCIS interview, Prince swore under oath that he had never been married to Fredricklyn or anyone other than Kartumu. USCIS denied Kartumu's Form I-130 petition in January 2020 and Prince's Form I-485 in March 2020.

In April 2020, Prince filed a second Form I-485 under the LRIF, this time acknowledging both marriages. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny in December 2020 and recommended Prince file a Form I-601 (Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)). Prince filed that waiver petition in January 2021. In January 2024, USCIS denied both the second Form I-485 (finding Prince had "repeatedly misrepresented material information" about his marital status, rendering him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)) and the Form I-601 waiver petition (finding Prince failed to show a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship). Prince's administrative appeal was also denied.

Claims

Prince's amended petition raised four counts: - Count I: USCIS misinterpreted § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his second Form I-485. - Count II: USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by directing Prince to file the wrong waiver petition (Form I-601 under § 1182(i)) instead of a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). - Counts III and IV: Declarations that, due to the alleged errors in Counts I and II respectively, Prince is eligible to adjust his status under the LRIF.

USCIS moved to dismiss the amended petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Legal Analysis

Standard of Review

The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Prince's favor. It also considered USCIS's January 2024 denial decisions, Prince's motion to reconsider and supporting materials, and USCIS's denial of that motion — all of which were embraced by the amended petition — without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.

Counts I and III: Materiality of Misrepresentations

Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) bars from admission any alien who, "by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure ... a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit" under immigration law. Prince conceded his misrepresentations about his marriage to Fredricklyn were willful. The sole dispute was whether the misrepresented facts were "material."

Prince argued that "material" means a fact that, if known, would have led to discovery of information affecting the ultimate eligibility determination — and that his lies were immaterial because (1) Minnesota recognizes his cultural divorce from Fredricklyn; (2) his marriage to Kartumu was therefore lawful; and (3) USCIS never made a formal finding of marriage fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

USCIS countered that a fact is "material" if misrepresenting it tends to shut off a line of inquiry relevant to admissibility, regardless of whether that inquiry would ultimately have rendered the applicant ineligible.

The court sided with USCIS. Citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988), United States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 749 (8th Cir. 2016), and Matter of D-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. 105, 113 (BIA 2017), the court held that a misrepresentation or concealment is material if it "tends to shut off a line of inquiry that is relevant to the alien's admissibility and that would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his or her eligibility." The parties had conceded at oral argument that whichever standard applied, the other party would prevail — effectively stipulating the legal standard would be dispositive.

Applying this standard, the court found that Prince's concealment of his first marriage had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that his marriage to Kartumu was bona fide and that he was qualified to adjust status. Disclosure would have led USCIS to investigate the full circumstances: the visa application ostensibly to visit Fredricklyn, Prince's pattern of moving in and out of Fredricklyn's home, his request that she file an immigration petition on his behalf, and his divorce from her shortly after receiving temporary status and work authorization. The court found this could have triggered an inquiry into marriage fraud under § 1154(c), which could have rendered Prince permanently inadmissible. The court therefore dismissed Counts I and III.

Counts II and IV: Eligibility for § 1159(c) Waiver

Prince argued that after USCIS issued its Notice of Intent to Deny, it should have directed him to seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) rather than § 1182(i).

The court rejected this argument. Section 1159(c) is a specialized waiver provision that applies only to aliens who were admitted as refugees under § 1157 or granted asylum under § 1158. Prince did not allege — and the record did not reflect — that he fell into either category. His argument that the word "Refugee" in the LRIF's title should extend § 1159(c) eligibility to LRIF applicants was rejected as unsupported by the text of either § 1159(c) or the LRIF itself. The LRIF exempts applicants only from the inadmissibility grounds listed in §§ 1182(a)(4), (5), (6)(A), and (7)(A) — not § 1182(a)(6)(C), which was the ground applied to Prince. The court noted that Congress knows how to incorporate the § 1159(c) waiver standard into other statutes and chose not to do so in the LRIF. The court therefore dismissed Counts II and IV.

Disposition

The court granted USCIS's motion to dismiss. Prince's amended petition was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.