Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. v. JPF Inc
Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. a/s/o Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC, and Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC v. JPF Inc., JRO Global, Inc., and Easy Express
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:22-cv-03007
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 22
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.
In Starr Indemnity v. JPF Inc., Judge Provinzino denied summary judgment on a federal freight-liability claim but granted it on a negligence claim the plaintiff failed to defend.
Freight shippers, cargo insurers, and companies in the transportation industry who use intermediaries (brokers or sub-carriers) to move goods across state lines. The ruling clarifies that a company's self-identification as a 'broker' is not automatically dispositive under the Carmack Amendment, and that carriers cannot escape liability by following a downstream contract that conflicts with the bill of lading. It also serves as a reminder that plaintiffs who fail to defend a claim in their summary judgment briefing risk losing that claim before trial.
What happened
This case, Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. a/s/o Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC v. JPF Inc., JRO Global, Inc., and Easy Express, arises from a shipment of Jack Daniel's liquor worth roughly $288,000 that was picked up in Tennessee in July 2021, diverted to Illinois, and never delivered to the buyer in Minnesota — and is now presumed stolen. Breakthru Beverage (BTB) had hired JPF to handle transportation; JPF in turn hired JRO Global, who secretly subcontracted to Easy Express; Easy Express then delivered the liquor to an Illinois address per instructions from a third-party broker, ignoring the bill of lading's Minnesota delivery address. After BTB's insurer, Starr Indemnity, paid out part of the loss, it sued all three companies under the Carmack Amendment — a federal law that makes freight carriers strictly responsible for lost or damaged goods in interstate shipments — and also sued JPF for negligence.
The central legal dispute on the Carmack Amendment claim is whether JPF acted as a 'carrier' (strictly liable for the lost goods) or merely as a 'broker' (which arranges transportation and is not covered by the Amendment). JPF argued it was always just a broker: it never owned trucks, never physically transported anything, was registered with federal authorities as a broker, and its contract with JRO explicitly called it a broker. The court found these facts were not conclusive. On the other side, hundreds of bills of lading — including for this very shipment — listed JPF as the 'carrier'; BTB never knew JRO or Easy Express were involved and contacted JPF directly when the load went missing; and JPF itself reached out to the shipper to investigate. These conflicting facts created a genuine dispute that only a jury can resolve. Easy Express, which admitted it was a carrier but argued it did nothing wrong because it followed its subcontractor's delivery instructions rather than the bill of lading, also failed to show it was entitled to judgment, because under the Carmack Amendment the bill of lading governs and cannot be overridden by a downstream contract.
Judge Provinzino granted JPF's motion for summary judgment only on the negligence claim, because Starr entirely failed to address or defend that claim in its written briefs — focusing solely on the Carmack Amendment. When the issue came up at oral argument, Starr said it had not meant to abandon the claim, but the court held that failing to oppose a basis for summary judgment waives the argument, and allowing the claim to proceed to trial without Starr ever having met its burden would be unfair to JPF. As a result: JPF's motion was granted in part (dismissing the negligence count) and denied in part (the Carmack Amendment claim against JPF will proceed to trial); and Easy Express's motion was denied in full (the Carmack Amendment claim against Easy Express will also proceed to trial). JRO Global, which never appeared in the case, already had a default judgment entered against it.
The detailed version
- Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. v. JPF Inc · No. 0:22-cv-03007
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Oct. 7, 2025
Background
Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC ("BTB") is a wholesale wine, spirit, and beer distributor. In mid-2021, BTB purchased liquor from Brown-Forman Beverages Worldwide, the owner of the Jack Daniel's distillery in Lynchburg, Tennessee. BTB designated JPF Inc. ("JPF") as its carrier on the purchase order, consistent with a long-standing relationship in which JPF had arranged transportation for BTB's products for decades — handling an estimated 150–250 loads per year between 2016 and 2021, without any written agreement between the parties.
When the shipment became available for pickup on July 21, 2021, JPF — which describes itself as a federally registered transportation broker — could not reach its usual trucking contact and posted the load to a broker bid board. JPF hired JRO Global, Inc. ("JRO") as the carrier, executing a carrier/broker agreement that identified JPF as broker and JRO as carrier, and that prohibited JRO from reassigning the load without JPF's written consent. Unbeknownst to JPF, JRO contracted with a third party, AB Broker Inc. ("AB"), which in turn hired Easy Express as the actual carrier. AB instructed Easy Express — in writing — that the shipment was a "blind shipment," to check in as "JRO Global," and to deliver to an address in Illinois rather than the bill of lading's stated destination of St. Paul, Minnesota.
Easy Express picked up the liquor on July 23, 2021, per the bill of lading signed by Brown-Forman. Easy Express delivered the load to Illinois, consistent with AB's instructions. The liquor never reached BTB and is presumed stolen. BTB submitted an insurance claim to its insurer, Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. ("Starr"), for $288,621.25; Starr paid BTB $188,621.25, reflecting a $100,000 deductible. Starr then filed this subrogation action — meaning Starr stepped into BTB's legal shoes to recover the loss — along with BTB as a co-plaintiff.
