Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation

Background

On June 17, 2022, Dillon Remmick was driving a pontoon boat toward a dock at Gull Lake in Brainerd, Minnesota, where his wife, Angela Remmick, was sitting with her legs over the dock's edge. The boat's engine — designed, manufactured, and sold by Brunswick Corporation (also known as Mercury Marine) — suffered a gasket failure in its idle limiter. This caused the engine to rev at high speed and prevented Dillon from shifting into reverse to slow the boat. The boat struck the dock and severely injured Angela's legs.

Angela filed suit in Minnesota state court against both Brunswick and Dillon. She alleged negligence and strict products liability against Brunswick, and negligence against Dillon. Brunswick is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Wisconsin, making it a citizen of those states. Both Angela and Dillon are Minnesota citizens. Complete diversity of citizenship — required for federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) — is destroyed when any plaintiff and any defendant share state citizenship. Dillon's Minnesota citizenship would therefore have required the case to remain in state court.

Removal and Motion to Dismiss

Brunswick removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446, invoking the fraudulent-joinder doctrine. That doctrine is an exception to the complete-diversity rule: when a plaintiff joins a non-diverse defendant against whom there is no reasonable basis in fact and law for a claim, that defendant's citizenship is disregarded for jurisdictional purposes. Brunswick then moved to dismiss Dillon as a fraudulently joined defendant.

Legal Standard: Fraudulent Joinder

Under Eighth Circuit precedent, joinder is fraudulent when "there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim against the resident defendant." Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003). A "colorable" claim — one that is reasonable, though perhaps speculative — is sufficient to defeat a fraudulent-joinder finding. The district court must resolve all facts and ambiguities in the plaintiff's favor. When uncertain about state law, courts resolve doubts in favor of remand (returning the case to state court). The removing party bears the burden to establish fraudulent joinder. Conclusory allegations without supporting facts do not create a colorable claim. Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 950–51 (8th Cir. 2011); Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2021).

Courts in this circuit may consider materials beyond the complaint to determine if there is any factual support for the plaintiff's claims. Here, Brunswick offered Angela's expert report, and Angela offered her counsel's affidavit describing pre-litigation communications. The court declined to consider either: the expert report undermined rather than supported Angela's negligence claim against Dillon, and the pre-suit communications merely reflected the parties' preliminary legal positions, not additional facts about Dillon's conduct.

Analysis: Was Dillon Fraudulently Joined?

The court analyzed whether there was an arguably reasonable basis to predict that Minnesota law might impose negligence liability on Dillon. Under Minnesota law, negligence requires: (1) a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation. The parties agreed Dillon owed Angela a duty and that she was injured. The contested element was breach — whether Dillon failed to act as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances.

The court found two fundamental reasons why there was no colorable negligence claim against Dillon:

First, Angela's own complaint affirmatively alleged that Dillon acted reasonably. It described him slowly approaching the dock as he had done many times before, shifting into neutral, and planning to shift into reverse in accordance with Brunswick's operating instructions. The complaint explicitly stated that Dillon "was unable to control the boat" because of the engine malfunction — a defect caused by Brunswick's gasket failure, not by anything Dillon did or failed to do.

Second, the complaint's allegations of negligence against Dillon were nothing more than bare legal conclusions — statements that he "failed to use reasonable care" and that his conduct "constitutes negligence" — without any supporting factual allegations. Under fraudulent-joinder standards, conclusory allegations do not create a reasonable basis to predict liability.

Angela's Counter-Arguments

Angela advanced three arguments, all rejected:

1. Distinguishability of cited cases: Angela argued that Block, Henson, and Lane v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc. involved "factually dependent duties" — situations where liability depended on a specific exception (e.g., a retailer's knowledge of a product defect, or a supervisor's direct involvement in discrimination). The court found this distinction unsupported by those cases and contrary to Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2014), where fraudulent joinder was found based solely on the absence of factual allegations establishing breach of a recognized duty.

2. Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards: Angela argued that Henson and related cases used Rule 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) reasoning inappropriately and that such standards should not apply here. The court rejected this, noting that Henson was analyzed under fraudulent-joinder standards even though the motion was styled as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and that Block explicitly stated fraudulent joinder requires more than proving a 12(b)(6) dismissal would be warranted.

3. Minnesota notice-pleading standard: Angela argued the complaint would survive dismissal under Minnesota's more lenient notice-pleading rules, so Dillon should not be dismissed. The court declined to apply state pleading standards, holding that the Eighth Circuit's fraudulent-joinder rules — not state dismissal standards — govern the analysis.

Collusion Observation

In a footnote, Judge Tostrud noted that while Minnesota abolished interspousal tort immunity, Minnesota courts have acknowledged the risk of collusion when spouses sue each other, particularly when insurance is involved. The court identified three circumstances warranting alertness: (1) Dillon is insured and his insurer is funding his defense; (2) Dillon did not oppose the suit or move to dismiss, which is unusual in fraudulent-joinder cases; and (3) Dillon's Answer denied having sufficient knowledge to admit basic facts — such as whether he was on the lake that day or was operating the boat — which the court found difficult to credit. Because Dillon was dismissed on fraudulent-joinder grounds, the court expressly stated it was not necessary to decide whether these facts independently warranted dismissal.

Disposition

The court granted Brunswick's motion to dismiss Dillon Remmick as a fraudulently joined defendant. All claims against Dillon Remmick are dismissed without prejudice. With Dillon dismissed, complete diversity exists between Angela (Minnesota) and Brunswick (Delaware/Wisconsin), and the federal court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims.