Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi

Background

Belsai D.S. is a native and citizen of Mexico who has lived in the United States since approximately 1990, having entered without inspection at age five. The government granted him Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status in 2014, and his most recent DACA renewal was approved on September 5, 2025. On August 12, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested him in Bloomington, Minnesota, issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him as removable because he entered without inspection and was never admitted or paroled, and has held him at the ICE detention center in Elk River, Minnesota since that date. The opinion notes that on August 10, 2025, he was arrested by local police on charges of violating a domestic abuse no-contact order, which led ICE to investigate his removability, but that arrest does not render him subject to mandatory detention under either 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or the Laken Riley Act.

The Government's New Detention Policy

On July 8, 2025, a memo from Todd Lyons directed ICE employees to treat noncitizens who are present in the United States but entered without inspection or admission as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) — the statutory provision governing inspection and detention of aliens at the border and ports of entry. Under this policy, such individuals are ineligible for a bond hearing before an immigration judge and cannot be released for the duration of their removal proceedings, except by parole.

Petitioner's Claims

Belsai D.S. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention as unlawful. He asserted five counts: - Count One: A declaratory judgment that he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention and is instead detained under § 1226(a)(1), entitling him to a bond hearing. - Count Two and Four: That denying him bond eligibility violates § 1226(a)(2)(A) and related regulations. - Count Three: That denying him a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. - Count Five: That applying § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention to him violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Jurisdiction

Respondents argued the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under several statutory provisions: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1226(e), 1252(a)(5), and 1252(b)(9). The court focused on § 1252(g), which strips courts of jurisdiction over claims "arising from" the government's decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders."

The court held it has jurisdiction. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC), the court emphasized that § 1252(g) is narrow — it covers only those three discrete actions, not challenges to the lawfulness of detention pending removal proceedings. Because Belsai D.S. was not challenging the commencement of removal proceedings or the removal decision itself, but rather the legality of his detention without a bond hearing, § 1252(g) did not bar review. The court expressly disagreed with the reasoning in S.Q.D.C. v. Bondi (No. 25-cv-3348), a prior case from the same district that found § 1252(g) barred jurisdiction under similar facts.

Merits: Which Detention Statute Applies?

The central legal question was whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Belsai D.S.'s detention.

§ 1225(b)(2) requires detention of an "applicant for admission" who is "seeking admission" but is not clearly entitled to be admitted. The government argued that because Belsai D.S. entered without inspection, he is deemed an "applicant for admission" under § 1225(a)(1) and therefore subject to mandatory detention.

§ 1226(a) is the general discretionary detention provision for noncitizens subject to removal proceedings, under which detention is permitted but a bond hearing must be provided unless § 1226(c)'s mandatory detention category applies.

The court rejected the government's interpretation on four grounds:

1. Plain Language The phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires active, present-tense conduct — someone currently attempting to enter the country. The government's reliance on the § 1225(a)(1) statutory definition of "applicant for admission" (which deems all unadmitted aliens as such) to trigger § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention effectively erases the "seeking admission" requirement from the statute, violating the rule against surplusage (a canon of statutory interpretation holding that every word in a statute should have meaning).

2. Structure of § 1226(a) Section 1226(a) broadly authorizes arrest and detention of aliens pending removal. Section 1226(c) carves out a mandatory detention category for people with certain criminal convictions. The Laken Riley Act (Pub. L. No. 119-1, enacted January 2025) added § 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for noncitizens who both entered without inspection and are charged with, arrested for, or convicted of certain crimes. If § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention of all undocumented noncitizens present in the country, the Laken Riley Act's amendment to § 1226(c) would be superfluous — Congress would have been legislating to achieve something already accomplished.

3. Context and Statutory Structure Section 1225 as a whole is directed at arriving aliens and the inspection process at ports of entry and borders. Section 1226, by contrast, addresses apprehension and detention of aliens already present in the country. This structural distinction, recognized by the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez, supports limiting § 1225(b) to persons seeking entry, not those long residing in the United States.

4. Legislative History and Agency Practice The court agreed with other courts that the government's new interpretation is inconsistent with longstanding agency practice, which historically treated noncitizens present without admission as subject to § 1226(a), and with the legislative history of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The court also found the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) recent contrary interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), unpersuasive and inconsistent with the statutory text, applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo that such agency interpretations are not automatically entitled to deference.

Disposition

The court granted the habeas petition on Count One. It declared that Belsai D.S. is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and is instead subject to the discretionary detention framework of § 1226(a)(1). The court ordered Respondents to provide him a bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days of the order. If no bond hearing is provided within that time, Belsai D.S. must be immediately released from detention. The court ordered the parties to submit a status update within ten days regarding the bond hearing outcome or release, and to advise whether further proceedings are needed.

The court declined to rule on the APA claim (Count Five) or the due process and regulatory claims (Counts Two, Three, and Four), finding the habeas relief on Count One sufficient. The court also declined at this stage to dismiss any of the named Respondents for lack of proper custodial authority, finding that question inadequately briefed.