Claims and Procedural History
Starr filed suit on December 1, 2022, alleging: - Count I: All three defendants (JPF, JRO, and Easy Express) are liable as carriers under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, which imposes strict liability on motor carriers for actual loss or injury to goods in interstate shipments. - Count II: JPF is alternatively liable in negligence for hiring JRO.
JPF answered and filed a crossclaim against JRO for breach of contract and indemnification. JRO never appeared; the Clerk entered default judgment against JRO on April 28, 2023. On May 27, 2025, JPF and Easy Express each moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
JPF's Motion for Summary Judgment
Carmack Amendment: Carrier vs. Broker
The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability only on "motor carriers" — not on "brokers." A motor carrier is defined as "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). A broker is "a person, other than a motor carrier," that arranges transportation by motor carrier for compensation. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). The operative question is whether a party accepted legal responsibility for the shipment — not merely whether it physically transported the goods.
JPF argued it was definitively a broker because: (1) it is registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) as a broker; (2) it has never owned trucks or employed drivers; (3) its contract with JRO explicitly identified JPF as a broker; and (4) BTB's own post-incident communications referred to JPF as a "shipping broker."
The court rejected each argument as non-dispositive. Federal registration and self-labeling as a "broker" do not determine status as a matter of law; what matters is how a party represents itself and what responsibility it actually assumed for the specific transaction. The inability to physically transport goods also does not preclude carrier status, since courts uniformly hold that accepting legal responsibility — not physical transport — is the key. As for the post-incident emails calling JPF a broker, the court noted that pre-incident documents — including hundreds of bills of lading listing JPF as "carrier" — cut the other way, and weighing those competing descriptions is a jury function.
The court identified multiple facts supporting a reasonable finding that JPF acted as a carrier: - The bill of lading for this shipment listed JPF as the "carrier" and directed contact to JPF employees under the heading "carrier information." - In 263 bills of lading for other 2021 shipments, JPF was consistently listed as carrier in the same format, and JPF never objected. - BTB's representative testified he always considered JPF a carrier responsible for safe delivery, and that the relationship was governed by the bills of lading. - BTB had no knowledge of JRO's or Easy Express's involvement; JPF was BTB's sole point of contact. - When the shipment went missing, BTB called JPF — not JRO or Easy Express — and JPF itself contacted Brown-Forman to investigate. - The parties had a longstanding oral relationship with no written broker agreement.
Applying Essex Insurance Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2018), and Tryg Insurance v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 767 F. App'x 284 (3d Cir. 2019), the court held that these facts create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether JPF assumed legal responsibility for the shipment and therefore qualifies as a carrier. JPF's motion for summary judgment on the Carmack Amendment claim (Count I) is denied.
Negligence Claim: Waiver at Summary Judgment
JPF moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim, arguing federal law (the Carmack Amendment) preempts state-law negligence claims in this field, and alternatively that JPF did not act negligently in hiring JRO. In its response brief, Starr never addressed the negligence claim, made no argument against preemption, and presented no factual support for negligence. At the hearing, Starr acknowledged the omission but stated it had not intended to abandon the claim.
The court held that "failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument," citing Satcher v. University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff Board of Trustees, 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009). Allowing an undefended claim to proceed to trial would both undermine the purpose of summary judgment and prejudice JPF, which never had the opportunity to respond to Starr's arguments on that claim. JPF's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim (Count II) is granted.
Easy Express's Motion for Summary Judgment
Easy Express conceded that it is a carrier but argued it was not liable under the Carmack Amendment because it fulfilled its contractual obligations by delivering the shipment to the Illinois address specified by AB. The court rejected this argument.
Under the Carmack Amendment, the bill of lading is the governing contract for the shipment and binds all carriers in the chain. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 342 (1982). Any conflicting instructions from downstream contracts are void. CNA Insurance Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 747 F.3d 339, 355 (6th Cir. 2014). Because Easy Express delivered to an address other than the one specified in the bill of lading, it did not complete delivery as legally required. The Supreme Court held in Georgia, Florida, & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916), that "delivery" under the Carmack Amendment means delivery as required by the bill of lading.
Easy Express also argued that because JPF was the carrier, Easy Express was merely a middleman not subject to liability. The court rejected this as well: the Carmack Amendment expressly provides for liability of multiple carriers in a single shipment chain — including receiving, delivering, and intermediate carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Easy Express's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Disposition
- JPF's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 43) is granted in part and denied in part: denied as to the Carmack Amendment claim (Count I); granted as to the negligence claim (Count II).
- Easy Express's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 49) is denied.
- JRO Global, which never appeared, already has a default judgment entered against it.
The Carmack Amendment claims against JPF and Easy Express will proceed toward trial.
Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.