Kasso v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Plaintiff Leila Kasso is a self-represented (pro se) litigant in a pending civil case against the City of Minneapolis and other defendants. The nature of her underlying claims is not detailed in this order. In a separate workers' compensation proceeding, the City obtained an Independent Medical Examination (IME) report concerning Kasso. She filed a motion styled as a "Motion for Temporary Restraining Order" (TRO) seeking to prohibit the City, its counsel, and any witnesses from introducing, referencing, or relying on the IME report — or any future adverse IME reports — in this federal litigation.

Kasso's stated grounds were that the IME report is irrelevant to the issues in this case under the Federal Rules of Evidence and that its introduction would cause confusion and waste time, making it unfairly prejudicial.

Analysis

Ground 1: Failure to Meet the Standard for Temporary Injunctive Relief

To obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant must satisfy the four-factor Dataphase test (drawn from Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)): 1. A threat of irreparable harm (harm that cannot be compensated after the fact); 2. Likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claims; 3. That the balance of harms favors granting relief; and 4. That granting relief serves the public interest.

The court found Kasso did not make the required showing. Specifically, she did not allege a threat of irreparable harm from the IME report that would justify preserving the status quo before trial, and she did not demonstrate she was likely to prevail on the merits of her claims. The court also noted that the requested relief was not directly connected to the conduct alleged against the City in her complaint — a separate requirement under Eighth Circuit precedent (Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1994)).

The court noted that the legal standards for a TRO and a preliminary injunction are the same, and that although Kasso did not seek ex parte (without notice to the other side) relief, this procedural distinction did not change the outcome.

Ground 2: The Motion Is a Premature Evidentiary Request

The court also denied the motion because it is, in substance, an attempt to exclude evidence before the proper procedural mechanism is available. Requests to exclude evidence before trial are called motions in limine, and courts typically set a deadline for such motions in a trial scheduling order. Here, the case has not yet been scheduled for trial, so no such deadline exists and the motion is premature.

Kasso also asked that the IME report not be considered in connection with any motion — including, implicitly, a motion for summary judgment (a motion asking the court to rule in a party's favor before trial based on undisputed facts). The court found this question equally premature, and declined to resolve the relevance of the IME evidence outside the context of actual summary judgment briefing.

Because Kasso is unrepresented, the court applied the rule that pro se pleadings and motions should be construed liberally, but still found the motion could not be granted.

Disposition

The court denied Kasso's motion without prejudice, meaning she is not barred from raising the same evidentiary arguments at the appropriate time — either when trial is scheduled and motions in limine are due, or in connection with summary judgment proceedings. No injunctive relief was granted.