Rondeau v. Bisignano
- Elizabeth Wright
- 0:24-cv-02049
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 69
In James R. v. Bisignano, Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright denied James R.'s request to reverse or remand the Social Security Administration's denial of his disability insurance benefits and dismissed his complaint with prejudice.
Military veterans and others who apply for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and are denied, particularly those with mental health conditions such as PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorders; those who rely on VA disability ratings in Social Security proceedings; and claimants whose experts' opinions conflict with the administrative record.
What happened
In James R. v. Bisignano (No. 24-cv-02049), a veteran named James R. challenged the Social Security Administration's decision to deny him Title II Disability Insurance benefits. He had applied for benefits claiming disability based on combat-related stress, sleep apnea, insomnia, anger management problems, and other conditions. An administrative law judge had found him not disabled after concluding he could perform certain jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and the Appeals Council declined to review that decision.
James R. argued on several grounds that the administrative law judge's decision was wrong: that his mental health impairments met the criteria for a presumptive disability listing; that his residual functional capacity — an assessment of the most he can do despite his limitations — was improperly calculated regarding postural limitations and social interactions; that the administrative law judge improperly discounted his subjective symptom reports; and that the step-five analysis relying on a vocational expert was flawed. The court reviewed all of these arguments, finding that the administrative record as a whole contained substantial evidence to support the administrative law judge's findings. The court found, among other things, that James R.'s conservative treatment history, his failure to consistently take prescribed medications, his own reported daily activities, and the medical record's repeated documentation of normal memory, concentration, and cooperative behavior all supported the administrative law judge's conclusions.
Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright denied James R.'s brief seeking remand or reversal, granted the Commissioner's brief in opposition, and dismissed James R.'s complaint with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Rondeau v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-02049
- Elizabeth Wright
- Sept. 26, 2025
Background
James R. filed an application for Title II Disability Insurance benefits on July 11, 2022, alleging disability as of March 1, 2018, based on combat-related stress, sleep apnea, insomnia, hyperattentiveness, anger management problems, and anhedonia. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Brenda Rosten ("the ALJ"), who issued a decision finding James R. not disabled. The Appeals Council denied further review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. James R. then sought judicial review in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which allows federal courts to review Social Security disability decisions.
The ALJ's Five-Step Analysis
The Social Security Administration uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability claims. At step one, the ALJ found James R. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2019, and met insured status requirements through December 31, 2025. At step two, the ALJ identified several severe impairments: insomnia secondary to obstructive sleep apnea; obesity; major depressive disorder, moderate, chronic; generalized anxiety disorder, chronic; panic disorder with specific phobias; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and alcohol use disorder. At step three, the ALJ found these impairments did not meet or equal a presumptively disabling listing. At step four, the ALJ assessed James R.'s residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most he can do in a work setting despite his limitations — as less than a full range of medium work, with numerous physical and mental restrictions including limited interaction with coworkers and the public. The ALJ found he could not perform his past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ found, based on vocational expert testimony, that James R. could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including custodian (approximately 38,000 jobs), hospital housekeeper (approximately 40,000 jobs), and lab equipment cleaner (approximately 25,000 jobs), and therefore was not disabled.
Issues Presented and Court's Analysis
Step Three — Mental Health Listings (12.00 Paragraph B Criteria)
James R. argued he met Listings 12.04 (depression), 12.06 (anxiety), 12.08 (personality and impulse disorders), and 12.15 (trauma). To satisfy a Listing's Paragraph B criteria, a claimant must show either an extreme limitation in one of four areas of mental functioning or a marked limitation in two of the four areas. The four areas are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself.
The ALJ found only mild limitations in the first and third areas, and moderate limitations in the second and fourth areas — falling short of the marked or extreme limitations needed to satisfy Paragraph B. The court reviewed the ALJ's analysis of each area and found substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. Among the supporting evidence: James R.'s own function reports stated he needed no reminders for grooming or medications, could follow written and spoken instructions, and had no memory issues; medical records repeatedly documented normal memory, concentration, and attention; James R. was almost always cooperative and pleasant with providers; and his daily activities included cooking, cleaning, household repairs, hunting, fishing, intense exercise, and caring for his elderly father.
