Google Ireland Limited v. OOO Google
- Edward Davila
- 5:25-cv-00851
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Google Ireland v. OOO Google, Judge Davila entered default judgment, compelled arbitration, permanently enjoined Russian proceedings, and deferred the fee amount.
Google Ireland Limited received default judgment, an order compelling arbitration, a permanent injunction, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. OOO Google, its liquidator, and the other people and entities covered by the injunction are barred from pursuing the specified proceedings outside the required arbitration and from taking related steps in Russian proceedings.
What happened
Google Ireland Limited sued OOO Google, which the opinion calls Google Russia, over disputes relating to two agreements. Google Russia did not appear or defend the case, and the Clerk entered default after the court gave it multiple opportunities to respond.
The court found that it had authority to hear the case and that Google Ireland had standing. It entered default judgment for Google Ireland, declared that the agreements’ arbitration provisions bind Google Russia, and ordered arbitration. It also converted an earlier preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction blocking Google Russia and specified related people and entities from pursuing covered claims outside the required arbitration or taking related steps in Russian proceedings.
Judge Davila also awarded Google Ireland attorneys’ fees and costs but deferred deciding the amount. Google Ireland was ordered to file its fee request within 14 days.
The detailed version
- Google Ireland Limited v. OOO Google · No. 5:25-cv-00851
- Edward Davila
- Sept. 29, 2025
Background
Google Ireland Limited asked the court for relief against OOO Google, which the opinion refers to as Google Russia. Google Russia did not appear in the action. After giving it multiple opportunities to appear or respond, the court directed the Clerk to enter default on April 3, 2025, and gave Google Russia one final opportunity to appear or seek relief from the default. It did neither.
The court therefore considered Google Ireland’s motion and the automatic-conversion provision of an earlier preliminary injunction as a request for default judgment. The opinion incorporates the facts from a concurrently filed order that is not included in the provided text.
Jurisdiction and standing
The court found subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 4 and personal jurisdiction over Google Russia based on its agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to the relevant agreements in Santa Clara County, California. The court also found that Google Ireland had standing because Google Russia’s litigation forced Google Ireland to litigate in a forum other than the forum the parties had agreed to, and the requested arbitration order and permanent anti-suit injunction could redress that injury.
The court noted that Google Russia was treated as having waived its defenses when default was entered. Even so, the court independently considered standing arguments raised by Proposed Intervenor Pravoslav. It rejected those arguments, finding that Google Russia was the proper party because it signed the relevant contract, that a live dispute existed because Google Russia refused to arbitrate after receiving a demand, and that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine did not apply because the dispute was contractual and therefore concerned the parties rather than property under the court’s analysis.
Default-judgment analysis
The court applied the seven factors identified in Eitel v. McCool, which address prejudice to the plaintiff, the merits and sufficiency of the claims, the amount of money at stake, the likelihood of factual disputes, excusable neglect, and the federal preference for decisions on the merits.
The court found that Google Ireland would have no other recourse if default judgment were denied because Google Russia had not appeared. It also found that Google Ireland had pleaded a claim on which it could recover, relying on its earlier finding that Google Ireland had shown a likelihood of success under the standard for a preliminary injunction. Because Google Russia had not defended the action, the court found little likelihood of a dispute over material facts. It further found that the default was knowing and intentional, not the result of excusable neglect. Although the federal rules favor decisions on the merits, the court concluded that default judgment was appropriate because Google Russia refused to litigate and default judgment was Google Ireland’s only recourse.
Ruling
The court entered default judgment against Google Russia and in favor of Google Ireland. It declared that the mandatory arbitration provisions in the 2009 RSA and 2018 RSA were binding on Google Russia and compelled arbitration under Section 12 of each agreement.
The court also converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. The injunction covers Google Russia, its liquidator, officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and people or entities acting together with them. It bars them, directly or indirectly and in the United States or abroad, from pursuing or participating in proceedings outside the required arbitration concerning claims on behalf of Google Russia against Google Ireland or its current or former affiliates and related personnel. It also bars proceedings in the Russian Federation concerning clawback, secondary-liability, or other claims relating to the agreements, including applications filed by Google Russia’s liquidator on October 18, 2024, and proceedings intended to restrain or impede Google Ireland’s federal action.
The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(i1), as rendered in the opinion, but deferred ruling on the amount. Google Ireland was ordered to file a fee motion and bill of costs within 14 days.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.