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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Sept. 22, 2025

Kassab v. Bisignano

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:24-cv-03707
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
6

Counsel4 of record
PLAINTIFF
Bryan Konoski Konoski & Partners, P.C.
DEFENDANT
Ana H. Voss United States Attorney's Office
James D. Sides Social Security Administration
Sophie Doroba Social Security Administration, Office of Program Litigation

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

Social SecurityCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Corliss K. v. Bisignano, Judge Menendez affirmed the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability benefits, finding the ALJ made no legal error in limiting the plaintiff to 'occasional' coworker interaction.

Who this affects

People who have been denied Social Security disability benefits (SSDI or SSI) and whose cases involved state agency medical consultants recommending 'superficial' coworker interaction limitations — particularly those arguing that an ALJ erred by substituting 'occasional' for 'superficial' in the RFC, or by deviating from a consultant's exact wording without detailed explanation.

What happened

In Corliss K. v. Bisignano (No. 24-cv-03707), Corliss K. challenged the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. He argued that the administrative law judge (ALJ) who decided his case made two legal errors when she determined his capacity to work: first, that she failed to adequately explain why she limited him to 'occasional' contact with coworkers instead of the 'brief and superficial' contact recommended by two state agency medical consultants whose opinions she found 'generally persuasive'; and second, that 'occasional' (a term about frequency) and 'superficial' (a term about quality of interaction) are legally distinct and cannot be substituted for each other.

A magistrate judge reviewed the record and recommended dismissing the complaint with prejudice, finding no legal error. Corliss K. objected, and the district court conducted an independent review of the portions of the record he challenged. On the first issue, the court found that the ALJ built a sufficient logical bridge between the evidence — including largely unremarkable mental-status exam findings and Corliss K.'s daily activities such as managing his child's appointments — and her decision to use 'occasional' rather than the consultants' exact wording. On the second issue, the court relied on a 2024 Eighth Circuit ruling that had directly rejected the argument that the distinction between 'occasional' and 'superficial' is legally meaningful, calling it a 'manufactured inconsistency.'

Judge Katherine Menendez overruled Corliss K.'s objections, accepted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full, affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying benefits, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Kassab v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-03707
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
Sept. 22, 2025

Background

Corliss K. filed suit in federal district court after the Social Security Commissioner denied his applications for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. He asked the court to either reverse the Commissioner's final decision and award benefits outright, or remand (send back) his case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Because Social Security appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) are decided on the parties' written briefs rather than on a motion for summary judgment, the parties filed competing briefs.

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

On July 22, 2025, Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Corliss K. timely filed objections. Because specific objections were raised, Judge Menendez conducted a de novo (fresh, independent) review of the contested portions of the R&R under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The ALJ's Decision and Plaintiff's Arguments

The ALJ who originally denied Corliss K.'s benefits found two state agency medical consultants — Dr. Ray Conroe (who issued an opinion in August 2022) and Dr. Cynthia Crandall (who issued an opinion in November 2022) — to be "generally persuasive." Both consultants concluded that Corliss K. was limited to "brief and superficial" contact with coworkers. The ALJ, however, formulated a Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) — a formal assessment of the most a claimant can do despite their limitations — that restricted Corliss K. to only "occasional" interaction with coworkers, without using the word "superficial."

Corliss K. raised two distinct legal challenges to that RFC determination.

Argument 1: Failure to Build a Logical Bridge (SSR 96-8p)

Corliss K. argued that the ALJ violated Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p by failing to create a "logical bridge" — a clear, reasoned explanation — connecting the evidence in the record to the RFC determination. He contended that the ALJ gave no adequate reason for departing from the consultants' "superficial" limitation even while finding their opinions "generally persuasive."

The court disagreed. It found that the ALJ did provide a sufficient logical bridge by: (1) noting the objective medical evidence showed largely unremarkable mental-status findings; and (2) highlighting Corliss K.'s successful engagement in daily activities such as managing his child's medical appointments, reasoning that the social interactions those activities require are the same as those needed for employment. The court also reiterated the established rule that an ALJ is not required to "list and reject" or "explicitly reconcile" every limitation suggested by consultants, citing McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2011), and Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723 (8th Cir. 2022). Nor does finding an opinion "generally persuasive" obligate the ALJ to adopt it word-for-word. The court found that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's RFC.

Argument 2: "Occasional" vs. "Superficial" as Legally Distinct Terms

Corliss K.'s second argument was that the ALJ committed legal error by substituting "occasional" (a quantitative limitation describing how often something occurs) for "superficial" (a qualitative limitation describing the nature of the interaction), because those terms mean legally distinct things.

The court rejected this argument as foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Lane v. O'Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024), which specifically addressed and rejected this distinction as a "manufactured inconsistency." Corliss K. attempted to distinguish Lane by pointing to a district court decision, Jason L. v. O'Malley, No. 23-cv-184, 2024 WL 965240 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024), which had remanded a claim on this same basis after Lane was decided. The court was not persuaded, finding that relying on Jason L. ignores Lane's explicit rejection of the very argument Corliss K. advances. The court also noted that the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly declined to find error in comparable circumstances.

Disposition

Judge Menendez:

  1. Overruled Corliss K.'s objections to the R&R;
  2. Accepted the Magistrate Judge's R&R in full;
  3. Affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying benefits; and
  4. Dismissed the matter with prejudice.
The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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