The court also addressed James R.'s retained expert, Emily Tiderington, BSN, RN, who opined that James R. had extreme limitations in interacting with others and in adapting in the workplace, and that he met multiple Listings. The ALJ found Tiderington's opinions unpersuasive, and the court upheld that finding. The court noted that under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, the ALJ evaluates medical opinions based primarily on supportability (how well the opinion is supported by objective medical evidence and the source's own explanation) and consistency (how consistent the opinion is with other evidence in the record). The court found Tiderington's opinions were inconsistent with the record in several respects, including that James R. followed a conservative course of treatment, repeatedly declined prescribed psychiatric medications, and showed largely normal mental status examinations throughout the record.
Step Four — RFC: Postural Limitations
James R. argued the ALJ erred by finding he could frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, when state agency physician Dr. Sporn found on reconsideration that he could only occasionally perform those activities. The court agreed the ALJ failed to explain the discrepancy between two conflicting agency opinions on this point — one finding unlimited ability, the other finding only occasional ability — and that the RFC's "frequent" limitation was not adequately explained. However, the court found this error harmless because James R. did not contend his ability was less than occasional, and the lab equipment cleaner position involves no greater than occasional postural limitations. With 25,000 jobs in the national economy, that single job was sufficient to sustain the step-five finding.
Step Four — RFC: Social Limitations
James R. argued the RFC's social limitations — occasional, cursory, non-collaborative interactions with coworkers and only incidental contact with the public — were insufficiently restrictive. He pointed to two past assaults (one involving a motorcycle incident in 2015, 2018, or 2019 depending on his varying accounts, and one in 2022 in response to being struck with a pool cue) and his history of anger issues. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ's social RFC, noting James R. had no reported angry confrontations in any work setting; he himself testified he was laid off due to a reduction in force rather than behavioral issues; a former supervisor offered to help him find a new job; and medical records consistently documented cooperative and pleasant interactions with providers. The court also upheld the ALJ's treatment of the Department of Veterans Affairs' 70% disability rating, noting that under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, VA disability ratings filed after March 27, 2017 are not binding on the SSA and need not be specifically analyzed, though the underlying medical evidence must be considered. The court found the ALJ considered the VA medical records throughout the decision.
Step Four — RFC: Subjective Symptoms
James R. argued the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective reports of disabling fatigue, insomnia, sleep apnea, depression, and obesity. The court applied the framework from Polaski v. Heckler and SSR 16-3p, under which an ALJ evaluates the consistency of subjective symptom allegations with the record as a whole. The court found the ALJ's consistency analysis was supported by substantial evidence, including: James R.'s mild sleep apnea was documented as not interfering with his ability to work; he repeatedly denied fatigue; he consistently declined prescribed medications for depression and anger; his obesity produced no documented functional limitations in the record; and his daily activities — including hunting, building a farmhouse, exercising intensely, traveling to France, and starting a nonprofit — were inconsistent with the level of disability alleged.
Step Five Challenges
James R. raised several step-five arguments. First, he argued the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was less restrictive than the RFC because it did not include the phrase "less than a full range of medium work." The court rejected this, explaining that the hypothetical captured all of the RFC's specific nonexertional limitations, and the phrase "less than full range" simply reflects that nonexertional limitations erode the medium work occupational base — which is precisely why the ALJ consulted a vocational expert.
Second, James R. argued the ALJ erred by not asking the vocational expert whether the listed occupations have changed since the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) was last updated. The court rejected this, noting the Eighth Circuit continues to rely primarily on the DOT for work requirements information, consistent with SSR 00-4p.
Third, James R. argued the vocational expert did not disclose data sources for job numbers and did not provide regional breakdowns. The court found no error, explaining that SSR 00-4p (which applied because the ALJ's decision predated the January 6, 2025 effective date of the replacement rule, SSR 24-3p) does not require identification of data sources. On regional numbers, the court aligned with the majority of district courts within the Eighth Circuit holding that national job numbers can satisfy the step-five burden where nothing about the number or nature of the jobs suggests they are confined to isolated regions. The court found the 25,000 lab equipment cleaner jobs nationally sufficient to meet that burden.
Disposition
Judge Wright denied James R.'s brief seeking remand or reversal, granted the Commissioner's brief in opposition seeking dismissal, and dismissed James R.'s complaint with prejudice.
Read the full 69-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.